Strengthening The Homeland Security Enterprise Through Intelligence Reform And Integration

Beginning in 2001 Intelligence about the impending nature of an attack was increasing, not only from US Intelligence sources but also from 11 other countries such as Britain, Israel, India, Egypt, Morocco and even a top Taliban commander from Afghanistan (Thompson.) Beginning in August warnings become coming in from everywhere, foreign governments, CIA and FBI sources and so on however, next to none of this information was shared between the many intelligence agencies. In April, NORAD launched a training scenario in which the pentagon was to be incapacitated by a hijacked airliner however the Joint Chiefs of Staff disregarded the scenario as “too unrealistic” (September 11 attacks advance-knowledge debate.) On august 19th the Israeli’s gave US intelligence personnel credible information including, the list of 19 suspected terrorist’s names and the fact that a large aircraft would be the primary weapon involved. The names were not shared by the CIA with other intelligence agencies (Robinson.)

Assessing our vulnerability to terrorist attack remains difficult in part because the events surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001, have not been thoroughly explained. In its investigation into them, the 9/11 Commission slid past many important questions, leaving them unanswered, and did not adequately challenge the Bush administration when it refused to cooperate or obfuscated its own actions.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the Islamic terrorists group al-Qaeda hijacked four planes and crashed into the United States’ centers of power: the

The Attack on the September 11, and the consequent War on Terror changed how the American government and its public perceive terrorism and how to formulate a policy to counter the phenomenon. A couple of large wars were waged on the name of War on Terror and many other small wars and conflicts took place in numbers of countries and continents to eradicate the threat of a terrorist attack. Yet the terrorist groups survived and the United States were left with a large debt acquired by expensive counterterrorism effort. After more than a decade, we are still facing the same enemy with no concrete plan to end the conflict. As long as the United States remains as a world powerhouse and a key player in global stage, it will be a target of a terrorist attack, so there must be an effective plan to finally end the threat of terrorism. The counter-terrorism strategy of the United States following the Attack on September 11 has been largely ineffective. In order to end the Fourth Wave of Modern Terrorism, there must be a strategy shift within the United States government while simultaneously creating a counter-narrative to oppose Al-Qaeda 's propaganda.

In my opinion, one of the main intelligence failures of 9/11 was the lack of information sharing, an issue that has plagued the Intelligence Community (IC) for years; federal agencies chose when and with whom they shared collected intelligence all under the umbrella of ‘secrecy’ and the ‘need-to-know.’ The 9/11 Commission Report found that there were two weaknesses in the IC and operational capabilities during the conduction of counter terrorism.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the downing of an airplane by passengers on September 11, 2001 left many Americans reeling with fear and feeling vulnerable. The American people no longer felt safe and protected on their homeland soil. It was a violation of security that united not only the American people, but countries around the world. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, then President, George W. Bush, proposed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to this proposal, the responsibility to protect the nation’s security fell to over 100 different government agencies. Not one of these agencies saw homeland security as their primary goal. The newly created

The attack on the World Trade Center was not the first attack and was not the first time the US Intelligence Community had heard of Al-Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden. The role of counterintelligence from both sides the US and Al-Qaeda, lent to the information flow not only form the attackers but also to the ones who would ultimately respond. The FBI, the CIA, the DIA, have integral parts in these series of events from the information collection to the information flow. In a time where it was realized that Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism have a similar need, as well as information sharing across agencies, have led to the CI and IC we see today.

The war on terrorism is vast and intense. Most of the media and public are focused on the international threats and groups plaguing the globe, however there is a true and real concern for the terrorism in our backyard and the government has taken notice. How exactly can a government so fragmented and already stretched so thin take on another hardship with such high stakes? By restructuring the system with a more narrowly tasked counsel, the Domestic Terrorism Counsel (Carlin, 2015), to focus all involved, bridging the gaps between vertical intergovernmental relations, from federal to local levels, and the horizontal cross-sector collaboration of multiple organizations, like the FBI, the Attorney General’s Office, and the SPLC. (Carlin, 2015)

Subsequent to 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), which compelled the U.S. to imagine the inconceivable, because that day things went really wrong. That was the day that terrorist decided to make their presences know by attacking us. They evolved from using bombs to using airplanes to deliver as their attack weapon because it would cause lethal fatalities on U.S. soil. This was never done before and we were not prepared to handle such a massive attack. This paper will investigate what went wrong before and after 9/11, surveillance surge, and what was the problem, with the CIA and the FBI regarding communication with each other, the dissemination of information to first responders, and recommendation for changes to policies that are obsolete. We understand that local law enforcement and state agencies will bring specific advantages (their strength) from their organizations, and they will also bring their inherited weaknesses. But, they will also bring one important thing to the table which is, how they collect local intelligence; and being able to address some of their organization’s weaknesses, and how they can fully use any data they collect before and after 9/11. This paper builds and contributes to how things were before and after 9/11, and the types of changes that were made in law enforcement, CIA.,

The terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center towers in New York City on September 11, 2001 has changed the way federal, state and local police departments communicate with each other, their structures, and operations. The new federal organization known as Homeland Security set out to coordinate their work at the state level, collect, analyze and share pertinent information and intelligence, protect key infrastructure and assets, secure the nation’s borders and ports, team up with federal and local task forces, and prepare new response training, equipment, systems and strategies (Foster and Cordner, 2005). The Federal Bureau of Investigation also shifted focus from addressing traditional crimes to preventing terrorist attacks. This is

In September of 2001, the worst terrorist tragedy that has ever occurred on American soil, and quite possibly in the world, rocked the foundations of the United States of America. The unimpeded destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center led many to wonder how an event of such magnitude could not have been foreseen and prevented. Later, many sources led us to believe that it was not that the information was not there, but rather, it was the inability of intelligence communities and law enforcement agencies to communicate the data among themselves that resulted in the greatest security breach in American history. To combat this inability to coordinate use of data and information, the Defense Advanced

After 9/11, an event so shocking, and humiliating to both the American people, and the U.S. Government, vast reforms were identified to ensure that an attack of this magnitude never happened again. From the ashes of this despicable act came two major pieces of Intelligence reform. These documents were the 9/11 Commission Report and The Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorist Prevent Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Both documents worked to reform the Intelligence Community (IC), and streamline current processes to improve the sharing of intelligence information, and products. With the sweeping changes

Throughout Intelligence Community’s history, there has been multiple attempts to input reform measures into various agencies. Often met with pushback, the reform attempts typically fail or are weak in merit. Being unaccepting of reform and showing little adaptation towards newer strategies and technological advancements, the IC was caught unprepared to thwart the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon. Some governmental reports, those that have assessed the IC’s actions regarding the devastating attack, have noted that greater cooperative efforts between various agencies may have halted the terrorist attack. The creation of a Homeland Intelligence Organization could be the start of implementation of a reform to bring the IC closer together.

In the heat of extremist organizations rising up across America, ranging from white supremacy to Islamic extremism, investigating organizations as well as intelligence offices are looking for greater ways of being able to access information to preserve public safety. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the country based one of its most disastrous mishandling of intelligence in decades. It was well-documented that the information presented that Osama bin Laden was planning an attack on America had been presented and yet nothing was done.

Congress created the Department of Homeland Security which consolidated two dozen agencies and was given the task of protecting the United States from another attack. (Waxman, 2009). By consolidating these agencies, communication paths would be greatly improved. Fusion centers were then created to enable the various agencies to share information and conduct threat assessments for events. The amount of intelligence is greatly improved by the increased participation of the numerous agencies. The agencies then have the ability to “connect the dots” and create a better picture of an incident or