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Legal positivism is generally based on the principle that Law and morality is distinct and that the validity of a rule depends more on its sources, while Natural law would be more inclined to favour features of reasonableness and the link between morality and law. There are two predominant groups of legal theorists being, Natural law theorists and Positive law theorists, John Austin and HLA Hart

In August 2015, the case Miller V Davis brought to light the complicated relationship between law and morality. Indeed, Mrs Davis a county clerk in Rowan county (Kentucky), is being sued for not delivering marriage licences to same sex couples as she believes that homosexuality is morally wrong. Thus, despite the fact that same-sex marriage has been made legal by the U.S Supreme Court since June 2015. Ought individuals to apply the law though it is in inadequacy with their moral beliefs? Do the law should be totally free from any moral influence? Many legal scholars have argued on these questions, as well as trying to define the terms “law” and “morality”. While no one has agreed to a universal definition, law can be defined as a “body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects”. On the other hand, morality is referred to as an “ethical wisdom” , the set of common values unifying a society. This essay will discuss the role of morality in the law, while analysing different legal school of thoughts arguing on the topic. First of all, positivists such as Bentham, Austin and Hart, argued that morality should not interfere with the law as it is created by a legitimate authority. On the other hand, naturalist theorists, such as Aristotle, Fuller and Dworkin, believed in the existence of a “higher law”, highly influenced by morals, has to be integrated in a legal system

PHL 612 Philosophy of Law [Calendar Description]: What is law? What makes something a legal norm? Should

Common law is created from the customs and precedents set in the country rather than statutes created by Congress. Common law allowed more discretion on behalf of the judges originally, but less room for change down the line. Natural law is the basis for human contact and does not waiver on moral principles. Natural rights are less vague than the law; meaning, natural rights are part of a person. You cannot be a person if you give up your natural rights, these rights are inalienable, and are the rights referred to in the Declaration of Independence. Legal positivism emphasizes the belief that law is synonymous with positive norms. The norms of legal positivism are created through common law. Legal positivism also argues that the legality of an issue does not settle the morality of issues; legality is always separate from

Each of these philosophies has engendered rich schools of thought and many tomes have been devoted to defining each position, but we can distill working definitions from their governing hermeneutic principles. Textualism (often called strict constructivism) calls for an interpretation and application of the law guided by taking the words of a source document literally with strict adherence to etymology and historical precedent.1 Legal pragmatism, in contrast, adopts a hermeneutics stressing ‘‘(1) the importance of context; (2) the lack of foundations; (3) the instrumental nature of law; and (4) the unavoidable presence of alternate perspectives.’’2 In the Hamdi case, Justice O’Connor’s pragmatism battled and bested Justice Scalia’s textualism. That triumph, however, was a narrow victory, and a victory riddled with dissonance. It was also a victory that evoked from Scalia one of the more scathing jeremiads he has issued from the bench. In what follows, I shall analyze the argumentation of Hamdi in terms of substance and style, and will look at the various opinions issued, along with a detailed examination of Scalia’s lamentation. A decidedly American philosophy, pragmatism seeks what works. In that pursuit, its focus on the instrumental often privileges expediency over principle. For many human endeavors, finding expedient resolutions simply

R.M. Dworkin wrote an essay titled “Is Law a System of Rules?” In this essay he proposes an argument against the Legal Positivism, more specifically the version of Legal Positivism that H.L.A Hart was a proponent of. In his essay Dworkin puts forth the ideas of rules and more importantly legal binding principles behind rules. Dworkin says that these principles can be legally binding and the legal positivist position has issues with validating them as a legally binding construct due to issues with the legal positivists approach to validating such a rule which hart called the Rule of Recognition. This is one part of Dworkins argument that I have trouble agreeing with. Dworkin stated in his essay that there are multiple reasons why The Rule of Recognition does not work with legal principles such as; that they do not have any pedigree, they do not stem from a legislature, three is no way to tell how much support a principle needs to make itself a legal principle, and from the positivist point of view introducing a new legal rule through judicial discretion creates ex post facto legislation. I plan to take a look at these points and put forth my hesitations for going along with them, as well as looking into the idea that Mr. Hart’s Rule of Recognition could be made to work with the legal principles that Dworkin is arguing for.

The contrast between Natural Law and Legal Positivism is a necessary starting point for those who wish to understand the relationship between law and morality, and the most varied manners in which it influences society to this day. When it comes to analyzing which theory offers the most well-rounded idea of law, one can argue that Legal Positivism provides the best definition of what law is at its essence. However, because Legal Positivism came to exist as a critique to what was proposed by Natural Law theorists, it is significant that both are explored in depth as means to support such argument.

Law and morality work together to guide our behavior; while law does it by punishing us if we do something wrong, morality does it through incentives. In their articles, both H.L.A Hart in “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” and Lon Fuller’s reply to professor Hart in “Positivism and Fidelity to Law,” discuss the concept of law post world war II Germany and their re-imagining of natural law as put forth by Gustav Radbruch’s theory. In this paper, I hope to show how both law and morality is needed to create just rules, more specifically drawing from the “grudge informer” case mentioned in Hart’s article. First, I will explain the dilemma of the “grudge informer” case and the contradicting theory laid down by Radbrunch’s.

This paper will demonstrate how Hart’s account of the relationship between law and morality shows an understanding of how they both work together yet can also work as separate entities. It will take a specific look into the internal point of view to aid the understanding of why

John Finnis, an Australian legal philosopher has tried to resurrect the natural law tradition in moral philosophy and law since the mid-1960s. He tries to offer a "neo-Aquinian" natural law philosophy which does not presuppose a divine being. By focusing attention on goods rather than a single Good, Finnis skilfully articulates what he calls a theory of moral action for our day. Or, in other words, he seeks a theory of how to live well. Finnis identifies a number of equally valuable basic goods or ends, given human nature, there are seven. Three are substantive, existing prior to action and four are reflexive which is depending on our choices.

The legal-formalist belief in the capacity of legal rules to determine the outcomes to legal disputes without having recourse to the judge’s political beliefs or sense of fairness has been severely criticised by, amongst others, legal realists and critical legal studies scholars. This assignment will firstly address what legal formalism entails, following which the criticisms of legal formalism will be discussed and lastly whether legal formalism can impede the transformative ideas of the Constitution. All of the above will be analysed to determine the role of legal formalism today.

This shows us that the idea that Dworkin has of moral principles playing a role in judicial decision-making and interpretation is correct to a large extent, and thus the use of subjectivity is accurate and apparent.

This article discusses the conceptions of legal normativity, both moral and “strictly legal” conceptions. According to Spaak, regarding the normative force of legal justification, legal positivists can still embrace the moral idea and not be in conflict with their generally held belief in the “strictly legal” concept of law. In Torben Spaak’s opinion, there is a reason to desire legal positivism; he explains this through introducing the concept of jurisprudence. When discussing the nature of law, Spaak states, “that while the moral conception is what is likely favored on a smaller scale, the strictly legal conception is more appealing because it is broader,” (478). Spaak is arguing, his belief that “validity-based explanations come nearer to the truth,”(483) rather than belief-based explanations. He concludes that we are to prefer legal positivism over natural law theory. “That is why in this article I have been concerned with the law itself rather than our views about it.”(483)

In this paper, I will propose that it is better to look at whether a law is legally valid or not through the perspective of natural law theory as opposed to positivist theory. My argument consists mostly of the language of “improvement” which can only exist based on the theory of natural law which states that law is something which has an objective truth behind it. Only when there is an objective mark to hit can there be hits and misses and I believe that positivism disregards the possibility of hits and misses entirely. So, my argument is that it makes more sense to consider legal validity of a law from the perspective of natural law rather than positive law because it includes not only the previously set up legal system when considering validity, but it also considers the general idea of some kind of morality as well. A sub argument is that the starting legal system must have had some basis by which to have been created and accepted which must be some form or notion of morality.

Frederick Schauer’s paper, Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law, has two central claims. First, the fact that law is primarily coercive (with the use of sanctions to ensure compliance) has been vastly overlooked in the wake of H.L.A Hart’s critique of John Austin’s work on legal positivism. Second, those who aim to study the philosophical nature of law would be better to examine what makes law truly important and distinctive rather than the necessary and mandatory features of law. In this paper, I will begin by describing Austin’s account of the nature of law. Then, I will explore Hart’s criticisms of Austin’s account that Schauer objects to before delving into Schauer’s argument. To conclude, I will