Strategic Strategy Of The Mp Program

With Trump’s election this year, his rhetoric of “Making America Great Again” and therefore revitalizing our military will soon become a reality. Trump has formally requested a reappropriation of funds; around $54 Billion, towards the US military. Part of Trump’s campaign promises had to do with making the military more robust; ensuring America’s title of militarily strongest in the world. In order to achieve this goal. Trump’s federal government has the option of many different aspects of the military to focus on. Of these, funding weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, and further military research and development prove themselves as most relevant in the contemporary military.

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

(U) HQDA EXORD 10-13 IN SUPPORT OF THE HQDA FY 13-15 ACTIVE COMPONENT MANNING GUIDANCE. (U) (ATSG-NCOA) The United States remains a nation at war and there are challenges such as grade and military occupational specialty (MOS) shortages and a growing medical and administrative non-available population which significantly impacts the ability of the personnel inventory to meet specific requirements based on the current and foreseeable conditions and constraints. The US mission is to provide the Army with the Personnel Manning Guidance for FY13 -15 that is synchronized with the Army’s priorities. The priorities are reflected in the Integrated Requirement Priority List and are established by Army Leadership. The key tasks are manning the

Evaluating General Franks’ and General Casey’s approach against joint functions exposes a trend of inaccurate and insufficient intelligence resulting in an overdependence on movement and maneuver. Determining current enemy activities, capabilities and potential actions promotes the development of an appropriate operational approach. Intelligence failures resulted in weaknesses of both Commander’s plans. General Franks’ incorrect assumptions about Saddam’s grip on power, Iraq’s chemical weapons capabilities, the population’s acceptance of the “liberation” and the failure to identify the Fedayeen’s potential impact on offensive operations greatly increased operational risk. The lean invasion force accepted excessive risk as it raced to the Iraqi capital without the mass to secure its lines of communications or react to unanticipated events. General Casey misunderstood the true cause of sectarian violence and pursued an operational approach that risked strategic failure. Intelligence gaps propagated his belief that the insurgency was the source of sectarian violence and thus the conflict’s center of gravity. Casey believed that American troop presence was an irritant that fueled the insurgency and withdrawing coalition troops would reduce tensions and force Iraq to stand up and accept responsibility for its internal security. This strategy led to record violence in May 2006 and General Casey’s belated realization that he needed more

The security environment today is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. Supporting these capabilities requires proper balancing of the Joint Force. This essay discusses the impending environment, key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required by

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the U.S. military campaign planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2002 to 2007 using the Joint Planning Publication 5-0 Joint Operational Planning as a framework. The overall proposal of this document is that it was the miscalculations associated with the understanding of the operational environment and specific elements of operational design that led to the major planning failures. This paper also covers how the reframing process, also known as “the surge”, led to significant changes to the operational approach. This essay begins with a discussion of the initial planning and execution of OIF, including a description of how well military leaders understood the operational environment

Today’s security environment is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. This essay discusses the key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required of the Joint Force, each member services and the inherent associated risks.

Commanders requested safer vehicles suited for irregular warfare tactics, and received up-armored HMMWVs and add-on armor kits, which did not provide sufficient protection in an irregular warfare environment. Further, the services were slow to respond to Combatant Commanders’ requests for MRAPs because their priority was to develop the JLTV, fueled by the assertion that MRAPs would be obsolete beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This speaks to the tendency of the services to invest in future capabilities, while failing to provide Combatant Commanders with a method to develop or procure equipment necessary to fight present wars. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees JCIDS and is “often misaligned because it often defers to the services. Neither the Army nor the Marines wanted to invest in MRAPs, so neither did the JROC”. As a result, the requirement for MRAPs was slow to validate and once valid remained an unfunded requirement until political pressure and public opinion forced the Pentagon to reevaluate fielding MRAPs in large numbers.

Diminishing resources and lack of predictability within the military budget process will introduce significant strategic, military and political risk. Joint Forces capability, capacity and readiness requirements are derived from the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and provide the framework for Joint Force future strategy. Sequestration has severely impacted the Joint Forces ability to plan and program resources necessary to achieve these strategic objectives. Sequestration requires the DOD to execute across the board cuts from all accounts and has limited the department’s ability to move resources to accounts with greater needs. This has not only impacted readiness and force structure, but has also reduced investment in new weapon systems. Research and development is necessary in order to field new technologies that will enable the Joint Force to keep ahead of

Staff comment. IAW CONPLAN 49991-20, Annex W, use the 409th CSB to coordinate a multi-national contract for the recovery, lift, movement, and storage of recovered equipment to support follow-on training, issue, and integration of captured equipment into the AZE Defense force starting and PH IV and terminating at the end of PH V. Prime contractor must be able to rapidly enter the battle zone following PH III operations to recover equipment and transport items to pre-determined storage locations that enable future AZE distribution. Because the equipment will remain in AZE control, a preponderance of funding should remain with the AZE government, with supplementation by coalition forces if the GOAZE government is unable to fund the requirement due to catastrophic infrastructure and installation lost during the conflict. Use of civilian contracted support will allow the JTF to rapidly posture forces for PHIV EEZ operations, while ensuring AHA cannot use the equipment for future aggressive operations, prevent SAPA forces from supplement equipment for Anti-GOAZE operations, and enable the rapid re-composition of the AZE defense

In response to the September 11th attacks, the United States launched the Global War on Terrorism, invading both Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite these wars and the necessity for post-conflict stability operations, military leadership, including the Secretary of Defense, had neither desired nor trained its personnel to effectively conduct stability operations, which require effective interagency collaboration. Failing to effectively leverage interagency capabilities during the early phases of the 2003 Iraq War at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels prolonged the achievement of the U.S. military’s objective—transferring power to the Iraqis.

The Coalition of the Willing (COTW) programmatic model is an informal and alternate organizational solution to the Joint Program Office to develop and manage a materiel solution for the joint force and interagency. COTW leverages the subject matter expertise of one organization and provides access to this expertise to through a common program office and contract vehicle. This organizational solution encompasses full lifecycle activities while balancing proper acquisition rigor with speed and flexibility. The selection of the organization of the program office must be carefully considered as inherent authorities and structures are needed to enable the unique characteristics of this solution.

The Army and Marines face a rapidly changing operational environment, requiring difficult decisions on how to allocate limited resources to address emerging capabilities and remain a relevant element of national power. While there is no way to predict exactly what capabilities they will need in the future, history indicates that land forces will be

• Formulated and implemented individually and team training programs include tactical security operations, weapons qualifications, physical training, and equipment readiness.

Joint Force 2025 needs to increase the number of Special Operations Forces and foreign military equipment sales in current and potential gray-zone conflict locations. U.S. and NATO