Strategic Thinking

This was a great mistake of the Athenians, as Thucydides claims, ‘most of them (Athenians) being ignorant of its (Sicily) size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians’. So, Athens undervalued Sicily and overvalued their (the Athenians) greatness. Nicias tried to warn citizens about the wealth and strength of the Sicilian states - enemies they would have to challenge, and insisted on a great preparation and investments in the expedition to make it possible. He also added: ‘Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves’.

To a certain degree the characteristics of his youth, despite his own affirmation of ‘breaking and training’, beneficially prevail to adulthood. The roman biographer Cornelius Nepos ascertains that ‘The vices of his early youth were compensated by great virtues’. These same vices, his impulsive attitude in the public life, were responsible for the very virtuous achievements he is referring to. In fact these character traits foreshadow the decisions he would make years later in the Persian Wars. Comparatively, his impulsiveness matured into a cunning and uncontrollable determination in the face of authority. He was cleverly deceitful in the construction of a fleet of triremes, he was uncompromising against the Spartan commander Eurybiades at the first gathering at Corinth in 480 BC, and he was determined to get his own way in vital battles such as Salamis and Artemisium whether that required deceiving those authorities above him or not. Plutarch, Nepos, and Themistocles himself all refer to a degree of uncontrollable yet cunning determination that serves a great purpose in Greece’s victory over Persia.

Some of the northern Greek city states had already surrendered to Xerxes. This made the defensible position at the Isthmus more favourable as the other northern city states were sure to fall as well and many Peloponnesian city states were reluctant to send troops north to defend cities that were not their own and vulnerable to the Persians massive infantry. However it was Themistocles that persuaded the war council to fight at Salamis.

I am in agreement with your assessment regarding the Athenians decision to conduct the Sicilian Expedition. If the Sicilian Expedition would have been their single endeavor then I could have been feasible for the Athenians. You are correct in that Sicily had little to no benefit to Athens. The Athenians bit off more than they could chew, fighting Sparta and their alliance, protecting Attica while adding the Sicilian Expedition was just simply more than they could handle. Thucydides makes the point that Athens had not conducted solid analysis looking at the forces and the large land mass of Sicily before they decided to invade (Strassler p. 361). The Athenians overextended themselves and making this decision more than half way through the

Artemisia was the only commander in Xerxes’s force to be female. Xerxes’s brother Ariabignes perished in the Battle of Salamis. The Persian’s primary tactic for this battle was to overwhelm the Athenian Navy with their massive armada. Xerxes wanted to end the conquest of Greece in a single military campaign. The Persians were better sailors; they had experienced men and ships that had fought before. The Greeks had unexperienced sailors and new ships. Statisticaly speaking, in an open sea battle, the overwhelming number of Persian ships and experienced sailors should unquestionably defeat the Athenian Navy. The Greeks without many choices had to defend the Island of Salamis. If the Greeks wanted any chance in winning, they would have to bring the Persians someplace where the number of ships would no longer be a variable. Themistocles sailed his navy to the narrow straits of Salamis in order to constrict Xerxes’s fleet. Once they came through the narrow path, the Spartan Navy began attacking along with the Athenians.

The Athenians had allied with Sicily. After Sparta and Athens concluded the Peace of Nicias treaty in 421, Athens ordered out an armada to conquer the island. Sicily was now a target due to the fact that Sicily was not much smaller than Athens conquering all of it would have brought Athens an immense amount of resources. The Athenian force consisted of over 100 ships and some 5000 infantry (Crystalinks.com 2015). When the armada landed in Sicily, Lamachus recommended to attack immediately as to take the main city when it was still unprepared despite that the other two commanders suggested different approaches. The Athenians created a base in Catana and defeated the Syracusans in battle, nonetheless illness, political sabotage and death had struck the three commanders causing crucial complications. Hermocrates convinced his men to extend the city’s fortifications and reformulate the structure of command. The new system failed and the Athenians laid siege to Syracuse. Athens sent reinforcements to Syracuse, and very burdensome, Sparta declared war on Athens, this made spreading the required resources difficult. It did not take long until the Athenian Expeditionary Force was conclusively destroyed. Thucydides however states that the Sicilian Expedition contained some of the greatest action in Greek history “ To the victors the most brilliant of successes,

Invasion to Sicily is a certain choice of Athenian strategy because after Peloponnesian War they were trying to find new resources in order to beat each other’s. However, the Sicily was long distance from Athens, it was very difficult to take reinforce and logistic. The Sicilian expedition of Athens in the Peloponnesian War was biggest mistake Athens it was beginning of the collapse Athens. The Athens strategy end was feed of manpower but they miscalculated means (resources) because during the fighting with Syracusan, the Athens force was suffering. Therefore, Nicias sent a letter to Athens that describes the condition and he asked must instantly depart or be strongly reinforced. “Nicias tells the Athenians that Athens has ho military resources in reserve and concludes the failure here will lead to Athens’ quick defeat by Syracuse and Sparta.” The Athens could not adapt a good strategy because they miscalculated risks, therefore, they gave chance for Sparta. Now the Athens fear from Sparta. The Sparta initial strategy was still exist to defeat in

Athens agrees to invade Sicily and has Alcibiades co-chairing the fleet in authority with Nicias, but before the fleet gets too far, Alcibiades is summoned home to attend a trial regarding acts he did of vandalism to statues of Hermes. Alcibiades flees the trial and runs to Sparta, proof that he is a coward and would not have made a good Spartan. Alcibiades now convinces Sparta to fight Athens, and after winning, whispers to Spartan that they should became an ally with Persia, which Sparta

Everything leading up to them going into battle is what caused the Athenians to go thoughtlessly into the encounter. One of the most influential parts of the agreement was that they were supposed to get paid and were told that it was an easy battle, but that led them to believe that there was nothing to care about. The information they were told however, was not entirely true and their hope of reclaiming land was exceedingly high, that they concluded that this idea for war was a good thing. Unfortunately, the Athenians were, “ignorant of the size of the island and the number of its inhabitants” (Bagnall 201). Also, in addition to them being ignorant of the size of the island, “they did not realize that they were taking on a war of the same magnitude as their war against the Peloponnesians” (Bagnall 201). Furthermore, their generals were not able to agree on what to do, and the soldiers rushed onto shore without any directions or strategies to guide them. Their generals had a great deal to do with the fact of their soldiers failing to invade and win this battle. They did not think to plan any well thought out strategies before sending their troops into battle. Nobody did anything to help guide them along the way. The fact that they mindlessly went into battle was the most catastrophic part of the war. All of these factors went hand in hand and is what brought the destruction of this city upon

Following the victorious repelling of the Persian invaders, the coastal and Aegean poleis formed an alliance – the Delian League (478 BCE), of which deferred to Athens as hegemon (leader), for reasons of her military successes in the battles of Marathon (army) and Salamis and Mycale (both navy). These Ionian city-states banded for mutual defense against common enemies with oaths of allegiance --that swore no secession, purposing to punish Persia and liberate captured Greeks. Members of the League symmachia (treaty) included the Greek islands, Ionian poleis, Hellespont, Caria, and Thrace. The confederation established a treasury in the Delos temple, whereas Aristides appointed representatives, an admiral, financial officers, and treasurers.

They firstly argued that an alliance would create an obligation for Corcyra to always assist Athens throughout the impending war. Secondly that an alliance would assure that Corcyra would remain independent and be able to stop any Peloponnesian ships whilst aiding those from Athens on the route to Sicily . Thirdly they argued the naval power Corcyra would provide Athens would be indispensable, evident in Thucydides’ Histories as he documents a Corcyreans plea “….Thirdly yourself excepted, we are the greatest naval power in Hellas.” Thucydides was perhaps one of the most prominent statesmen and generals of Athens and is a highly regarded source for the Peloponnesian war. After being convinced by the threat that if they did not help Corcyra that Corinth and therefore the Peloponnesian league would absorb its fleet, Athens became allies with Corcyra . Athens came to Corcyra’s aid when Corinth attacked a fleet of ships off a group of islands known as Sybota. The war of Sybota officiated that Athens and Corinth were fighting, causing tensions to rise between Athens and the Peloponnesian league. This anguish between Corinth and Corcyra was a long-term cause of the war as their strife rippled through the Greek world and primarily triggered all events that followed it. The now present tension was amplified as problems arose in Potidaea.

Nicias advised that, not to try expedition to Sicily because it could decline Athenian prestige if the campaign voted. He tried to detail the Sicilian strength, distant from Athens difficult to sustain, and focus on main enemy near home which was Sparta. In the other side, Alcibiades presents its support to deploy Sicily by undermining the capability of all cities and exaggerating the Athenian power. Finally, after repeated effort, the assembly voted to expeditions. It could benefited to vote the advice of Nicias, because his advice was better than Alcibiades.

They had yet to have an effective navy. Athens on the other hand had the Delian league, which was known for their ability to fight from the sea. Their navy outnumbered Sparta’s three to one and they had 200 skilled archers while the Spartans relied on their swords and spears (Hunt 103). Because of these staggering numbers Sparta and its allies worried about Athens attacking them. Athens having control of the Delian league gave them much confidence and this likely is the cause of all their refusals to peace treaties.

There is no coincidence that the rise of Athenian Democracy goes chronologically hand in hand with the rise of the Athenian Navy. Following the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks, Athens’ naval successes allow it to surpass the previous naval power of Corinth; create the Delian league to fund and support this navy; and eventually ruffle enough feathers with their fellow Hellenic neighbours that they inspire the Peloponnesian war. Overall their naval reputation and intimidation comes from the skill of the men who maneuver and command the ships, and the tool they use to wield their power, the Athenian trireme. By looking at the design of the trireme, and the work and numbers put both into the ship and the men that drive it, hopefully

Sparta is small but strong, it is hard to just cant kill them all at once. Athens should of caused rebellions to open the path. They should of struck fast and tactically with Athens having weaker men but higher numbers in the beginning. Aim for what they fear and in the distress start thinning there numbers. It would be even ideal if you get a commander or two. The less highly experienced troops on the field the better, but constantly waiting and doing little attacks wont help anyone, attacks need to have everlasting effects on both supplies and moral. This is why Athens got killed off in the Great Peloponnesian