Summary Of Maphet V. Heiselman

Mr. Simpson, a minor resident of California, is seeking to inherit from the estate of Mrs. Sweeney, decedent and resident of California at time of death, under the doctrine of equitable adoption. Mrs. Sweeney is the widow of Sam Sweeney (hereinafter called “Mr. Sweeney”), and the mother of Hannah Sweeney (hereinafter referred to as “Hannah”), the biological daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Sweeney (hereinafter referred to jointly as “the Sweeney’s”). Simpson interview, pg 3. In 2008, the Sweeney’s obtained formal custody of Mr. Simpson from the San Diego, Superior Court in California. Id. at 7. Mr. Simpson was eight at the time of obtaining custody. Id. at 4. The custody agreement awarded sole custody of Mr. Simpson to the Sweeney’s. During the time Mr. Sweeney was alive, Mrs. Sweeney attempted to talk Mr. Sweeney into formal adoption of Mr. Sweeney numerous time to no avail. Id. at 4. Mr. Sweeney did not believe in formal adoption of children, but nevertheless he continued to care for Mr. Simpson as he was his own child. Id. Mrs. Sweeney also spoke with an attorney about adoption while Mr. Sweeney was still alive. Id. at 5. During this time the Sweeney’s fed, clothed, and provided a home for Mr. Simpson without the financial support of others. Id. at 6. Mr. Simpson also went on vacations and took part in events, such as family pictures, that would form a familial relationship, and Mrs. Sweeney wore a “mothers ring” with Hannah’s and Mr.

Szafranski and Ms. Dunston would both be considered legal co-parents of the child and that Mr. Szafranski agrees to undertake all legal, custodial, and other obligations to the child regardless of any changes between each party. Furthermore, the co-parent agreement went on to state that any eggs retrieved and cryopreserved as a result of the in vitro fertilization retrieval shall be under Ms. Dunston’s sole control and should the couple separate, Ms. Dunston will control the disposition of those pre-embryos. The co-parent agreement was never signed yet the couple moved forward with the in vitro fertilization. In May of 2010, Mr. Szafranski sent Ms. Dunston a text message effectively ending their relationship and then filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County three months later seeking to permanently enjoin Ms. Dunston from using the pre-embryos so he could preserve his right to not be forced into fathering a child against his will. Mr. Szafranski argued that a man and woman are in equal positions when it comes to cryopreserved embryos as they’re not inside the woman’s body. Therefore, Mr. Szafranski argued, “the constitutional right not to be a parent means the consent of both the woman and the man is required for any sue of the pre-embryos. “ In September

Identify and investigate these contemporary issues relating to family law and evaluate the effectiveness of legal and non-legal responses to these issues

A train barreled over Joseph Hewins' body on a wintry evening in 1845 in the Massachusetts Berkshires. Hewins had spent the workday shoveling snow off the tracks, only to be killed on his trip back to town when a switchman got distracted. Hewins left behind a wife and three children, who were poor even before his death. His widow sued but lost at every level. Had the train merely chopped off Hewins' leg, the railroad would have paid. But in the perverse logic of that time, when a man died, he took his legal claims with him. And so the thinking went for most of the century, until something unheard of began to happen. The courts started to put a dollar value on a life--after death.

With fault based divorce in the 1960s, child custody depended primarily on the child’s age. If the child was under seven years old, also known as the ‘tender years,’ the mother would receive physical custody. This was because of the belief at the time that women are good caregivers and it was their job to take care of the children at home. However, if the children were older, custody would be granted to the parent of the same sex. Sometimes judges would also award custody of children dependent on martial or sexual conduct of the spouses. When custody was awarded in this way, the presiding judge could be more focused on the rights of the parents than what is best for the child in that situation. Either way, it was quite noticeable that child custody was based on the judge and their opinion, which could change from case to case.

Mr. Katzoff stated in July 2014, they came up with an agreement, joint decision making which included four overnights. He indicated that he agreed to 4 overnights over a 14 day period until Hudson fourth birthday. He indicated that he wanted to avoid litigation. The father reported on the child’s fourth birthday, Dr. Kaplowicz was going to make a recommendation for a fifth overnight. It was recommended and he get an extra overnight. The father stated that he agreed to the recommendation of Dr. Kapolowicz to avoid going to court. However, he indicated that from the beginning he wanted to 50-50 custody. The father stated that the parents signed a document agreeing to the proposal of Dr. Koplowicz. Mr. Katzoff stated that the parents lived by Dr. Koplowicz recommendation for about one year until October 2015. He indicated that decided that he was no longer agreeable to the plan of Dr. Koplowicz. He reported that Dr. Koplowicz recommendation indicated that the father would not get a sixth day until after the child was in first grade (2.5 years later).

Christopher Lambesis (Father) and Erin Lambesis (Mother) were divorced in 2013. In the divorce decree, Father was ordered to pay Mother $100 per month for child support for the two minor children. In October 2014, Father filed a Petition to Modify Child Support. Based on his own calculations using the Parent’s Worksheet for Child Support, he requested Mother pay him $100 per month. Mother requested a hearing in response including her own calculations indicating that Father should be paying her $123 per month. An evidentiary hearing was held and the court ordered Father to pay mother child support amounting to $149.30 per month. Father filed a Motion for a New Trial stating that he was not provided with documentation regarding Mother’s financial status in a timely manner and that the family court’s child support obligation calculations were incorrect. Mother filed an Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The court denied Father’s request for a new trial and granted Mother’s request for attorney fees. Father filed a motion to reconsider the allocation of parenting time coordinator’s fees. This motion was also denied. Father appealed the court’s decision.

Procedural Facts: In May 2010, a couple of months after Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski donated his sperm and have eight eggs fertilized for freezing, Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski sent Defendant Karla Dunston a text message ending the relationship. In August 2010, two months after the relationship ended, Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski filed a pro se complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski sought to keep Defendant Karla Dunston from using the frozen pre-embryos so he was not forced to father a child against his will. Defendant Karla Dunston ended up counterclaiming and asking the court to grant her sole custody and control over the pre-embryos so she could someday use the pre-embryos to bear her children. Defendant Karla Dunston sited breach of contract and asked the court for relief under promissory estoppel. The circuit court ended up siding with Defendant Karla Dunston by granting her full custody and control over the use of the frozen pre-embryos.

Amie Cullimore, a medical practitioner, filed a child support claim against Michael Ranson, who more than two decades ago donated his sperm to Amie Cullimore, who subsequently conceived two children. Cullimore alleges that throughout the years, Ranson has assumed the role of loco parentis, which means that Ranson has stood in the place of the parent throughout the years. Ranson filed a response that Bill 28, also known as, All Families Are Equal Act, which extinguishes Cullimore`s claim based on the assertion that the surrogate parents who lack an intention to be parents cannot be considered parents in law.

Mr. Conklin’s legal representative revealed through the testimony of the non-custodial parent (NCP), James W. Conklin, that he was divorced from the custodial parent (CP), Kathleen Conklin, in 1989 in the Circuit Court of Madison County. He stated that the documentation presented as Conklin Exhibit 5-Payment Record Letter from the Common Wealth of Virginia Department of Social Service Division of Child Support Enforcement shows as of May 10, 2004 on the NCP’s account the amount of arrears, a record of payments, and charges. The document indicates that the NCP was behind $3,548.49 as of May 10, 2004; the NCP was paying child support. The youngest child was Jason, date of birth May 7, 1985; by May 10, 2004, he reached the age of 19. The

Along with every story, there are two sides that can be debated upon. The husband and wife who had a three-year-old child were

Tom Hanks once said, “A hero is somebody who voluntarily walks into the unknown” (“Tom Hanks Quotes”). When people volunteer in the army and work as a farmer they are stepping into the unknown everyday. Loras Heims, has helped many people as a lifelong farmer, and through his service in the United States Army. Because of his life choices, Loras Heims is a hero.

At issue in this petition is whether the determination by the trial court, should the child be turned over to Julie Williams. In light, of this judgement solely based on prior gestational agreement forms, Julie Williams is requesting that the decision be overturned and the surrogate turn over the child.

Van Staagen’s testimony revealed that he and the CP were married in June 1992 and divorced in May 2004 that left the CP with custody of the children and him paying child support of $1,323.00. Mr. Van Staagen stated that from the date of the divorce until August 2011 he paid the $1,323.00 without ever missing a payment, completely supporting his children. Mr. Van Staagen quoted from the agreement, page 2, “Husband shall pay to the wife for the support and maintenance of the children the sum of $1,323.00 per month until each child shall attain the age of nineteen years or shall marry, whichever shall first occur.” He stated this is a confusing sentence to him because it does not say pay $1,323.00 a month until both children turn age 19. He stated he understand that this may not be the intent of what the document should say but it clearly says until each child obtain the age of 19; does not state anything about coming back to court to change the child support after the first child turn 19 or anything like that. He stated it left both, he and the CP to believe that once a child turn 19, the support should be reduced. To add to that, the NCP stated when the oldest child was 17; she went away to school in August 2011. The NCP stated that in August 2011, the CP requested him to give half the support to their oldest child and the other half to the CP. That continued until the oldest child turn 19 at which time he stopped paying child support directly to the oldest child;

It wasn’t until the 1960s and 1970s that more unmarried pregnant woman opted to keep their babies instead of putting them up for adoption (Else, A., 2012). Due to the financial pressures of sole-parenting the Domestic Proceedings Act was introduced in 1968, which required fathers to pay mothers some maintenance for