Stephens Vs Giovenco Case Study

The case was brought forward to the NSW Supreme Court in 2001 whereby Judge Hulme ordered both Respondents as negligent. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal whereby the judgement was granted in favour of the Respondents. This case affirms the previous decision.

By having knowledge of the chromium in the water supply, PG&E should have been required to let the people know that were affected by it. By not telling the citizens, they were withholding information that affected these people’s lives. Because a risk was created, consequences came, and nothing was done to prevent such injuries that did occur, PG&E should have been considered negligent.

There are two defences to an action in negligence: contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. (FoBL, 2005, p83) This case only involves contributory negligence.

“A factor, by itself, may not be sufficient to cause injury but if, with other factors, it materially contributes to causing injury, it is clearly a cause of injury.”. This quote, stated by Lord Salmon in McGhee v National Coal Board is an example of the difficulty that can arise when determining if a defendant had materially contributed to the plaintiff 's injury when the medical evidence is inconclusive. It is argued that the material contribution test has changed the path of the law and as we will see when analysing both McGhee and Fairchild, it has blurred the distinction between legal and factual causation.

Benge, R v (1865) pre-SCJA 1873 D, a foreman platelayer misread the timetable as to when a train was to arrive. He placed a flagman at the wrong distance giving insufficient warning to the driver. A train left the rails at a spot where rails had been taken up and not replaced. The negligence was that D did not take the correct care to make sure he was working at the right time, when any reasonable person would have known how dangerous the job can be and to double check they are correct.

Explanation of deadly accident, Mr. Burch the plaintiff’s husband on 13th November 1998, he was on that way to cross the floodway as it was regular banking day for him. But Mr Burch died while he tried to cross the floodway in his car which slide off while he attempt trying to cross the culvert.

I believe that the hospital should take the blame for the damages and suffering that Kelly Niles endured. This decision reflects the quality of care that Niles received while he was at the hospital and also correlates to his physical status. The neurosurgeons stated that his status would have been better if they got to him sooner and were able to treat him in time, but due to the negligence throughout his whole treatment he is left with the ability to only move his eyes and neck. The fact that there was doubt that Kelly would survive the next few days after his surgery supports my decision that what the court ruled was reasonable and appropriate. Kelly “remained in a coma for 46 days before gradually regaining consciousness.” Kelly is totally disabled and his condition can’t ever be improved with medical attention or surgical treatments which furthers my final decision (“Niles v. City of San Rafael,”

Below is the memorandum for the negligence action regarding our client, Mr. Ragnarr Loobrok. To succeed in a claim of negligence, it must be proven that, on the balance of probabilities, that a duty of care was owed by the State of Victoria to prevent him from getting arrested once his bail conditions had been formally changed.

The legal reasoning by Mason C.J., Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Wilson v R is an updated decision based on a development of the mens rea and actus reus elements of involuntary manslaughter of an unlawful act. It approved the Holzer test used of a previous Australian case and disproved the England (UK) test that has previously been used by Newbury. The test between these two authorities reflects the importance of what degree of danger is required to exist. Under common law, there are two categories of involuntary manslaughter, manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, and manslaughter by criminal negligence. However, it was decided that criminal negligence did not apply to this case and therefore the prosecution must prove manslaughter

The Court’s conclusion and interpretation was correct in regards to this case. This was due to Morris J’s thorough research into the legislative history and legislative intentions of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic).

The appellant’s second submission concerned the way the judge in the first instance referenced sudden and temporary loss of self-control to the jury in the direction. The appellant submitted that this direction was incorrect. He also proposed that the learned Judge’s direction regarding the appellant’s characteristics in an attempt to use the model set by Lord Diplock in DPP v Camplin. The counsel for the appellant criticized the learned judges direction on two grounds: Firstly, that the Judge did not mention that the appellant was suffering from a condition known as the battered woman’s syndrome which so affected her personality that it put her in a state of learnt helplessness. Secondly, that the list of characteristics should have been left open so that the jury may pick up on the fact that she suffered from a

In another light, if Harry Hillman saw John Craftsmen “goofing around” with his co-workers prior to the incident, Hillman should be asked: (1) How long before injury did Hillman witness Craftsmen’s behavior? (2) Did Hillman mention Craftsmen’s behavior because he feels it reflects Craftsmen’s workmanship or ethic? If so, why didn’t Hillman address Craftsmen behavior before allowing him to proceed with any heavy machinery? This criteria needs to be checked considering Hillman is expected to have a significant amount of oversight on machinery and should be adhering to the strict liability precautions of Truss Construction Shop.

‘R v Stone; R v Dobinson’ is significant as it addresses the point of ‘duty of care’ and the outcome was described as “highly controversial because of the low capabilities of the two accused” . Appellant Gwendoline Dobinson was treated differently to appellant John Edward Stone due to her gender. Dobinson was expected to care for Fanny due to women being the “primary care-givers in domestic relationships” , proving that “the rule on voluntary undertaking of responsibility potentially remains structurally gendered” . The case was dealt within the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal by Geoffrey lane LJ, Neild and Croom-Johnson JJ. The appeals against conviction were dismissed although the appeal by Stone against his sentence was allowed, altering his sentence. The decision was also influenced namely “whether in a case of manslaughter it is necessary to prove that the defendant was reckless as to whether the victim would suffer death of serious bodily harm” .

Torts of negligence are breaches of duty that results to injury to another person to whom the duty breached is owed. Like all other torts, the requirements for this are duty, breach of duty by the defendant, causation and injury(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). However, this form of tort differs from intentional tort as regards the manner the duty is breached. In torts of negligence, duties are breached by negligence and not by intent. Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). The standard measure of negligence is the universal reasonable person standard. The assumption in this case is that a reasonable

In order for the Willie to prove that the Flipper was liable for the damage caused, it must be established that a duty of care existed between the two parties, that there was a breach of such duty, that breach was the cause of the damage sustained and finally the damage was not too remote a consequence of the breach. To determine whether a duty of care existed the Willie must use the three stage test developed in the case Caparo v Dickman. The first stage is whether there was reasonable foreseeability of damage; this requirement is satisfied because it is obvious that the master of the Flipper’s acts in not obeying the