Strategic Intelligence Personal Statement

Account of the work of the CIA, discussing in some detail the nature of the relationship between the intelligence-gatherer and the policy-maker. Since the 1970s the CIA has provided intelligence to Congress as well as to the executive, so that it now "finds itself in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised nearly equidistant" between them. It has not however abused this freedom of action, probably unique among world intelligence agencies, so as to 'cook ' intelligence. CIA deputy director.

The 1776 united States of America Declaration of Independence contain the words that succinctly describe our national objective, strategy, and message, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” In today’s United States of America, the world acknowledges American’s as the preeminent owner of individual freedoms, holding and promoting these three basic principles for some 240 years. During these years, the U.S. has employed the use of intelligence to shape its objectives and strategies, and then in times of war used the same intelligence to shape strategic messages against foreign powers. However, as hostilities decline and give way to the restoration of relative peace, the use of intelligence for strategic messages against foreign powers ceases. Under these circumstances, the void created by secession of U.S. messages, provides a communication opportunity to foreign powers for transmission of anti-U.S. messages. Attempts have been made to reinstate the offices that during war countered these anti-U.S. messages to a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S Government intelligence community. This paper does not support creation of a new agency or department to utilize existing strategic intelligence.

The United States (U.S) Intelligence community has come a long way since the revolutionary war. After winning independence from England, the U.S would not invest much into intelligence or foreign policy until the 20th century. Foreign policy was simply not a priority for our young nation, having an ocean on eastern and Western boarders of the country severely limited potential threats. President Franklin D. Roosevelt would be the first president since Washington to understand the importance of intelligence and lay the groundwork for what we now consider national intelligence. Unfortunately, it has taken two catastrophic failures in intelligence for the U.S to realize the need for good intelligence and take steps to improve itself. The

Additionally, would streamlining the sharing of this information both vertically and horizontally at the federal, state and local levels improve efficiencies, effectiveness, and operability? There are almost 50 agencies from the President down to the local level that have “fingers in the pie” so to speak in the domestic intelligence gathering community. This paper will examine the complexity and inherent barriers within the domestic intelligence community from the federal to the state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) levels, then analyze the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and what appears to be a lack of unity amongst the disparate organizations at both the federal and SLTT levels, and finally assess the levels of training and operational effectiveness to evaluate the overall performance efficiency of the intelligence community at the enterprise level. A way forward is also presented at the end of each section to provide suggested

The history of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) spans over 70 years despite its much shorter 55-year existence and encompasses a tale of necessity and opportunity in the face of newly emerging technologies in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Richelson, 2012, p. 36). This paper will discuss the vast and rich history of this intelligence agency, its duties, and responsibilities as well as its limitations and the challenges it faces to accomplish its mission. Finally, we will look at how and why this agency is associated with the intelligence community as well as it effectiveness throughout its long existence.

Some geographic COCOMs and Combatant Commanders significantly influence U.S. foreign policy in their region which offsets the effectiveness of other instruments of power and sets the perception of military first.

Knowledge accumulation and investigation fuel the world-changing choices of policymakers consistently. The pioneers of nations, their prompting staff, military pioneers, and government organizations all depend on auspicious, exact reports keeping in mind the end goal to choose the destiny of a military unit, a nation's military, or a nation itself. These policymakers need worldwide, national, and nearby occasions clarified in a way that inspects all ramifications and conceivable results of a situation. It is the Intelligence Community's business to gather, examines, and reports these occasions to the policymakers. So as to serve the nation most successfully, an insight examination report must Webb 2 be client engaged, tending to the client's

Major military and covert intelligence operations are being undertaken simultaneously in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Far East. The U.S. military agenda combines both major theatre

Dangers to the country are tireless and continually developing. Local and remote psychological warfare and the growing range of transnational composed wrongdoing syndicates crosswise over the internet, worldwide outskirts, and jurisdictional limits of the United States highlight then proceeded with need to manufacture and manage successful knowledge and data sharing organizations among the government; state, nearby, tribal, and regional (SLTT) governments; and the

My childhood was anything but ordinary; a typical Saturday afternoon in the would consist of me watching a documentary on the origins of the universe, C-SPAN, or learning a new programming language. I wasn’t a fan of baseball, football, or most other sports for that matter, I just really liked learning. I have always possessed a quiet sense of internal patriotism and watching the President deliver the State of the Union to me was like the Super Bowl. However, it wasn’t until after some soul searching in the ninth grade that I know I wanted a career within the United States Intelligence Community. Thomas Jefferson, in Congress wrote on July 4, 1776 “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. This single quote (that I hold close to my heart), a devastating event on a Tuesday morning in September 2001, a strong sense of civic duty, and ensuring the continuity of the American Dream is why I want to contribute to the silent story of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The United States has focused on developing better methods and capabilities to obtain intelligence since the revolutionary war. Arguably, the most significant advances in intelligence collection capabilities have developed since the digital era and have matured through asymmetric warfare during the Global War on Terrorism. For the past thirteen years, the United States has continued to grow technical intelligence capabilities to understand and develop the military battlefield environment. With this growing, need for technical intelligence the United States’ non-technical intelligence methodologies have gradually atrophied and reduced the nation’s military ability to obtain a comprehensive intelligence picture. Through examples in Iraq, Afghanistan, and African countries, we can illustrate adversaries’ abilities in an asymmetric environment to overcome technical intelligence requiring the nation to retrain and perfect non-technical intelligence capabilities. With a constantly evolving battlefield, the future success of the nation requires a blended approach of collecting and disseminating intelligence utilizing technical and non-technical capabilities equally to enable predictive deployment of military power against unseen threats in future operating environments.

The proficiencies and boundaries of the intelligence in auxiliary the efforts of homeland security within the Department of Defense are significant part of the United States’ national intelligence resources. Included as part of the intelligence resources are the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence and security branches of the individual armed services (Department of Homeland Security 2015). By providing communication intercepts, satellite reconnaissance and human intelligence worldwide, all of the agencies work to deliver the

The existing geopolitical world environment continually tests current United States National Security Strategy and exposed several flaws. The current grand strategy, formulated piecemeal following U.S. victory in World War II, seeks to both retain American hegemony and act as global champion for the ideals of liberal democracy. Ultimately continued exercise of this strategy has exposed the ever increasing commitment to capability delta and challenges the existing ends, ways, and means methodology. Russia’s recent exercise of its expeditionary capacity in Syria as well as China’s expansion and annexation of islands in the South China Sea only serve as reminders to U.S. strategic limitations. Patrick Porter rightly posits that the U.S. is at

Served as the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asian States (AFG/PAK/CAS) Team NCOIC. Personally created, maintained and briefed Intelligence continuation books for the seven countries in my area of responsibility (AOR) which were instrumental to the SOCCENT Deputy Commanding General during Key Leaders Engagement (KLE) AOR visits. Provided weekly intelligence updates and threat analysis briefs in support of the AFG/PAK/CAS Operational Planning Team (OPT) and 10 inter-agency and SOF outstations. As a need to sync intelligence efforts I led weekly intelligence exchanges with analysts from 3rd Special Forces Group, CENTCOM and SOCOM DIA analysts which improved networking, increased coordination and

A profusion of scholarly works and articles lament the fact that the European Union does not develop a grand strategy and militate to confer an enhanced military dimension on the EU. These views imply that the European Union has no grand strategy or has an inadequate one. However widespread, these conclusions do not fit with all existing conceptions regarding grand strategy. In the meantime and interestingly enough, people seem more inclined to accept that NATO has a grand strategy. This observation and its potential implication for the international order inspired and initiated this study. They lead to the two following questions that guided the analysis. Do the European Union and NATO have grand strategies? If yes, what are these grand strategies and what are their possible impacts on the international order? Answering these questions required, first, to understand grand strategy. In chapter 1, the study began by scrutinizing the concept of grand strategy, which has historically been intimately intertwined with the concept of strategy. Rigorous investigations into the nature and history of strategy combined with the application of different lenses to the canon of work of recognized authorities in the field of strategy supported the analysis. The etymological, historical, and epistemological lenses applied to strategy provided the basis to assess the dominant schools of thought, understand the contemporary developments, and ultimately comprehend grand strategy. This