Socrates And Thrasymachus In Plato's Republic

ABSTRACT. This paper seeks to reject Socrates ' arguments against Thrasymachus ' account of the just and unjust in Plato 's Republic, and, in doing so, show that Thrasymachus ' account is in fact a coherent and plausible account of justice. I begin by describing the context of Socrates and Thrasymachus ' argument and what it would take for Socrates to overcome the Thrasymachian account. I then describe the Thrasymachian account and argue for its coherence. I attack the Socratic method of deconstructing Thrasymachus ' argument and show that Thrasymachus true argument remains unaddressed throughout the course of the their exploration and Republic as a whole. I conclude that Thrasymachus – although himself unaware – succeeds in proposing a plausible and defensible account of justice and that Socrates misleads both Thrasymachus and the reader to advance his own conception of justice.

Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote “One man’s justice is another’s injustice.” This statement quite adequately describes the relation between definitions of justice presented by Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic. Polemarchus initially asserts that justice is “to give to each what is owed” (Republic 331d), a definition he picked up from Simonides. Then, through the unrelenting questioning of Socrates, Polemarchus’ definition evolves into “doing good to friends and harm to enemies” (Republic 332d), but this definition proves insufficient to Socrates also. Eventually, the two agree “that it is never just to harm anyone” (Republic 335d). This definition is fundamental to the idea of a

The debate between Thrasymachus and Socrates begins when Thrasymachus gives his definition of justice in a very self-interested form. Thrasymachus believes that justice is only present to benefit the ruler, or the one in charge – and for that

The debate moves on as Thrasymachus tries to define justice. Thrasymachus makes two critical points in his argument. He first says that justice is the advantage of the stronger. Thus the rulers govern on their own behalf. However Socrates shows that in fact the rulers are at the mercy of their subjects and make decisions that can be good or bad for the people and it is the right of the people to follow these actions or not. He states that "no knowledge considers or prescribes for the advantage of the stronger, but for that of the weaker, which it rules." [342d]

To start with, Thrasymachus argues that it is profitable to act unjustly and harmful to act justly. When Thrasymachus first defines justice as nothing other than the advantage of the stronger, he refers to the ruler, which is the stronger, and the ruled (Plato, 338c). In this context, he believes that the ruling party in any type of regime – tyranny, democracy, or aristocracy – makes laws to its own advantage and defines the acts to its disadvantage as unjust (338d – 339a). For the subjects it is just to obey the laws and serve the ruler’s interest, so if there is a conflict between the interests of the ruler and the subjects, the ruler seeks what benefits itself through laws

The position Thrasymachus takes on the definition of justice, as well as its importance in society, is one far differing from the opinions of the other interlocutors in the first book of Plato’s Republic. Embracing his role as a Sophist in Athenian society, Thrasymachus sets out to aggressively dispute Socrates’ opinion that justice is a beneficial and valuable aspect of life and the ideal society. Throughout the course of the dialogue, Thrasymachus formulates three major assertions regarding justice. These claims include his opinion that “justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger,” “it is just to obey the rulers,” and “justice is really the good of another […] and harmful to the one who obeys and serves.” Socrates

First, throughout Book I, Plato seems to portray Thrasymachus as a vigorous character who wants to overcome and achieve rhetorical victory over Socrates. As Plato illustrates, “Even in the middle of our conversation Thrasymachus had repeatedly tried to take control of the discussion” (Plato, 336b) and as soon as Socrates ends his discussion in finding the true definition of justice with Polemarchus, “he gathered himself and sprang at us, like a wild beast at its prey” and enters into the discussion (Rep. 336b). However, unlike his zeal to achieve victory over Socrates, Thrasymachus is continuously rebutted by Socrates which views Thrasymachus’ arguments inconsistent and self-contradictory for his definition of justice. Initiating his discussion with Socrates, Thrasymachus brings up his account of justice. Thrasymachus insists, “I say that justice is simply what is good for the stronger” (Rep. 338c). Also, later on in his discussion with Socrates, he provides another claim for his view of justice, that “justice and the

Plato creates a seemingly invincible philosopher in The Republic. Socrates is able to refute all arguments presented before him with ease. The discussion on justice in Book I of The Republic is one such example. Socrates successfully refutes each different view of justice presented by Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. Socrates has not given us a definitive definition of justice, nor has he refuted all views of justice, but as far as we are concerned in Book I, he is able to break down the arguments of his companions.

Before analysing the strengths and weaknesses of Thrasymachus’s argument we must look at a key fault in his definition, which is he doesn’t give one. Instead of defining justice he ends up describing it. Thrasymachus says that justice is in “the advantage of the established ruling body” but does not define what justice is. The conversation

In the following paper I am going to defend my personal position on whether or not justice is objective. I am going to explain the argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus and define the terms used. Next I will give supporting evidence to support my position. I agree with Socrates, which is that justice is an objective truth.

Socrates’ three opponents in The Republic come in the form of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. Cephalus provides his opinion first, which is that justice is defined by, “truthfulness and returning anything we have borrowed (The Republic, 331C).” Socrates quickly counters, and says that Cephalus’ interpretation of justice cannot be right, because, “if one borrowed a weapon from a friend who subsequently went out of his mind

In sections (352d-354b) of the book, “The Republic of Plato” by Allan Bloom, Socrates begins by arguing with Thrasymachus that the just life is the happiest and best (352e). He provides rhetorical appeal of logos and compelling arguments that all living things have a function. Socrates establishes a well-rounded statement to counter argue against Thrasymachus by including multiple statements on how the just life has virtue, while as unjust brings the opposite of happiness. He pieces together to puzzle that blocks Thrasymachus from understanding the correct rationality for the attributes that we possess.

On examining Thrasymachus' idea that it pays to be perfectly unjust, Socrates refutes this argument in Book 4 as he speaks of the souls three parts; wisdom, spirit, and desire. The civil war between these three parts is shown to be the cause of injustice, but before Socrates can correlate this with the regimes of certain

In the discussion of what is and is not just, Socrates first forms the opinion that justice is something

     First of all, a careful examination of Socrates’ arguments against Thrasymachus is needed to determine to what extent he refuted Thrasymachus’ viewpoint. One of Socrates’ stronger points is that “the just man is good and wise after all, and the unjust man is bad and ignorant” (350 c). He convinces Thrasymachus into believing this by asking whether a man of knowledge would follow the standard behavior of other men of knowledge. Thrasymachus grants this to be true, and by using the fact that an unjust man tries to take advantage of all men, Socrates shows that the unjust man is actually