Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is the legal process whereby a judge applies a statute to a case and must give meaning to the words in the statute in order to decide what they mean and how it should be applied to a particular case. When interpreting statutes, the judges’ role is to put into effect the Parliaments wishes. Conflicts may arise when deciding if the intention of Parliament can be found in the words of the statute itself or whether judges should acquire into the purpose of the Act then interpret the words themselves. In order to interpret these

There are ways for the courts to prevent things such as trivial matters in courts through proper interpretation. There are two ways courts can interpret matters, there is the textual and contextual approach. In this situation, the approach would be more contextual as it would focus on the use of reason to interpret the law beyond what is in the statute and more based on societal factors.8 Societal factors refer to a person’s economic, financial, educational, or a person’s background. Some people in society have a low standing in all these factors, which would put them at a disadvantage and most laws reflect those needs.

The courts, too, will be called upon to specify legislative details, meaning, and reach of legislation. Many scholars in the legal realism camp

Based on information currently available, the EPA believes the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 2) meets the NCP threshold criteria and provides the best balance of tradeoffs among the other alternatives with respect to the balancing and modifying criteria. EPA expects the Preferred Alternative to satisfy the following statutory requirements of CERCLA §121 (b): (1) be protective of human health and the environment; (2) comply with ARARs; (3) be cost-effective; and (4) utilize permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies or resource recovery technologies to the maximum extent practicable. Though Alternative 2 does not meet the statutory preference for treatment, this Proposed Plan explains why that preference

In the words of Elmer Driedger (as cited in Boyd, 2015), “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context in their grammatical sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament” (p. 65). This approach advocates analysis which balances the literal language used with the context of the statute and its intended purpose. This paper will assess the strength Driedger's approach in relation to the cases R. v. Boudreault, Paldi Khalsa Diwan Society v. Cowichan Valley (Regional District), and R. v. Skakun. It will be argued that Driedger's approach is advantageous to the courts in general, but insofar as it is combined with the principle of stare decisis, it is beneficial only when the judgments in precedent-setting cases accord with fundamental justice.

Why is it necessary to consider other sources of legal interpretation in addition to the applicable statutory language?

Statutory interpretation is required where complication and ambiguity arises as to what the section actually provides and to whom is within the provisions. There are numerous occurrences where judges call for statues to be interpreted further in more depth; such as failure of legislation to cover a point, a broad term, drafting

Interpretive regulations are rules issued by an agency to help clarify existing regulations and laws. Interpretive regulations do not create a new law or change a regulation it just help understand the point of that statute better. They exist to help clarify or explain a statute or regulation. Interpretive rules are simply a way of how agency understands the statute and their duties. Interpretive law cannot be used in a legal procedure its only there to remind agencies of their

1. When interpreting legislation, the Courts use several approaches to aid their interpretation. Describe how the literal, golden and mischief rules of interpretation operate.

‘The natural and reasonable desire that statutes should be easily understood is doomed to disappointment. Thwarted, it shifts to an equally natural and reasonable desire for efficient tools of interpretation. If statutes must be obscure, let us at least have simple devices to elucidate them. A golden rule would be best, to unlock all mysteries. Alas there is no golden rule. Nor is there a mischief rule, or a literal rule, or any other cure-all rule of thumb. Instead there are a thousand and one interpretative criteria. Fortunately, not all of these present themselves in any one case; but those that do yield factors that the interpreter must figuratively weigh and balance.’ – Lord Bingham

For example, the word ‘inflict’ has been interpreted in numerous ways in various cases over time. In R v Clarence , ’inflict’ requires evidence of an assault or battery; yet R v Wilson claims that ‘direct application of force’ is all that is necessary. R v Martin states that the ‘force was indirectly applied’ but in R v Ireland ‘inflict’ is defined as ‘cause’. The redefining and multiple interpretations make it hard to understand the true definitions and leads to a lack of clear

The Judicature, is authorised to interpret the law, therefore it contributed indirectly to the ultimate decision in the case by using the statutory laws and precedent cases such as Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001]

Can a corrective approach to Scrivener’s Error find conceptual room in a formal textualist theory of statutory interpretation?

Primary rules have an internal aspect to them, in which individuals have a relationship to the rules and regard them as grounds to criticize those who violate them, making primary rules duty-imposing (MacAlister, 2017). Secondary rules on the other hand, are seen as supplementary to the primary rules, which, instead of imposing duty upon individuals, they confer powers to them (MacAlister, 2017). Secondary rules are split into three different types: Rules of change (allow public/private powers to fix old rules), adjudication (remedy for inefficiency, introduces courts and law enforcement), and recognition (confers powers on people to identify law, and unification of rules) (MacAlister, 2017). Another important concept within Hart’s theory of law is that he thinks judges have to their discretion. Hart proposes the idea of open texture in law, which states that at times, the law does not cover every situation that arises and that law may run out (MacAlister, 2017). Within this open texture, the is a clear core of certainty, where application of the law is apparent, and beyond the core, is the penumbra, the uncertainty and indeterminacy in law in which hard cases are based upon. As law branches out of this core of rules, it becomes more and more indeterminate. Due to this indeterminacy, Hart believes that since there is no clear answer written in the law, judges should have the discretion in dealing with hard cases. In the case of Riggs, since the relevant rules of

With the increasing number of international bodies, institutions and accords, the need for legal discourse with its molds and fixed-like characteristics grows, especially in drafting international documents. Legal translation is considerably distinct from other fields. Drawing on Harvey, Cao (2007) maintains that legal translators, particularly those engaged in translating international instruments, are required to possess certain prerequisites that enable them to combine the free literary style with the very meticulous approach of technical translation, while putting into consideration the archetypes and limitations imposed over methodologies of translation due to the restricting nature of law. (p. 3) These features, accordingly, have to be met with an appropriate equivalent that preserves the core of law while translating into another language concerning lexical items and complex grammatical structures.