Summary of the Argument In this brief, I am going to prove to you, the judges and the court, that Officer Raymond’s initial stop is objectively justified under the Fourth Amendment and the New Setonia Statute. Because the truck was old, Officer Raymond’s experience being a police officer, and Mr. Jackson’s making movements towards the glovebox while Officer Billy was approaching the car, this proved there was reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Additionally, even if Mr. Jackson’s car was not a commercial vehicle, there were enough other factors pertaining to search of the truck that made the mistake of law objectively reasonable. Based on all of the facts and the evidence listed in the case, the state of New Setonia is going to win. Argument A. Officer Raymond’s reason for stopping Mr. Jackson’s car was objectively reasonable. Therefore, because of the reasonable interpretation, this proves reasonable suspicion was present. There are many reasons justifying Officer Billy Raymond’s stop in regards to Mr. Jackson. The main reason was because of Aaron Jackson’s loud truck noise. As stated under New Setonia Statute 123§45, the section states how trucks must have a muffled or dampened sound. Because Aaron Jackson’s Ford F-150 truck caused a loud noise, which is prohibited in New Setonia, it caused Officer Raymond to pull him over. Therefore, it is understood the New Setonia Statute 123§45’s main goal is for trucks to have a dampened sound. For the reason being this statute is
This case is important to anyone working in law enforcement because of the objective reasonableness standard that it established via the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This case also reversed a four-factor test regarding use of force that was used to test if the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or was applied with malice to cause harm. The Supreme Court in 490 U.S. 396 (1986) determined that the four factor test did not cover all possible situations and only the decision making skills of a human being can adequately determine the appropriate use of force.
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. The Court found that the officer acted on more than an “hunch” and that “a reasonably prudent
Both parties in this case agreed that a seizure did occur when Deputy Scott collided with the rear of Harris’ vehicle, but Scott contended that given the circumstances of the chase, his actions were reasonable. Harris attempted to use the standards set in Tennessee v. Garner. The decision in the Garner case was that the officer’s excessive use of force was not reasonable because the suspect did pose an immediate danger to the innocent bystanders, the officer gave no warning, and the excessive force was unnecessary to stop the suspect’s
Facts: In September 2004, New Mexico police officers received a report that Larry Begay, the
Respondent was halted by Border Patrol Agent Stoddard while driving on an unpaved street in a remote territory of southeastern Arizona. A puqrsuit of his vehicle uncovered more than 100 pounds of pot, and he was accused of ownership with purpose to appropriate. The Federal District Court denied respondent's movement to smother, refering to various certainties that gave Stoddard sensible suspicion to stop the vehicle. The Ninth Circuit turned around. In its perspective, truth particular weighing of circumstances or other multifaceted tests brought instability and capriciousness into the Fourth Amendment examination, making it important to plainly delimit the elements that an officer may consider in making stops, for example, this one. It then held that few elements depended upon by the District Court conveyed almost no weight in the sensible suspicion math and that the remaining variables were insufficient to render the stop allowable.
the weapons voided the defendant's fourth amendment, stating officer McFadden had no probable cause to stop them. The motion to suppress was overruled on the basis that McFadden had the benefit of experience. The prosecution the argued that the search incident to the stop was legal because it was purely for the officer’s protection. The court then made a point to distinguish an investigative stop from an arrest, and a frisk from a full search. It was established that McFadden had the right to pat them down due to a reasonable belief that Terry and Chilton could be armed. After the court denied the motion to suppress Terry and Chilton pled guilty and waived their jury trial. Terry and Chilton appealed, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed it,
The first issue in this case was whether or not the evidence collected in the case should have been suppressed or not. When Moore was first arrested the vehicle in which he was driving was then searched. Moore thought that the evidence should have been suppressed do to the fact that he was arrested on a misdemeanor charge where there doesn’t have to be an arrest made. Since the officers arrested him and then preceded to search his car Moore believed that this was a violation of his fourth amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable search and seizures. According to the case Gerstein v. Pugh and Brinegar v. United States if arresting officers have probable cause that a person committed even a minor offense in his presence the arrest is deemed constitutional reasonable. The case California v.
Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. Hudson’s counsel moved to subdue the evidence from the record because of the violation of Hudson’s Fourth Amendment right when the officers prematurely entered his home. The issue was whether or not a violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule would call for the courts to throw out of all evidence found in a warranted search if police do not exercise the rule announcing their presence and giving proper time for the citizen to respond before entering the citizen’s home. Upon
2) Based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer pulled Mr. Hightower based on unreasonable suspicion and no probable cause. Mr. Hightower from Metropolis drove a late model Corvette at around 3 am down Main Street does not arouse suspicion to a reasonable person. In addition, the arresting officer did not witness Mr. Hightower commit any traffic violation or any crime and it is legal to drive around the city at 3 am. The officer violated Mr. Hightower’s Fourth Amendment right of protection of unlawful
Stop and frisk was legally based off of early cases that showcased its importance. The case of Terry v. Ohio led to the development of legal stop and frisk in New York during the year of 1968. The case was built from a detective providing a stop and frisk on two males who had the potential to commit a crime. Within the case of Sibron v. New York, a stop and frisk was legally made by Officer Anthony Martinez in New York in 1967. Officer Martinez observed Nelson Sibron for hours. The officer believed Sibron was suspicious enough to stop because Martinez believed Sibron was carrying illegal
To justify a stop under the Supreme Court’s Terry decision, a police officer must have “a reasonable suspicion” of some wrongdoing. In determining reasonableness, an officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts” that warrant the governmental intrusion; reliance on “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or [a] ‘hunch’ ” is not permissible. Furthermore, the scope of any resulting police search must be narrowly tailored to match the original reason for the stop. The Court emphasized that a search must always be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justif[ied] its initiation.”
The Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable seizures under the fourth amendment. The stop of the individual by the law enforcement does not constitute an unlawful seizure because it was reasonable within the meaning of Heien and therefore suppression is not warranted. Section A evaluates that the initial bicycle stop was reasonable because the officer reasonably thought appellant violated the California Vehicle Code. Section B identifies that even if the initial detention was unconstitutional the doctrine of the fruit of the
It's interesting that the Supreme Court decided in Whren vs. U.S. that any offense was a legitimate legal basis for a stop, regardless of the officer's subjective state of mind. Ultimately, this decision is an easy out and can be used to stop and search any vehicle an officer wants which goes against what the Fourth Amendment stands for (Siegel). Our country has developed a system based on fair and equal treatment of all people and not unfair treatment based on one’s race or color. In another case of Ohio v. Robinette, the Court rejected the argument that officers seeking consent to search a vehicle must tell the driver he is free to refuse permission and leave (Find Law).
1. Did officer Smith have reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop of this vehicle?
If not wearing a seat belt is illegal and punishable by law in that state, I think officers did have right to stop the person. I know it’s not how it is not sounding right, but if I am an officer while on duty and see something suspicious, I think I will act as if I work in that jurisdiction. Officers are also citizens, so applying citizen arrest shouldn’t be against them. It is also an officer call to whether the arrest is reasonable and he believes that he has a probable cause toward that arrest. I think if the officer believe a crime has been commited or the law have been violated, they have the reasonable right to stop. This is actually what community messed up with probable cause or reasonable cause. It is hard to understand the law correctly, because the public don’t always know the rights and the meaning of it. I sometime did think police shouln’t stop me without committing any fault. This was before I take this class, but now I understand that a reasonable