Snc's Failure Summary

Candidate Jordan delivered an in depth five paragraph order. SNC posted security ensuring that the safety of the fire team was not put at risk. SNC had a good initial plan and proceeded to move the fire team towards the objective. SNC moved the fire team through the woods with minimal opposition; SNC maintained communication and good dispersion. Upon receiving enemy fire SNC suppressed the enemy by assaulting the enemy. SNC pushed through the objective to ensure that all enemy were killed. However, SNC forgot about the weapons cache and commenced to conduct a hasty 180, followed by a consolidated 360, and then an ACE report. SNC, in his haste to complete the problem, completely forgot that the mission was not only to subdue the enemy

The third error that happened was lack of tactical coordination for close air support. This error occurred because the lack of air integration capability between ground and air forces. The CJTF did not even have some of the proper equipment to call in close air support. According to the article an actual kill box was not generated until four days into the battle. This error could have been avoided if the CJTF would have complete step 3 of the MDMP process. Under step 3 it discusses generating options. Generating options is a good Course of Action (COAs) can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks. Goal is to develop several possible COAs. (Battle Staff Page 2-13) The CTJF should have pushed for more air coordination with the corps-level Air Support Operations Center. By asking for more air

SNC gave a detailed brief that outlined a precise plan that was coherent and directed towards mission accomplishment. SNC contradicted a well thought out plan of action with a monotone voice and his use of filler words, such as, uh and um, coupled with a lack of passion. The lack of passion was seen in his sense of urgency as SNC spent 80% of his time briefing his 5 paragraph order that adversely affected his sense of urgency. SNC was able to secure the objective quickly, but loss situational awareness of his surroundings and enemy position that initially created confusion when engaged by the enemy. SNC was able to make clear and concise decisions in an appropriate amount of time that efficiently utilized his fellow candidates. This expedited

Candidate Davis delivered his 5 paragraph order covering most of the key points associated with the order. SNC’s orientation was confusing; SNC briefed that the current location was where the cache was located, then proceeded to state that the fire team needed to advance to the second set of grid points to complete the objective. This information is confusing and is proof that the fire team leader did not fully comprehend the order briefed to him. SNC stuttered consistently, displaying his uncertainty of the information that he was relaying. SNC improperly stated his TCM’s and informed his team they would utilize a column formation from the “assault to attack” and a column from the “attack to assault”. Upon reaching the objective, the fire

Candidate McKenzy demonstrated and understanding on how to conduct a five paragraph order but omitted key information throughout the entirety of the brief. SNC displayed he was somewhat confident with his brief by his calm demeanor using a conversational tone during his brief. SNC stated there is no need for security prior to conducting his brief. The scheme of maneuver was vague, and non-executable without further guidance. The tasking statement stated basic billet assignments as who was the ready, fire and the assist. Once the execution began, SNC was in control of his subordinates and effectively communicated adjustments to the initial plan. Upon the first friction point, SNC remained calm and was able to devise a new plan and maintained

Candidate Hays' attempt to brief the initial five paragraph order and take charge of his fire team did not work in his favor. There were times when SNC reiterated certain briefing points which displayed a lack of confidence rather than a sense of clarity. Other than the Mission, SNC failed to brief all the key points of the order. SNC seemed unclear on the mission and what needed to get done although, SNC did verbally address an initial plan of how to attempt negotiation of the obstacle, prior to the actual execution. SNC made the vital mistake of not briefing nor posting security. Upon execution of the problem, SNC's initial plan did not appear to be well thought out and unsafe as he attempted to have his fire team along with himself

SNC did not calculate the correct distance to the objective. SNC tasked fire team members to set up the terrain model, but failed to verify and correct the mistakes they had made. SNC made eye contact with his squad members during the brief. SNC had poor vocal control, stumbling over his words and using filler words such as “uh” and “um” throughout the brief. SNC also briefed information in the wrong order and repeated information that he had already mentioned. During the execution, SNC had excellent control over his squad, making decisions quickly, giving commands clearly, and moving his subordinates with a sense of urgency. After the squad neutralized the enemy, SNC had the casualties brought to the objective location. When SNC attempted

Candidate Sharp demonstrated a basic understanding of the five paragraph order, but did not clearly articulate his words, paused intermittently, and rushed through parts of his brief. SNC failed to develop an executable plan and did not brief any tasking statements to his team. SNC also ended the brief and then went back to finish it after he had already begun executing the mission. After a suggestion from another candidate, SNC delegated security to a team member. Another team member would continually ignore SNC while executing the obstacle. However, SNC lacked the command presence and communication skills to correct the candidate or recognize the need to replace him at a key location. SNC had difficulty leading multiple candidates and failed

He then told us, search every building in the area then secure it. That’s it, that’s what we were given. No problem, we’ve got this. We did as we were told, we searched and secured areas and continued to receive mission updates by SATCOM as they came in for us. Our 2 day mission (or so we thought) was now into our 5th day. We had a Black Hawk come and drop off some food and water for us on our 3rd day, so we were good there. On the 5th day we got into contact. I won’t go into a lot of details but my men still walk today while enemies do not. But now we’re running black on ammo as well. We we’re originally told we don’t believe you by higher…………that’s another story. Eventually we got them to come back out and drop us a speed ball and everyone was able to reload. This wouldn’t be the last time we were engaged during this

Candidate Kautz briefed a detailed orientation with confidence and clarity. His five paragraph order was complete and briefed thoroughly to his fire team. Candidate Kautz was not the first one on the platform and stood in the back attempting to control his fire team. This caused him to lose control of members and not fully understand the points of friction. Candidate Kautz failed to display a sense of urgency and make decisions quickly when asked by his fire team. Though he maintained confident, his decision making ability lacked. Once he identified his solution would not work, there was a pause of over two minutes in which he stopped to create another solution to the problem. His fire team appeared to respect SNC and he was clearly

Candidate Goff immediately addressed security before briefing his order. SNC briefed in a rushed manner using many “ums” and “uhs,” showing he lacked confidence in his plan. When briefing, he referred to the scenario as an obstacle instead of treating it as a tactical situation. His fast brief was difficult for his fire team to follow, evident by their confusion at the beginning of the mission even though the initial plan was well developed. SNC had to direct his fire team’s actions he had just briefed in order for them to execute. This candidate lost his tactical and situational awareness, evident by his loud instructions throughout the task and the fire team dragging their weapons through the sewer tunnel making the execution extremely loud.

Candidate Huff did not brief the admin/logistics and command/signal paragraphs of his order. The rest of his order was briefed with shaky confidence involving heavy use of "ums." SNC did not establish security during his brief or during execution. SNC demonstrated inefficient use of his time by spending nearly sixty seconds re-slinging the teams rifles in the beginning of execution. Due to a lack of an initial plan following the brief, the team had to begin execution whileconducting reconnaissance and orienting to the problem. Once oriented, SNC was hesitant in deciding how to engage the problem. Once a scheme of maneuver was developed, he was able to communicate his guidance to the team members and begin driving his team toward mission

This decision was based on an inaccurate understanding of his enemy’s position and strength. The Battle plan ran against his position of always having the best ground or terrain from which to fight.

There were two Marine Force Recon teams in Baltimore now, their original mission was for twenty-four hours and had been extended for seventy-two. The first team, led by SSG Roy, was to scout and verify that the Supreme General’s HQ was in fact at the location one captured General Zenrick’s stated, in addition, verify that the Supreme General was actually there. The second team, led by SSG Becker was to verify the primary location of the base where the largest concentration of Soldiers of the Army of Baltimore were located. They didn’t have as far to travel as the first team, about half the distance. However, if they really fucked-up the mission the six man team would have to deal with thousands of Soldiers on that base, it would be certain death

SNC did not set security before giving the brief. SNC had command presence, spoke clearly, and had good eye contact. He did brief the FT’s Mission as part of the Friendly Situation, and repeated the same information during the Mission paragraph. During the execution, SNC maintained a pace commensurate with the requirement for speed and used appropriate hand and arm signals. SNC did not have clear command of the FT members behind him while on the move because he never turned to look at them nor assess the security situation in the rear of the formation. When SNC heard the sounds of enemy activity he immediately had them alter direction. Upon contact, SNC gave the ADDRAC, and was a clear fighter/leader. He had his FT line up on him by