Stasis at Corcyra Essay

The Peloponnesian War pitted the Athenians against the Spartans. The Peloponnesians’ were an alliance of city-states controlled by Sparta. These two powerful city-states became locked in a struggle for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean area. The roots of the conflict and in particular this expedition is highly complex. As Thucydides says in his history of the war, the underlying cause was Spartan fear of Athens' expansive power. But, the triggering event was Athens' aggressive behavior towards Corinth, an ally of Sparta.

Thucydides recounts the events that took place during the civil war in Corcyra. In the year 427 tensions between the Democrats and Oligarchs exploded into civil war, both sides hailing allies from all over the world for aid. At first the Oligarchs received aid from large a Peloponnesian naval fleet, which gave the democrats a scare. However, the Democrats receive back up from an ever-larger Athenian fleet, sending the Democrats into a killing frenzy of all who supported the Oligarchy. Thucydides describes the situation during the civil war

The Peloponnesian war lasted from 431 to 404 B.C. and was profoundly influenced by two Athenian men, Pericles and Alcibiades. Though Pericles and Alcibiades were related by blood they were quite different. Pericles was a diplomat, he approached matters with a level head and tried to find a solution that did not end in bloodshed. Alcibiades was less stable, he either fought, manipulated, or ran when confronted with a problem. Both men spoke eloquently enough to move almost the entire city of Athens, using their words to bend people to their will.  What was different between them was what their will was, one cared about the city and its wellbeing, the other cared about his own wellbeing.

Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.

"Just before the Peloponnesian War began, Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta provided net assessments of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. Evaluate their projections."

The Greek forces won the Trojan War. The story of the war is a cornerstone of Greek legend, and pervaded Greek literature and culture. Though the evidence for the Trojan War as historical fact is scarce, it was a formative event in Greek cultural memory, producing some of the classical world’s most famous heroes and narratives. The War was won, Helen was retrieved from Paris, whose violation of ξενία was redressed, the heroes attained the κλέος that many of them fought for – and yet the positive outcomes of the Trojan War are difficult to grasp. For the victims of the Trojan War, the tragedy is obvious; the War ended in genocide and total cultural destruction. But such a war, burnt into legend, should have left the victors far better off; and yet, the Greek heroes only suffer because of it. They die tragic, dishonourable deaths; their households are left in ruin; their families are torn apart. From both modern and classical perspectives, the Trojan War is a tragedy, a “harrowing destruction of life” (Euripides, Andromache, 291). The victory is pyrrhic, the loss of life is horrific, the reparations non-existent.

A reading of Thucydides’, Pericles’ Funeral Oration and The Melian Dialogue uncovers both contrasting and comparable viewpoints on Athenian politics, power, aims of war, and empire. Thucydides presents two differing characteristics of Athens, one as the civilizer in Pericles’ funeral oration and the other as an tyrant in the Melian dialogue. In the funeral oration delivered by Pericles during the first year of the war, the Athenian leader emphasizes the idealized personal image of the Athenians in regard to their constitution and good character. Pericles goes on to praise the Athenian democratic institution of Athens that contributes to their cities greatness; in Pericles’s own words, “The Athenian administration favors the many instead of few… they afford equal justice to all of their differences” (112, 2.37). This quote emphasizes the good character of the Athens’ to coax and encourage the Athenians to preserve and better their great empire into the future. On the other hand, in the Melian dialogue, this notion of justice and equality is irrelevant; one, because Athens compared to Melos, is the stronger of the two and thus, is more powerful. Further, Athens, will continue to acquire absolute power and build its empire by conquering Melos and whomever else stands in its way. Through Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue, the following conclusions/themes will demonstrate both the changing and somewhat stable nature of Athenian policy with regards to empire,

In the Aftermath of the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta, Pericles, Athens’ general and statesmen, delivered a powerfully comforting eulogy to the polis of Athens, assuring the people that their city state is in good hands, and easing the pain of all the families and relatives of the deceased. He uses several rhetorical devices throughout his speech to gain a positive emotional appeal by his audience and makes assertions in the attempt to enhance and transform the perception of him by the audience.

In 431 B.C., even before the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength compared to other Greek polises was evident. Athens had islands, a powerful, a well-trained navy, and one, if not the best, general at the time: Pericles. Pericles says in his speech that, “war is inevitable,” but in fact the war was preventable (72). Even with all of the military strengths and assets that Athenians had afforded to them, they chose to be merciful to the Peloponnesians who were in no shape to go to war. They did not have the experience, money, manpower, or means to participate in a lengthy war and Pericles makes the citizens aware of this (70). Pericles is both modest and humble for choosing to point out these facts which in turn helps the Athenians see the potential

Undeniably, the ancient Greek society places a heavy emphasis on values and traditions. The two texts of the “Clouds” by Aristophanes and “History of the Peloponnesian war” by Thucydides, although contextually divergent, are actually conceptually convergent. Both texts are built around the central theme of the collapse of conventional values. While the breakdown of traditional values in the “History of the Peloponnesian war” is presented in a more metaphorical and symbolical manner, the downfall of conventional values in the “Clouds” is on a more direct basis. Although both texts essentially convey across the same solemn message that the relinquishment of

The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.

The Civil War, consisting in large part of Caesar’s own account of the conflict between himself and Pompey, explores the origins of the war, the manner in which it was carried out, and most importantly the role of pivotal figures on both sides of the struggle. Prior to his records ending and supplementation by military officers, Caesar makes a case for his involvement in and perhaps triggering of the war, one which would transform the social and political landscape of the Roman empire as battles and campaigns were waged from Spain to Italy, Africa to Asia Minor. Caesar walks a fine line between historian, strategist and orator as he attempts to record historical events, martial decisions, and persuade an audience respectively. Despite his efforts to remain impartial, as evidenced by his admission that “the Pompeians were winning” at Dyrrachium, Caesar consistently presents himself as a charismatic and skilled general and leader, jeopardizing the integrity of the text as objective material and allowing it to be a propagandist account of sorts. Ultimately, Caesar uses anecdotal evidence, the presentation of his personal thoughts, and juxtaposition with his opposition to paint his side of the war in a positive and just light.

Compare and contrast Thucydides’ and Socrates’ analyses of the fate of Athenian democracy in war, of why the Athenians went to war, and of how and why they failed.

“But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians” (Thucydides 270). The Melians should have acted sensibly instead of being naïve and submit to the imperial power seeing that the odds were against them. The Athenians give them a choice, but they decided to act irrational and respond emotively. “They underestimated Athens’ military power, judging the issue by the clouded eye of volition rather than calculations based on security and followed the human tendency to back their desires with uncritical hope and use of sovereign reason only to reject what they find unpalatable” (Bosworth 36).

Unabashedly, tragedy is brimming with violence and death, “it reeks of blood and is strewn with corpses” (Henrichs 173). If it is not the precipice of the action, the plot of tragedy often revolves around the build-up to or the after-effects of violence; what to do with the body, how to reintegrate after the fact, and even what to do when violence is taken too far, such as in the Ajax. As a pervasive force in classical antiquity, the audience of the City Dionysia would be all too familiar with the many faces of violence throughout the cusping three decades of the Peloponnesian war leading up to 405 BC. Although it is flawed to attempt to condense tragedy into a single function, it is perhaps less so to name one as a digestion of the everyday violence of the ancient world. In Euripides’ Bacchae, the motif of violence is first presented by means of an enraptured herdsman speech that revels in the spectacle of violent delights and foreshadows what is to come. This motif comes to a close when a second messenger reveals the tragic reality of violence and Pentheus’ sparagmos while the chorus of bacchants revels in their god’s brutality. Through examining the chorus’ status and perspective on violence, the staging behind Agave wielding Pentheus’ head, and the contemporaneous socio-political climate in Athens, the Bacchae can be examined as in dialogue with tragedy’s tradition of violence.