Strategic Direction And Global Security Environment

In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.

As rivals such as China catch up or steal our weapons technology, America must advance even further in order to remain at the top. With warfare being redefined concluding the war in Afghanistan it is evident that America must improve its ground warfare technology in order to better combat the guerrillas found in the war on terror. Further developing weapons such as the airburst grenade launching system, the XM25, would help minimize American casualties and would create another advantage over the enemy. Other weapons such as the LRAD laser system or the THAAD could stop threats miles before the American coastline, as well as create threats to enemy vessels. New aircraft carriers could launch stealth planes or drones behind enemy lines, completely silently in the dark of night. The advantages to further research and development are endless in number. The main contributor to America’s current status as world's strongest military, our technology gives us an advantage and should Trump want to pursue a more robust military, an upgrade in weapons technology should be at the top of the list.

The threat environment has expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetrical threat from bombers, ICBMs, and air-or-sea-launched cruise missiles, to a continuing symmetrical threat in addition to an emergent asymmetric threat, focused across all domains, borders and agencies. Accordingly, our political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new ‘home game’. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defence of the US homeland, and this new Command was tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

The Secretary of Defense outlined three strategic pillars in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): defending the homeland; building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; and remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail. All three pillars are nested within the objectives of the NSS and arguably, the second pillar establishes a strategic to operational bridge through security cooperation operations (SCO). The assessment of SCO as a bridge between strategic guidance and operational objectives is supported by Joint Publication 3-0 which states that Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence are “ongoing activities (that) establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad.”

General Dempsey’s NMS underscored strategic challenges to the Joint Staff in rebalancing the JF of 2025 to meet the national security directives in an austere fiscal environment. General Dempsey highlighted strategic imperatives to protect and advance U.S national interests, apply contrasting approaches to state threats (China, Russia) verses non-state threats (ISIL), and adjusting to prolonged campaigns in an unpredictable strategic environment with limited resources.4 The CCJO emphasized enduring proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rise of competitor states, violent extremism, regional instabilities, transnational crime and competition for resources.5 Furthermore, advancements in mobile technology and social media allow middleweight

The security environment today is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. Supporting these capabilities requires proper balancing of the Joint Force. This essay discusses the impending environment, key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required by

This predictive analysis relies on several assumptions. Dissolution of these assumptions may modify the process of analysis or the result of the prediction. The first assumption is that there will be no change to guiding policy regarding the military’s role in national security for foreseeable future. Secondly, the Army will continue to staff, equip, prepare, its force according to the Defense Strategic Guidance 2015 and Department of Defense Budget (Headquaters , 2015) (Department of Defense, Comptroller, 2015). Thirdly, Special Forces Units have and will continue to conduct forced entry operations successfully (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012).

The objective of this study is to examine how, with the ultimate goal of joint mission being operational effectiveness, that USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM can 'enable' the mission. Also discussed will be the capabilities and limitations of the available service forces, and considering that these forces were not optimized for the assigned mission, explain which additional forces would be requested and why. Also addressed will be the interdependencies among available and requested forces.

The current model of SOF acquisition is adequate to address emerging threats. The model works well with the services providing the major end items to Special Operations Command (SOCOM). SOCOM then uses an internal defense acquisition process to modify these end items (combat vehicles, aircraft, etc) and tailor them to SOF-specific missions. Thus, the burden is placed on the services for life cycle sustainment and major end item upgrades. Moreover, the decreased acquisition cycle time allows SOF to procure technology faster than the Department of Defense to meet emerging

Sustainment of ground forces not to exceed programmed transformation level remain critical to maintaining the JF of 2025’s ability to project combat power. Minimal ground force strength of 980,000 (Army) and 182,000 (Marines) ensures sustainment of land-forces capable of full-range prompt and sustained, multi-phase joint and multinational land operations.7 Despite fiscal advantages of force reductions, disadvantages include increasing demand for ground force capabilities that remain significant and increasing.8 Additionally, down-sizing the ground forces to minimal force levels, leaves the JF at minimal levels to meet current and anticipated missions with an acceptable level of national risk.9 Leverage strategic depth in an austere budget

The United States (US) is facing a worldwide changing political landscape and an uncertain fiscal environment, and both will shape the United States military in the coming years. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and other national strategy documents vaguely outline the path that the US military will take in response to these two stressors. With over a decade of counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare, the leaders of the US military strategic leadership must decide to what level these conflicts shape the preparation for future wars. In order to protect US national strategic objectives, the US military must prepare to conduct regular warfare while training specific units to fight irregular conflicts.

Joint Force 2025 needs to increase the number of Special Operations Forces and foreign military equipment sales in current and potential gray-zone conflict locations. U.S. and NATO

The United States will only be able to rebalance the Joint Force in 2025 if adequate resources are available. Even with adequate funding, combatant commanders will experience considerable challenges operating in the global security environment. The current strategic direction has prompted a shift of military resources to the Asia-Pacific. This trend will continue. Additionally, globalization, cyber-attacks and advances in technology will further challenge the Joint Forces in the next ten years . The U.S. Joint Forces must identify and develop critical technology now in order to overcome future challenges risk in 2025. Diminishing resources and lack of predictability within the military budget process will introduce significant strategic, military and political risk . While no major organizational changes or force reductions are recommended for the Joint Force, finding the right balance between Active duty and Reserve end strength and missions will be necessary . Each of the Services will need to continue to man, equip and train forces to effectively integrate operations across the Joint Force. Anticipating, developing and fielding capabilities will be key for the Joint Forces to shape or respond to the challenges associated with the global security environment in 2025. Military advantages within the U.S. and allies will continue to diminish if not adequately funded, especially as globalization and the growth of immerging state and non-state proxies become more capable to

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review is in line with the National Security Strategy when it states, "U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners." Irregular threats are therefore the focus of US strategic guidance and are in line with global trends for the most likely type of military action.