Successes and Failures of Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) Essay

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

U.S. air forces were under the command of the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) and its Combined Air Operations

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

The war in Afghanistan started in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks because of a terrorist group called Al- Qaeda, and its leader, Osama bin Laden, the one who planned the attacks. It was a very long and hard conflict that lasted approximately thirteen years. Canadian troops got involved for more than a decade fighting to make Afghanistan a better place for their citizens. The Canadian forces completed several key military operations, including “Medusa operation”, and more with the help of their allies before ending the conflict successfully on their own terms.

To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

Iran took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. The resulting failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, was an international embarrassment for the United States. No single event or decision resulted in the mission’s failure; instead, the failure resulted from a chain of poor decisions. This single operation highlighted the need for a dedicated special operations aviation unit dedicated to the rescue of American citizens and their repatriation. This paper discusses the global situation and some of the poor decisions that were made throughout the entirety of the mission from planning through the crash at Desert One.

Our final goal was to secure strategic access to oil in the gulf region and maintaining US military bases. This goal was a minor one for our group, but we did in fact achieve this goal through the negotiation skills we had acquired from the first day. During the simulation, my group and I decided to refuse the Saudis request to blockade Yemen as we prioritized humanitarian aid over our own economic interests in their oil, so we thought this goal would have been tossed. However, through

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties.

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

Admiral James Ellis’ report of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo offers us an essential post-mortem assessment of the conflict from a Commander’s point-of-view. My experience of 20+ years in government contracting allows me to understand the importance of performing post-mortems to increase program effectiveness. Not only does he spell out the reasons to celebrate the victory, but he also offers the data to demonstrate areas for improvement. Throughout, he provides a selfless representation by detailing his own shortcomings in carrying out the operation. His outline of the issues shows us a humble display of self-awareness and openness. Certainly, he appears at first to deflect responsibility. However, I believe he is largely critiquing himself

military advisors were deployed to Uganda and to LRA affected areas of CAR, South Sudan, and DRC to assist the Ugandan military in conducting counter LRA operations. The U.S. advisors have also provided some training to small teams of DRC and South Sudanese forces engaged in counter LRA operations (CITE). The U.S. advisor effort is known as Operation Observant Compass, or OOC. The US effort was designed to help a 4-nation partnership (South Sudan, Uganda, Central Africa Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo) counter the LRA, a mission that includes training, funding, airlift, logistics, communications and intelligence support, specifically, fusing intelligence and support to operations. As a result of the U.S. involvement, the amount of turmoil in Africa had significantly decreased due to the mere presence of American soldiers. People of the LRA knew the capabilities of the United States therefore it deterred them from attacking them. Not only did Americas help promote a safer state to live in; they also have improved Africa’s health, education, sanitation and infrastructure and many more. Who would know where the continent of Africa would be if the United States of America never got involved in the

The military end state defines the initial, intermediate and ultimate objectives in the Directive for Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary force which are specify the set of the required conditions, termination criteria, and standards for the operations in North Africa. Moreover, the immediate objective in the TORCH outline plan and objectives for the Assault phase provides the required conditions, termination criteria, and standards as well. Therefore, the military end state for Operation TORCH is the complete control of North Africa from Casablanca to Tunisia.

In the United State’s led Global War on Terror; the best battles are the ones won before they even start. The way this is achieved is through a strategy called Foreign Internal Defense. Foreign Internal Defense is “the major military to military advisory effort under National Assistance”1. What that means is Special Operations Forces and conventional military forces train, advise and assist, and equip partner nation forces to carry out operations in their own area of operations. From Morocco to Libya, Foreign Internal Defense is conducted to not only protect the host nation’s citizens, but also to help strengthen the security of the United States. With the growing threat the Islamic State presents to North Africa, FID has been an excellent strategy to counter terrorism in the region by strengthening partner nation forces and enhancing the trainer’s skillset, building relationships between the United States and partner nations, and successfully taking the fight to the Islamic State; however, its efficacy has yet to be proven.