Summary Of The Ideological Roots Of Failure By Tony Dodge

Invading Iraq was—and remains—a highly debated and controversial decision within both world politics and the academic disciplines of politics and international relations. With a growing number of deaths, rising tensions in the Middle East, and a failure to find any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the voices condemning the Bush administration have been increasing ever since the decision to go to war was announced. While many scholars have traditionally argued against the war, this paper will argue that the Iraq War can be justified.

Foreign policy decision-makers are not omnipotent enlightened individuals who can calmly evaluate all available information, assign relative values, and reflectively consider options. Instead, foreign policy is determined by individuals, as a collective, attempting to comprehend a bewildering array of information sources while influenced by personal emotion, relationships, and a subjective understanding of history. Theory, henceforth, is simplification of reality predisposed to emphases certain facts while degrading others. In explaining the reasons for Australia’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, neoclassical realism and constructivism will be applied in deepening the rationale exploration. The systemic, national, and individual facets of this decision are examined supported discussing surrounding social rules, identity, perceptions, and the US-Australian alliance. Neoclassical realism combined structural realist theories with a deep unit-specific analysis to inform understandings of foreign policy where it is assumed states seek increases in relative power. Constructivism, however, is as social science allows for analysists to drill down into relationships and individuals to determine the its socially formatted nature.

With numerous opinions regarding whether the United States should continue airstrikes, re-send troops, or go another route, it is difficult to resolve the situation. Former Michigan representative Kerry Bentivolio’s thoughts that the removal of the United States’ troops from Iraq allowed the militant group easier access to overthrow the government is shared by many conservatives. Bentivolio (2009, para. 10) said in his address to congress

“If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” These were the first words spoken that would give any inclination towards what was soon to come. In George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, he referred to the Middle East as an “axis of evil,” a term that would be used for the next ten years, throughout the devastating war with Iraq. Millions of American’s views on Iraq were clouded by the malicious actions of the few nineteen suicide bombers on September 11, 2001, and other preconceptions about the Muslim people. Consequently, today many people think that the U.S.’s involvement in Iraq was successful, removing Hussein’s regime and restoring freedom in Iraq. However, they probably aren’t aware of the massive impacts the war has had on Iraq and less importantly, America. The U.S./Iraq war has had a devastating impact on the social and economic states of Iraq, and has contributed to the U.S. pouring billions of dollars of taxpayer money into the military.

Information is revised and edited to be accurate. Britannica is a reliable website. Sources used are both primary and secondary. No knowledge needed to read this article. Great place to start. Covers most aspects of the Invasion of iraq and the iraq War in 2003. Written chronologically.

As previously outlined the US invaded Iraq without any international support from international organisations such as the United Nations. This lack of international support contrasts with another invasion of Kuwait; a country in a similar area of the world as Iraq, in 1993. It is argued by many that the lack of international support is integral to how the invasion of Iraq by the United States has led to a limited development of Iraq. A former British and America government advisor Dan Plesch argues that this lack of support led to a significantly lower number of troops than needed for peaceful and successful transition as planned by the US Army. This advocates the view that despite planning with a bigger force, America’s kneejerk reaction

The decision to invade Iraq was perhaps the largest foreign policy blunder in modern Western history. Its immense cost—in the thousands of lives lost, trillions of dollars spent, and an unquantifiable amount of political capital squandered—represents an immense failure at many levels of government. Today, even though Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and security state have been dismantled, Iraq remains ruined: its economy is in shambles, sectarian strife is rampant, and the Islamic State, a terrorist army, controls much of the northern and western parts of the nation. Iraq is a “state” in name only. In her memoir “The Unraveling” documenting her experiences in Iraq, Professor Emma Sky argues that to identify who is responsible for this failure, blame cannot be placed on just one actor. Both Western policymaking blunders—from the marginalization of experts to de-Baathification to the support of Nouri al-Maliki—and Iraqi politicians’ self-serving agendas acted in concert to exacerbate the sectarianism that ultimately tore the country apart.

Destroying Iraq’s key society underpinnings risked effective American post-war governance and put the invasion force Commander’s objectives at odds with the overall strategic objective. General Franks misunderstood the operational environment, misdiagnosed the problem and pursued an operational approach that inhibited post-invasion success.

In the outcome of America's intrusion of Iraq, Norman Podhoretz, the neoconservative polemicist and supervisor of Commentary, composed a long exposition contending that the fight against Islamist fanaticism added up to "World War IV." Podhoretz had an energy for the prophetically catastrophic coinage, however, numerous observers on both the privilege and left comprehended al Qaeda's stunning assault on American soil as the opening round of a war between the West and "Islamofascism," as Christopher Hitchens called it. That temperament died down as the terrorists neglected to mount likewise fantastic assaults in any event in the United States and as the peculiar disappointment of the war in Iraq cooled the passion of numerous easy chair soldiers

One of the founding fathers of political realism, Hans Morgenthau [1948], states that mankind exists to quench its thirst for power. Realism believes that any political action is determined by the pursuit of power of any state- whether for self-preservation or simply, expansion of the existing power- as was the case in the 2003 war. ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ involved a U.S.-led coalition which sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime.

With the benefit of hindsight, many people consider the invasion of Iraq a failure. After the initial invasion of Iraq, things go worse instead of better within the country. Ultimately both the United States and Iraq payed a heavy cost due to Western intervention, which this paper will later discuss. The purpose of this research paper is to the Iraq invasion which includes the events leading to the invasion, the invasion itself, and the consequences. The purpose of examining the Iraq invasion as a whole is because a proper understanding of the event cannot be achieved without proper context. Actions have consequences, which this paper will explore. Although the invasion of Iraq took place in 2003, the first paragraph will discuss the country

It is substantial to understand that there was a significant difference of opinions among these diverse groups. On the pro-war side were the neocons and the political leadership of the bush administration: VP Cheney, secretary of defense Rumsfeld and his deputy Wolfiwutz .the neocons were convinced that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to U.S and they were optimistic about the ability of the U.S military action to establish a democratic government in Iraq with beneficial consequences for the middle east.at first Bush was against the decision to go to war with Iraq, but after 9/11, bush adopted the neocons vision of how national security policy should deal with the threat. However, The author argues the decision was made to rectify the profound mistake that was made by the first Bush administration. On the other side were the skeptics about the likelihood that war to depose Saddam Hussein would lead to democracy for Iraq as well as those who were dubious about some of the claims the administration made about Saddams’s WMD. The skeptic included many democrats and member’s of George H.W.Bush’s administration and some military leaders in the professional officer corps. The author points out some democrats supported the resolution because of their fear that a negative vote could be used

After examining both Liberal Internationalist and Realist perspectives, the best interpretation is a combination of the two. The way in which Bush used weapons of mass destruction, as well as open critiques of Iraq’s non-democratic nature to justify the invasion exudes resemblances of Liberal Internationalism. Bush’s actions are similar to nineteen and twentieth century imperialism, as he forced a head of state out of office and dismantled the government using hard power. While Bush and several members of Congress believed America was invading for the right reasons, his justification as well as his execution of the mission lacked the depth of foreign policy knowledge to have positive outcomes for both parties involved. This can be seen in Iraq

Critical approach provides a historical background to Iraq war of 2003 which, according to historical materialists, has its roots in U.S. sponsored Fordist Industrial Capitalism linked with geopolitics of petroleum. According to Andrew Basevich (2005 a, 2008, 2010) the very nature of U.S. State policy is characterized by

During the Bush presidency years, however, the definition of ‘rogue state’ has become increasingly muddled. It now takes account not simply of how states interact with other states, but also of how particular regimes treat their own people. From President Bush’s perspective, a state can be classified as a rogue if it denies freedom to some of its citizens. He views the rogue state as the chief threat to global order. His foreign policies, thus, aim either to alter the behavior of rogue states, or, failing that, to eliminate those regimes that refuse to play by the rules. The Bush Doctrine advances three core propositions: