The past decade has witnessed fundamental changes in the information environment, which makes availability and access to information more prevalent than in the past. For this reason, we must develop and maintain the ability to influence the content and flow of information to potential adversaries, as well as foreign civilian audiences in the area of operations. Marines overcome uncertainty and adversity through the innovative application of combined arms. IO is a natural extension and evolution of our Corps’ combined arms mind-set and maneuverist tradition of taking the initiative embodied within MCDP-1 Warfighting. IO seeks to integrate and synchronize information related capabilities with maneuver to target the enemy’s decision-making cycle
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.
Communication. Although the FM 3-37.2 did have an effective method to share information among coalitions. On the contrary, international coalitions were formed, making alliances, to fight terrorism and other threats, coordinators and commanders have found issues communicating to the coalition due to diverse language and culture. Therefore, leading into countries unaware of current information. Currently, coalitions aren’t communicating but commanders of the geographic area are making the decisions on what information is being given. Gradually, leaders of coalitions are having trouble with sharing information among the coalition, of course, there is no secure system that handles secret releasable information. The only way coalitions are communicating
When Ted Turner was launching his cable-TV empire in the '80s, he paid the bills by selling commercial space to anyone who had anything to sell.
must increase control of Information Operations (IO). IO is the integrated employment of core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security; specified to influence, disrupt, and corrupt the adversary. The anti-American propaganda that is released via the internet by ISIL continues to deceive the impressionable and attract volunteers to this terrorist group. The U.S. faces great challenges combating adversary propaganda from ISIL. Successfully locating, jamming and shutting down websites and social media that stream propaganda is not always effective; sites are shut down and moved too quickly. Adversary propaganda is designed to affect behaviors and influence American’s and our allies to disapprove of the war on terrorism, persuade society that their actions are justified and not terrorist actions; several sites solicit funds as well as
All the infrastructures of this country have been subjected to utilize the modern communication system exploited by terrorist networks. The National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Counterterrorist Center for the CIA are behind in a game that playing catch up in is very critical and expensive when citizens amongst military targets are fair game (JMIC, 2002). Authority and command consist of the supervision of personnel in addition to the tools to be used to achieve the inclusive objective. Worldwide to every authority post are three universal actions that consist of inputs, procedures, and outputs. The input part is communications that are normally intelligence or other data created through reports from the field elements or operatives. Furthermore, the procedure portion consist of making decisions about what should be done about the data received from the circumstances and progress reports (McClung & Rainey, PH.Ds, 2001).
Operation tempo in cyber and electronic warfare can be described by the OODA (Observe Orient Decision Action) loop decision making process (Pace). The steps occupy a logical order of electronic attack or defense. First, a particular electromagnetic characteristic is observed by either human or electronic operators. For example, a spike in a frequency known to be used by the enemy, indicating a potential target for electronic attack, or a sudden increase in noise on friendly systems which could indicate jamming by an adversary. Orientation is the allocation of resources to either exploit or counter the observed characteristic, such as reconfiguring analog or digital tuners, clocks, or filters
An information advantage assumes that one’s own troop and weapon command and control components are informed to a greater degree than are those of the enemy, that they possess more complete, detailed, accurate and timely information than does the enemy, and that the condition and capabilities of one’s own command and control system make it possible to actualize this advantage in combat actions of troops (forces).” (“Ten Key Elements of the Russian Understanding of Information Operations,” 2004, Timothy L. Thomas, FMSO, Ft
Dissemination and fusion of information into targeting channels is often inadequate and difficult to accomplish. Determining reliability of the source and verifying the information is often very difficult (Department of the Army 2006) Some of the limitation to using OSINT is that information overload, filtering can be difficult, along with finding and searching information can take up a lot of time. It requires a large amount of analytical work from humans in order to distinguish valid, verified information from false, misleading or simply inaccurate news and information. OSINT must be
Information warfare (IW) is a concept which involves the use of information in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. This includes spreading of propaganda or disinformation to manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information. In this context, it was Prussia that maximized informational resource available to achieve the strategic objective.
In this research, I will conclude some of the most essential trends in information and communication nowadays, and explain why they are so important and how they are probably going to be.
The last chapter focuses on the importance of gathering information from reliable sources and managing them. It specifically discusses the value and methods of developing good information sources. It describes five kinds of spies: local spies, inside spies, reverse spies, dead spies, and living spies. Reliable information can help mold your own strategy and gain competitive
However, existing U.S. strategies have three shortfalls: 1) scope (addressing all dimensions in the information environment), 2) deterrence (defining acts of war), and 3) whole-of-nation approach. The first shortfall is that the scope must be broader. U.S. strategies sufficiently address threats to the physical and informational dimensions within the information environment. However, the U.S. lacks a strategy that identifies challenges and threats in the cognitive dimension within the information environment. Adversaries, such as ISIS, are effectively utilizing influence campaigns to advance their agenda by manipulation of the values, perceptions, and beliefs of the U.S. public and other target audiences. Information, or misinformation, is a primary means to shape global opinions. The U.S. continues to yield the initiative in influence operations and function in a reactionary capacity. Strategic communication messaging to enhance U.S. credibility and legitimacy have been slow and at times ineffective. The behavior data generated through social media has enabled researchers to understand groups, globally making it easier to spread and
How information is collected, distributed, searched and consumed on the Internet has created huge ripple effects that it impacts not just businesses and journalism, but crosses into politics, medicine, and media. Ultimately, it affects the average person’s day-to-day lives.
With “systems of systems” fielded within the DOD both structured and unstructured data may be fused into actionable intelligence or PIR’s answered for combatant commanders. With accurate intelligence this may influence commanders and policymakers to act or not. The technological help of the systems gives more credibility. An adversary may be more nefarious as originally thought or vice versa.