Statecrafts

For this paper, I am going to define strategy using Joint Pub 3.0’s definition: A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multi-national objectives. Using this definition of strategy, I’ll argue that Nightingale makes a valid claim when he states that the US is weak in formulating strategy by highlighting several aspects of strategic development where the US needs improvement. Nonetheless, let the record show that America’s success rate in conflicts in the last century is mixed, laying claim that the US may not be great at strategy development, however, it has done well enough to defeat some pretty ruthless villains ie., Hitler, Saddam, Milosevic, and Bin

The transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) environment we face today requires strategic direction and guidance from the President (POTUS), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to allow the Combatant Commander (CCDR) of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to employ his Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) across the conflict continuum. In the following paragraphs, the above statement will be supported by the USEUCOM CCDR’s operational approach of developing broad strategic and operational concepts into specific mission tasks to show his TCP is linked to and supports U.S. national interests. To do so, examples of U.S. strategic guidance documents incorporated within the linkage will be presented. Lastly, a current engagement activity that is linked to a U.S. national interest in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (GAAT) will be discussed to express the range of military operations USEUCOM faces.

American presidents have spent decades attempting to explain how a particular grand strategy benefits US foreign policy. The Obama Doctrine departs from past doctrines, representing a hybrid approach, combining two approaches to foreign policy. Although it lacks consistency, the flexibility of the Obama Doctrine defies the constraints of grand strategies to discover solutions to problems in international relations.

5. Military problem: The continuous change in today’s battlefield increases the difficulty of anticipating our enemy’s threats. For example, the increase for Cyber Warfare Defenders and Cyber Operations Officers have increased in the Army due to the evolution of our enemy’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Since the Army is struggling to combat the wide range of threats, we must focus on optimizing our most agile resources.

A major focal point in the US Army’s education of field grade officers is the ability to understand the phenomenon of war, its relationship to society, and its ever-changing character. While the notion of strategic culture fails to be deterministic, there is no doubt that it plays an important role in both why and how a society wages war. For the strategist, the notion of strategic culture provides a critical input to the planning process by shedding light on the intent and future decisions of both state and individual actors; the value of an object and effort to expend in its pursuit; and the overall organization and employment of military force. The discussion begins by providing the theoretical foundations that led to the notion of strategic culture before turning to its practical use, and limitations.

During the Cold War the United States had a clear framework that helped guide their foreign policy. Then the idea was to maintain a balance of power between America and the Soviets, and during those days’ by “power” they meant military. Following the fall of the Soviets America emerged as the global hegemon with the largest conventional military in the world. But today with the evolution of technology much has changed. Obama has argued that “This century’s threats are at least as dangerous in some ways more complex than those we have confronted in the past” (Datta, 2015) This is a time for the United States to choose a course to replace the incoherent path we have been on over the last 25 years (Bremmer, 2015). We have the resources, this is a time to renew U.S. leadership in the world and make America great again. In order to accomplish this, the United States needs to create a universal doctrine and focus their foreign policy on working to improve conditions in the Middle East in order to decrease/terminate terrorism worldwide and stop the murder of innocents. Make strides with Russia one of the only other countries with nuclear weapons in order to stabilize and stop nuclear development in Iran and North Korea. Also the U.S. should make an effort to collaborate with China who is emerging as a world power and could soon surpass the U.S. together both countries could do great in the world, all this without neglecting domestic issues and working towards recreation of the

Political leaders and civilian advisors usually rely on senior military leaders’ advice and inputs when it comes to use of force. One of many best examples can be General Colin Powell’s well calculated and timely request of sending an extra corps to the Gulf, which eventually helped President Bush and the United States as a whole to achieve national strategic objectives in the first Gulf War . His recommendation to use overwhelming force with definite and attainable objective, and clear exit strategy in that circumstance proved to be the most influencing factor to enable the U.S. led coalition’s swift success . Take away from his brilliant advice to political leaders is that senior military leaders must possess extensive knowledge on military strategy and requirements to succeed as well as they should be courageous enough to express their needs. With that, I really want to improve my knowledge on strategy, strategic level decision making, and factors to shape those decisions while I am here. This will definitely help me to give sound and conversant advice to my national political leaders when time requires to do so in the

The purpose of this Foundation of Strategy paper is to defend this author’s opinion as to “What have been or are currently the three greatest challenges for the United States in translating its military power into desired political outcomes or end states?” (Air War College) Additionally, the paper will “evaluate the three challenges in the context of two different conflicts.” (Air War College) In today’s ever dynamic and changing strategic landscape, there are plenty of challenges facing the United States. As one can imagine, the palate is full given the many facets and combinations in which senior leaders make decisions as to how best to reach a desired end goal and/or political outcome.

As the case studies of the Civil War, WWII, Containment, and the Gulf War demonstrate strategies conceived with clear objectives, with political and popular will, multi-laterally, with the intangible elements of strategy in mind and proper whole of government resourcing, outcomes are successful. In contrast, those strategies undertaken without the elements above and devoid of understanding the culture, geographic, and ideological factors may win tactically but will probably fail strategically. Howard sums best with, “it was the inadequacy of the sociopolitical analysis of the societies with which we were dealing that lay at the root of the failure of the Western powers to cope more effectively with the revolutionary and insurgency movements that characterized the postwar era, from China in the 1940s to Vietnam in the 1960s” and I submit this same weakness cripples the US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan

Many elements define and theorize modern strategy; several best demonstrate the foundations that reveal the limits of predictability in war. The main elements of strategy that demonstrate the limits of predictability in war are the will of the people, power and culture. Throughout history, many civilian and military leaders studied doctrine and theory concerning warfare with Clausewitz being the most read and quoted of that academic group. Although history has shown that modern warfare is violent and volatile, however, the desire for a more comprehensive study and predictability in war is understandable. Although, during Clausewitz’s time war was very predictable and his life shaped by expectable results. His theory and thinking have guided man into conflict and exposed war a violent ever-changing event that may provide some framework for determining the outcome of war. In discussing the limits of predictability during war and the desire for the aforementioned, it would difficult to discuss without Clausewitz; however, several other theorist and political leaders provide sage advice and will lend to this discussion.

The 2010 strategy also places emphasis on tending to the sources of our strength, promoting our values by living them at home, reducing reliance on military to solve our problems, narrowing the definition of enemy, "recognize[ing] the world as it is and focus[ing] on shaping it, not resisting it”, embedding war on Al Qaeda in a wider strategic vision, and incorporating issues such as climate change. Additionally, the 2010 NSS focuses more on energy than engagement or military, and development and climate change more than

The “Bush Doctrine” was outlined in a speech by President George W. Bush in 2002. The US “would no longer rely solely on ‘Cold-War doctrines of containment and deterrence.’”9 The US would adopt preemption as its foreign policy, meaning they “reserve the right to preempt threats” and act accordingly.10 Furthermore, President Bush stated that the US would promote US principles and ideologies to countries around the world.11 g74 Lastly, President Bush stated that the US “would do what was necessary to remain the world’s sole superpower.”12 Kaplan and Kristol neatly summarize the Bush Doctrine as an “affirmative vision of American leadership, one that is neither reactive to nor dependent on the emergence of a specific threat.”13

History and culture are important key factors that help contribute, to the upbringing of strategic culture in today’s contemporary world. The significance of strategic culture, has allowed for our modern society to identify key factors such as, our country political structure, culture variables and most importantly our country national character. Strategic culture was developed subsequent to the Cold War this ideation helped the U.S to create strategies, thus influencing security policies. The subject of strategic culture is pertinent to the U.S engagement of international relation with our countries that are not democratic like, China, North Korea and Russia. Culture, specifically, has condition member to their respective society to think a certain way, thus giving them pre-condition responses to given situation. For example, the United State, experience a serve shock during the event of 9/11, this incident made the American people to become more willingly acceptable to engage in war, and as a result the patriot act doctrine quickly went in to effect. Ultimately, the U.S has become ethnocentric, substantially making strategic culture to western-centric making the U.S unable to understand other nations cultures. There are serval different factors that can shape a countries strategic culture, either through geography, history, technology and a countries political structure and defence organization are all different influences of strategic culture.

The Iranian Nuclear Test Crisis has recently created multiple security issues which need to be properly addressed. As part of the NSC staff, I recommend a strategy in response to this Iranian Nuclear Test Crisis that is consistent with both US policy and the state of international affairs. This strategy will integrate the use of Instruments of Power (IOPs) as well as explain which international relations (IR) perspectives influenced my decision on choosing these specific IOPs. When building a strategy for any situation, there are many things address and one should look into all Instruments of Power which are: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic.

Patrick Porter’s article, “Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S. Concert Balance Strategy” discusses the advantages of the U.S. abandoning its current Pax Americana strategy in favor of a Concert-Balance strategy. Porter recommends conceding “strategic space and spheres of influence to other states,” thereby reducing the U.S.’s ongoing financial hardships that are experienced under the current strategy that has ground and naval forces stationed throughout the globe. Porter quotes Admiral Mike Mullen, the former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to further his argument that mounting debt is the largest threat to national security. Porter believes that the adoption of a Concert-Balance strategy would enable the U.S. to maintain its economic