Summary: The Current United States National Security Strategy

The American “way of war” can be seen politically through the evolution of military policy as political perspectives changed. Post-World War II reveals primary and consistent policies that lead American military policymakers to avoid major international conflict. Coined the Cold War, Americans began waging war

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.

Recently, and especially since the 1990s, a popular conception of the world is that the age of empires and superpowers is waning, rapidly being replaced by a kind of global community made up of interdependent states and deeply connected through economics and technology. In this view, the United States' role following the Cold War is one of almost benign preeminence, in which it seeks to spread liberal democracy through economic globalization, and, failing that, military intervention. Even then, however, this military intervention is framed as part of a globalizing process, rather than any kind of unilateral imperialist endeavor. However, examining the history of the United States since nearly its inception all the way up to today reveals that nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States is an empire in the truest sense of the word, expanding its control through military force with seemingly no end other than its own enrichment. The United States' misadventure in Iraq puts the lie to the notion that US economic and military action is geared towards any kind of global progression towards liberal democracy, and forces one to re-imagine the United States' role in contemporary global affairs by recognizing the way in which it has attempted to secure its own hegemony by crippling any potential threats.

After unraveling of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, fears of war breaking out between the major powers of the United States and the Soviet Union were greatly reduced. Numerous commentaries, reports, and studies arose out of the question of what to do with the excess U.S. forces, and how to reshape them for a new era (Snider & Carlton-Carew, 1996). Since the birth of the United States, the military has been an important part of the United States. The US military has been a fundamental part of foreign policy, including fostering democracy, establishing rule of law, and assisting with economic development in territories allied with the U.S. (Ludema, 2007).

United States involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last thirteen years has resulted in much debate over the role of the United States military. This debate is encouraged, as it will sustain conversation of how to best employ an important yet dwindling national resource. The publication of Dominic Tierney’s article “Why Has America Stopped Winning Wars” speaks directly to this debate. The article argues that the US military has lost the capability of winning wars since World War II . Tierney posits that the world is a more peaceful place and the United States is incapable of adapting to the resultant style of low intensity conflict that normally rises with state peace. He believes the U.S. government has a lust for global hegemony. The excessive use of military force is the only way to quench Washington’s thirst He concludes with an implication that American’s victory culture has led to disillusionment of our government’s expectations, and that this culture should be reexamined in order to prevent unnecessary loss of life in the future. Although Tierney makes a valiant effort to question US military strategic efforts over the last 70 years, he fails to realize that America’s emphasis on national security is a major contributing factor for why the world has seen a reduction in state-on-state war.

President Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his extraordinary, worldly diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” During the early twentieth century, he brandished that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy in support of his country’s political objectives. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him as a diplomat and Commander in Chief was the superior power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nation’s ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms or elements within a state. Powerful states strive to employ all the elements of power, including diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and most importantly military to further their national objectives. Although a reasonable person might expect that a militarily powerful state routinely triumphs over the weaker state in matters of war, superior military power only guarantees a victory on paper, not in any real war. This paper will show that when one considers a state’s relative military power, weaker states are capable of defeating more powerful states that struggle to formulate

Ever since the early days of the Cold War, extended deterrence has been one of the most important but challenging aspects of American strategy.

In his book Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Barry P. Posen argues against the current U.S. Grand Strategy of Liberal Hegemony and offers Restraint as an alternative. Since World War II, the U.S. has relied on Liberal Hegemony, which emphasizes military action. After the Cold War, Liberal Hegemony gained support as the U.S. dominated the unipolar order with the desire to spread democracy. Posen argues that Liberal Hegemony has performed poorly and will continue to underperform. The strategy is costly, wasteful, and counterproductive because it increases military costs, underestimates the U.S.'s strength, and depends too much on a disappearing U.S. power advantage.

Introduction In 1941, the United States of America faced the prospect of war. The old world order of imperial empires had fallen apart, and it seemed destined to end an inglorious blaze of destruction made possible by modern technologies of war like tanks, airplanes, machine guns, and submarines, among other things to make way for the new order to come. The United States, being both a Pacific and Atlantic power, found itself in the middle of it all and for various cultural, economic, and political reasons, it was hesitant to accept the burdens and responsibilities of international engagement that came along with the tremendous wealth and power they had almost stumbled upon in the twentieth century. At its foundation the United States did not

The purpose of this paper is to compare the 1971 White Paper on Defence and the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. More specifically, this paper will compare the strategic environment, Canada’s greatest allies, the alliances Canada supported, and Canada’s security and defence priorities in the 1970s and under the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). As this paper will demonstrate, the key differences witnessed in the 1971 White Paper on Defence and in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy is in terms of the specificities of the foreign and defence policy presented, the perceived types of threats to national and international security, and the Canadian Forces’ capability to respond to such major challenges. However, both the 1971 White Paper and the 2008 CFDS clearly demonstrate that the Canadian Forces are there first to defend Canada and Canadians, then to defend North America in cooperation with the United States, and finally to contribute to international security. Furthermore, both papers emphasize on the importance of defence policy in achieving foreign policy objectives.

After World War 2, faith in the United States government was at an all time high. A brief, superficial, and weak understanding of the history on the aftermath of World War 2 leads the reader to understand that not only did the United States help defeat the evil Nazis, the fascist Italians, and the imperial Japanese. In the wake of World War 2, the United States of America ended up cementing itself as a world power – if not the world power, usurping the empty throne previously held by Great Britain and subsequently sharing it with the Soviet Union. Yet as is typical, there can never be two champions. There can never be two reigning super victors – one of the two powers had to lose. So began the conflict that never was, the cold war – a global chess match of attrition. Neither the USSR nor the USA would outright engage in conflicts with one another, but in the thirst and pursuit for more influence and power, they continually opposed each other through pawn states on a global scale for approximately 44 years. This type of warfare was known as ‘proxy’ warfare, and though the dates specifically for the Cold War are not known, the common dates for the war range from 1947 to 1991. With this understanding, it can also be inferred that it was not just a war for power, it was a war of ideologies.

Taking away nuclear deterrence from the argument, it is the conventional forces that provide the U.S. military to protect the homeland, deter aggression, and project power abroad – the direct aims of the 2014 QDR and 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Legitimate deterrence requires credible capability. The 2014 QDR seeks to reset the military, not to whitewash the past decade or the likelihood of continued irregular conflict, but rather to reset and reinvest the conventional capabilities for conflict with a peer competitor. To do so requires

American foreign policy has gradually changed since the birth of our nation. On July 4, 1891, John Quincy Adams addressed the Senate and House of Representatives during a powerful Independence Day speech designed to prevent an alliance with the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. Although sympathetic to their cause, he warned against involving America in other states’ affairs, stating,” America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to Freedom and independence of all”. This paper seeks to evaluate the implications of John Quincy Adams’ statement, examine the trends of foreign policy and national security from the late nineteenth century to the present, and address current policy issues regarding

The current international system is fragmenting rapidly since the end of the Cold War. A lot of regions in the world are still trying to find the balance of power in the international system, which the U.S. often intervenes to provide its brand of “global leadership”. Some countries like China are emerging as a global power since a few years ago. Subsequently, this will lead to a major threat to the U.S. status as a global major power. The rise of power by China in the international scene signifies the unpredictable nature of the international system. I would argue that the three most critical challenges for the U.S. arising out of this environment are the future world globalization that will cause a conflict between its domestic and foreign policy, the rise of China as a global power, and the ever globalization of terrorism. I believe that the U.S. should be pragmatic in handling its foreign policy and handle each situation independently without a fix doctrine in order to minimize the unintended consequences produced by the globalization of the world.