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Supreme Court Decision-Making

Decent Essays

Segal, Timpone and Howard’s article ‘Buyer Beware?’ (2000) draws upon existing research into the appointment of Supreme Court justices by seeking to empirically prove Robert Dahl’s 1957 theory that a justice’s voting typically reflects the policy preferences of the president who appointed them, thereby allowing presidents to achieve their policy goals even after leaving office (pp. 557-558). The authors clarify this by stating that in the event of a clear correlation, concordance should not be considered synonymous with responsiveness. Put simply, the research is not proposing that Supreme Court justices are directly influenced by the decisions of the president who appoints them, but merely that the president and appointee share the same political …show more content…

561-563). Somewhat unsurprisingly, the authors of the article found a correlation between the policy preferences of presidents and the voting records of their Supreme Court appointees, thus confirming Dahl’s 1957 hypothesis (p. 564). Interestingly, however, this link is most prominent during the start of an appointee’s tenure; on average, justices tend to deviate from the political positions of their respective appointer the longer they serve on the bench (p. 567). Segal, Timpone and Howard offer no substantive explanation for this phenomenon, but suggest that it may either be the result of justices modifying their votes in accordance with public opinion, or becoming more committed to the liberal/conservative ideology than the president who appointed them (p. 569). For instance, if a Supreme Court justice appointed under Ronald Reagan was deemed 20 points more conservative than Reagan by the end of their tenure, this would statistically be regarded a major deviation. As the authors note, however, Reagan’s own staunch conservatism would likely mean that the president would not consider this divergence indicative of a failed appointment (p. …show more content…

As Hulbary and Walker note in “The Supreme Court Selection Process” (1980), presidents may consider a range of factors when selecting their desired justice, such as age, race, religion and the likelihood of the nomination gaining the Senate’s approval. Thus, it would be reductive to conclude from Segal, Timpone and Howard’s research that shared policy preferences are the primary goal of a nominating president in all cases. The authors’ rightfully acknowledge this by highlighting Dwight Eisenhower’s nomination of William J. Brennan, a justice far more liberal than his appointer who is widely believed to have been chosen as a concession to northern liberals before the 1956 election (pp. 569-570). A more recent example of this trend would be the 2016 nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court by Barack Obama. While it is unlikely that the centrist Garland would have been Obama’s first choice to fill the vacant seat left by Antonin Scalia, he may now represent the least-worst scenario, insofar as he stands a small chance of being approved by an obstructionist Republican Senate. If this occurs, it would surely be treated as a victory by the current White House administration. As such, it is important not to automatically conflate ideological differences between president and justice with a “failed” appointment, a trap that the article occasionally falls into (p.

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