Success of the Amphibious Military Doctrine

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Having an AF that likely has freedom of maneuver outside of an enemy threat ranges with an amphibious OTH capability, combined with air assets capable of delivering assault forces from multiple avenues of approach. The AF commander has the ability to achieve another important tenet of maneuver warfare: Surprise. Having orienting to the enemy and identifying those centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that AF can now maneuver itself to best employ its highly maneuverable assets to best address the enemies system and destroy it. In some cases, the threat of having a highly maneuverable AF postured with the ability to conduct a landing is enough to fix enemy assets and allow attack from conventional land forces such as the amphibious demonstration (feint). Operation DESERT STORM is a great example of using an AF to drive the enemy into decisions that ultimately served our needs and not their

landing ships and assault and mechanized landing craft, there were now available also tank landing

Like any other unified team, how does the United States Army gain leverage against our enemies who look to seize the free world? Well like many teams they have offensive operations, which are to seek opportunities to gain leverage against their foes or even gain a win in the end and then they have defensive operations. Defensive operations are the opposite of offensive operations where instead of trying to take advantage of the enemy the Army’s forces are trying to take a stance and push the enemy back. Thus allowing a chance to defend the territory where the soldiers stand and hopefully allow the soldiers to regain their forces. So like many other military forces we have used these tactics for many of years to defend our great nation, but of course over the years are tactics have had to change in order to adapt to different wars. So in this paper you will learn the most current tactics that our Army

The 1986 revision of the US Army, FM 100-5 “AirLand Battle” doctrine introduced the Clausewitzian concept of culmination point as a “key concept of operational doctrine.” Moreover, the new manual adopted the traditional German notion of Auftragstaktik, a decentralized command system with the commander devising a mission and then leaving the methods and means of achieving it to his subordinate

Porter’s command brought down Richmond, the South’s capital. By then he had full control of the entire Mississippi. By then Rear Admiral Porter was tasked with attacking Fort Fisher. Little did he know his tactics would be the ground works for future Naval Doctrines to come. “These two thousand, the admiral said, would be the first ashore, and would secure and hold the beacon for the Army regiments that would follow then.” Amphibious landing was not heard of until then. This tactic would be used in the next century during World War II and would be adopted by the Marine Corps as one of their major

The purpose of this paper will be the battle analysis and evaluation of Operation Fortitude (code name for deception plan to invade France) in support of Operation Overlord (code name for the Battle of Normandy and invasion of German occupied France). The analysis and evaluation will be done using the intellectual standards and the elements of reasoning to provide an alternate outcome for Operation Overlord. An alternate outcome will be suggested based on the use of deception that results in the defeat of the Allies (United States, Canada and Great Britain) at Normandy.

Operation Cobra was the name given to the American’s attempt to break out of the Normandy bridgehead established after D-Day in June 1944 (WWII). Operation Cobra supported British, Polish and Canadian assaults which was also true in operations codenamed Atlantic, Spring, Totalise, Goodwood and Tractable. After D-Day, the Germans moved a great deal of equipment and men to Normandy. As a result, breaking out of the Normandy beachhead proved to be far more difficult than the actual landings at D-Day. By mid-June the Germans had reinforced many of their positions in Normandy and any advance inland was going to be difficult for the Allies.

AirLand Battle (1982-1993) Field Manual 100-5 printed in 1986 conserved and reinforced AirLand Battle’s vital ideas which is the significance of the operational level of warfare. The focus was on the seizing and retaining the initiative, and its insistence on the requirement for multi-service cooperation. Operation Desert Storm delivered the opportunity to test Army doctrine and force structure against a threat they were optimized to meet.

The Unified Land Operations is an evolution of the AirLand Battle Doctrine. Many of the same concepts that originated in the AirLand Battle Doctrine can be found in the Unified Land Operation Doctrine.

The implications of implementing the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), or Air-Sea Battle, presents opportunities and challenges which must be addressed to realize its full potential. This is especially true in the context of the rebalance to the Asia Pacific region.

The discussion of amphibious warfare and its primacy in military history is rather ambiguous in the sense that the study of amphibious warfare is incongruous with the traditional scholarship of naval and land warfare. While the use of amphibious tactics dates back through human history to the advent of naval warfare upon the world’s oceans, coastlines, bays, rivers, lakes, estuaries, and deltas, the assertion of amphibious warfare as a distinct subject of study has been a matter of debate within the overarching discipline of military history. Regarding amphibious warfare, merely defining it has been pragmatic. Theodore L. Gatchel, in his book, At

Contemporary theater and service planners successfully applied OIF lessons learned, and adopted adaptive operational planning throughout the joint operational planning process. In fact, post-OIF joint operation planning evolved from the antiquated Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) model, providing flexible options for application of military force to national decision makers.24 (Campaign Planning Handbook, p.11) In that, the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and APEX advanced theater and inter-service planning through institutionalized iterative dialogue and collaborative planning between echelons of command, ensuring the military instrument of national power is synchronized

Thus the air-land relationship from this perspective is one of relative equality at the aggregate level, while at the tactical level, the campaign is likely to be marked by frequent and often unpredictable alternation between fights in which air power supports a ground-centric scheme of maneuver and those in which the reverse is true. Because this approach to warfare is neither air nor ground-centric, embracing it is doctrinally challenging for organizations that are steeped in a tradition of command relationships that designate component commanders as either supported or

The United States landing forces met light resistance if any on the beaches, which allowed for their swift advance inland. An increase in Japanese resistance was noted as units moved off the beaches and towards their A-Day objectives and securing them on the first day as planned. Over the next few days’ units across the entire front continued to advance inland towards secondary and third objectives against Japanese counterattacks and stronger resistance. It was reported that the Japanese had suffered