Summary: Improving Strategic Readiness

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

Accountability for personnel aids in the accessing of a unit's assets and combat readiness is called personnel strength reporting. Personnel strength reporting is a command function that enables a unit as a whole, to analyze the manning levels and readiness to provide commanders with a snapshot of the unit's combat power and capabilities. The formula to achieve a Personnel Strength report is achieved by comparing the by name data obtained during the Personnel accountability process and face it against the specified authorizations to determine the percentage of the slots filled for certain positions within a unit. Even though Strength reporting seems to be only important for the deployment process one has to think of the capabilities of each and every by name soldier within the unit, if the soldiers do not report to training how will they every be prepared for when it comes to combat situations.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

The MOL system has transformed how the Marine Corps functions in many different ways. The IS has allowed the organization as a whole to reduce waste and streamline the data it collects to a central location. Requirements of the system have always been present within the organization until recently has not been reasonably attainable with the amount of employees within the organization. The ultimate drive of the system is unit readiness and the unit readiness is easily quantifiable within the system because the commanders within the Marine Corps have instant access to the information required to gauge it. Unit readiness is the ability to leave at a moments notice when called upon by the president or congress to deploy to a war zone. The type and basic uses of the system are some of the most essential parts of the IS. Without the basic use of this system the Marine Corps as a whole would be at a loss without the use of it. In essence the application of this system has changed the business processes of the Marine Corps as a whole.

The following assignment options provide the opportunity for you to identify how a health care process might be updated, streamlined, or implemented in a health care organization.

In support of my capstone project, I assessed and will submit a redesigned proposal with developmental recommendations for reformation of a solid POI for the SPCC that takes place at the Army Logistics University. In this, I have identified the foremost purpose for this redesign as the following: The investment in the education and training of rising leadership is vital to the long-term success of our sustainment support staff and the services provided. With this course providing training in modular force operations for newly selected command designees that enables them to function effectively throughout their command tour it is very important to make sure that the training is substantive. Therefore the main focus is to assure that training is current and emerging sustainment doctrine and leadership topics for commanders on the National Guard, Reservist and Active Duty levels is most essential.

The Army will begin their transition in reducing total personnel and force structure beginning in FY13. Our manning flexibility will be reduced causing affecting our ability to over man formations. Currently we can fill every position we are authorized with a Soldier, however that Soldier may not be of correct grade or MOS for that position. Prioritizing, the Army is going to focus on fully manning deploying units for prioritized operations, synchronizing the personnel assignments process with the ARFORGEN cycle and with Army priorities and invest in top quality officer and non-commissioned officers (NCO) in the institutional

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The National Defense University’s, Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, provides a critical analysis from a strategic perspective on the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan. The study concluded that, “Neither national-level leaders nor field commanders fully understood the operational environment.” Indeed, Secretary Robert Gates stated, “our prospects in both countries were grimmer than perceived; our initial objectives were unrealistic… [and] our knowledge and our intelligence were woefully inadequate. We entered both countries oblivious to how little we knew.” Worse, the study identified that after fifteen years of war senior leaders remained unable to identify what or who the enemy is. Recognizing this deficiency as well as the trends in the operating environment, the United States Army and Marine Corps began a multi-year effort in 2005 to develop methods for commanders and staffs to understand complex problems and visualize solutions to solving them. The result was the Army Design Methodology (ADM), which prepares the military for future wars in a complex environment by bridging art and science in an iterative process that facilitates learning, anticipation, and adaptation. The discussion begins with a brief over view of the operating environment before turning to ADM’s utility in preparing for future wars and addressing two of its criticisms.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

The Army Force Management Program (AFMP) provides integral guidance in developing the future force. In essence, the AFMP provides directional adjustments to the existing force, balances force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) within available and planned resourcing (i.e. people, equipment, time, and resources) and provides vital direction in shaping the force of the future. (AFMM, p. 1) Army leadership utilizes the force management (FM) process to direct force structure adjustments based on strategic guidance, constraints, and precedence in leadership decisions. (ibid) For example, programs such as the Current National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, directed Total Strength Reductions, Joint Force 2020, Decision

In my facility, we take a regimented approach to strategic and tactical planning. There are usually multiple committees formed and operational at any given time, addressing various operational and clinical organizational needs. The committee meetings are highly structured in their approach to identifying the problem, brainstorming for potential solutions, and determining implementation and monitoring/feedback methods.

“An internal capacity for leveraging resources and competences is a prerequisite for creating competitive advantage. Discuss, with references to theory and real world organization of your choice”.