Strategic Direction For Joint Operations

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

The function of the military forces for the United States has had no choice but to evolve as wars wax and wane. As the rise of militant terrorist groups became a threat to the United States and its allies, the armed forces of the United States were deployed by the President to countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Instability in these countries threatened bordering allies, and after September 11, 2001, the threat was brought to U.S. soil. Each president from Clinton to Obama has had to shape the policy of how the armed forces fit into civil-military policies abroad and overseas. In a war time environment, such as Iraq, the purpose of how the military should be deployed is easier to clearly state. But in times when there is no imminent threat, it is much more difficult to transition

The Department of Defense (DOD) must decide how to rebalance the armed forces general force structure to meet future challenges and opportunities in an austere fiscal environment. The general force structure and capabilities of Joint Force 2020 necessary to adjust the force based on current strategic direction and fiscal constraints is a smaller, efficient, adaptable and integrated joint force. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes US military forces will evolve and remain modern, capable, and ready while accepting some increased risk through force reductions. Rebalancing will require innovative approaches and solutions to protect the homeland, build global security, project power, and win decisively with a leaner force.

Despite the complexity of this environment and fiscal austerity, the JF25 must “protect our Nation and win our wars.” It must deter and defeat state adversaries, disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations, and strengthen the global network of allies and partners.” The prioritized capabilities required for Joint Force 2025 are linked to the imperatives of securing the homeland and maintaining strategic agility. This essay discusses general attributes of the JF, specific capability requirements by service, and the risk associated with focusing the rebalance on these two imperatives.

General Dempsey’s NMS underscored strategic challenges to the Joint Staff in rebalancing the JF of 2025 to meet the national security directives in an austere fiscal environment. General Dempsey highlighted strategic imperatives to protect and advance U.S national interests, apply contrasting approaches to state threats (China, Russia) verses non-state threats (ISIL), and adjusting to prolonged campaigns in an unpredictable strategic environment with limited resources.4 The CCJO emphasized enduring proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rise of competitor states, violent extremism, regional instabilities, transnational crime and competition for resources.5 Furthermore, advancements in mobile technology and social media allow middleweight

On 22 January 2013, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released a white paper describing his vision for the Joint Information Environment (JIE) and how it would support operations in the years to come.1 This mandated transition is driving a reassessment of the most appropriate command and control (C2) structure to conduct operations within the domain. Attempts to achieve a standardized fully interoperable environment will only achieve limited success due to the innate variability and changing nature of technology, exacerbated by service unique capabilities and requirements as well as inconsistent funding. Existing C2 models either fail to address the uniqueness of operations in the cyber domain or otherwise fail to

Military planning and operations in the 21st century must take into consideration a number of different issues. One of the ways in which the late 20th century evolved was the change in economic, political, and cultural movements that, through technology, seemed to move countries of the world closer together.

Following over a decade of irregular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is attempting to reset towards a conventional, regular type of warfare. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a U.S. military shift to the Pacific and the supremacy of capability against near peer nations rather than support irregular of and counterinsurgency operations. As the QDR points out the U.S. military must “be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace.” This is balanced against the reality that “our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged

Security is based on military strength. The chief purposes of the nation’s foreign policy are protection of America’s security in an often hostile world. Today, American security policy is worried not only with the procedures of the other nations such as Nazi Germany 1940, soviet Russia 1980; but also with activities of terrorist groups and other hostile non-state actors. To defend the nation and to achieve this goal, united state has built a huge military

In a speech at George Washington University in November of 2015, the United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter also addressed challenges facing the United States, stating that the security of the US depends on a force better than it is today. This force not only includes the military services, but also extends to the civilian workforce of the combat support agencies, upon which this paper focuses. The vision of the future force is one that can quickly adapt and achieve success in a sophisticated, highly-technical and rapidly changing environment; maximize the benefits of commercial technology development; and address global military competition to defend the nation and make the world a better place.

The days of unilateral and conventional battles are history. The Army of yesterday is no longer adequate to deter and defeat our nation’s enemies. Rather, the Army needs to adapt to meet the global challenges of today, and the complexity of hybrid threats. Former Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno stated, “The Army is probably the most flexible, adaptable organization across all the services”. In conjunction with that claim, the Army is implementing the regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept. Through the implementation of the regionally aligned forces concept, our nation’s Army will become a versatile, adaptable and globally ready force. Although the RAF concept is thoroughly sound, it is doomed to fail during its implementation.

The foreign policy strengths for the privatized combat role includes policy flexibility, force agility, and reduced political barriers. Policy flexibility is defined as the variety of options available and the scope in which they can be applied. The resulting collection of choices which may be mapped and compared to other choices can be referred to as the option space. In the case of the military, some of the policy options available can include mission types and the variety of roles from non-combat to combat. Force agility is defined as an armed force’s scalability, physical mobility, and adaptability. Force agility is mostly understood as a tactical level capability but the potential to provide agile capabilities can

The purpose of this Foundation of Strategy paper is to defend this author’s opinion as to “What have been or are currently the three greatest challenges for the United States in translating its military power into desired political outcomes or end states?” (Air War College) Additionally, the paper will “evaluate the three challenges in the context of two different conflicts.” (Air War College) In today’s ever dynamic and changing strategic landscape, there are plenty of challenges facing the United States. As one can imagine, the palate is full given the many facets and combinations in which senior leaders make decisions as to how best to reach a desired end goal and/or political outcome.

The complexity of the current and future Operational Environment (OE) requires the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to extend the reach of his situational understanding to continuously adapt to a changing

- Implications for defense posture and force structure: The NDS highly sticks on “compete, deter, and win,” with and to the major adversaries of the U.S., and gives emphasis on modernization and readiness as helping the U.S. military regain its advantage over China and Russia. Also, the NDS is able to a global operating model to help centrally manage posture and make it more “lethal, agile, and resilient,” all in line with facilitating the emphasis on deterring, fighting and winning conflicts with China or Russia. A strategy that emphasizes competing with China and Russia, modernizing the future force, and regaining readiness should be reflected in the department’s investments. Likewise, the NDS outlines