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Solicitors General Influence Supreme Court Justices

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Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzma’s article answers the question to whether Solicitors General (S.G.) influence Supreme Court justices to behave differently than they would like. The article argues that unlike some studies that assert that S.G.’s influence the justices decisions, the reality is somewhat contradictory. They claim that Justices are more sympathetic to motions from the S.G. when both the justice and S.G. are “ideologically proximate” or when the Solicitors General’s motion is conflicting to his own ideological tendency. According to them, “justices will find a solicitor general’s information more credible when the solicitor general and the justice are ideologically congruent or when the signal from the S.G. is ideologically counter to his typical policy views”. (p 72) That means justices are sympathetic to the SG’s signals under two circumstances: when their ideology is close to the S.G.’s ideology or when the S.G. files a motion that opposes his own ideological tendency. …show more content…

By using the signaling theory to defend their position, it makes impossible to interpret their thinking as valid. In fact, the signaling theory suggests that organisms with contradictory interests should be expected to communicate honestly. That means justices sympathize with the S.G. when he files a motion that opposes his own ideological predisposition because they believe the SG could only vote against his own ideology if he/she is sincere. Also, the authors’ approach focuses on success of the S.G. rather than the influence. Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzma’s logic is that the S.G. wins cases depending on merits; not based on its influence which I can say is partially

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