Susan Wolf Moral Sainthood

The ethical teachings and values of utilitarianism and Christian ethics are similar in some aspects, yet however are diverse in others. Utilitarianism is a generally teleological ethical system, where the outcome is said to justify the act. The act is considered ‘good’ if it brings about the greatest good for the greatest number. Christian Ethics, however, can be quite different. Many aspects of its ethics are deontological, for example, the Decalogue and Natural Law. There are other differences and indeed some similarities which will be considered throughout this essay.

A counter-example is that Wolf’s criteria of a moral saint could be adjusted to requiring only one of the two conditions to satisfy the moral saint ideal, the condition that their actions must be for the collective welfare of others. This makes it possible to argue that moral saints can commit non-moral acts if they lead to a greater good for the collective in the future, such as investing money into the stock market to generate a larger donation to a charity later. However, even then the moral saint is limited in what they can do, as the second condition still requires them to act only for the welfare of the collective, which limits the variety of what they can pursue in general, including being unable to learn a skill, pick up a hobby or read a book that will not improve the welfare of the collective in some form in the future or in the present.

In this paper, I will critically examine Rosalind Hursthouse’s argument on “Virtue Ethics” about the reasoning of a virtuous person by delving into the topic. I will then expose a particular problem within it. Perhaps the strongest point of the argument on “Virtue Ethics” that Hursthouse gives relies on the claim of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy claims that a virtuous person would act and make decisions like what a virtuous person would do. In this paper, I will focus on Hursthouse’s argument on the certainty of a virtuous person, offer an objection to the argument, and demonstrate how Hursthouse might respond to that objection.

In Susan Wolf’s, “Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life” Susan writes what makes a meaningful life, her belief is as followed “Active engagement in objective worthwhile activities.” Wolf believe this is the solution to a happy life instead of a depressing and sad one. Wolf said that both Active engagement and objective worthwhile activities need to be present to have a meaningful life. Thought the page, we will see how Wolf arguments requires both parts to accomplish meaningful life then we will make an objection to the arguments which I will then respond to argue against showing why the objection is false.

These individuals are known to be experts of morality. The chapter proposes two reasons as to why these individuals are called upon so frequently. One, for those who believe and have some sort of religious back round, and second, for those who believe in what is called a “scientific view” of the world. This chapter presents the idea that there is some popular belief that religion and morality go hand in hand and that in order to understand morality, you must understand religion. It is explained that when we view morality from a religious perspective, we give meaning to morality in a way that a “good man” made this world that we currently live in and that we are his children. While the book proposes the question that people who believe in God, or a higher power, base their values on what those religions state is right or wrong, whereas for an atheist the question still remains; how do these individuals weigh their moral compass and place their values?

Susan R. Wolf (born 1952) is a moral philosopher who works extensively on the meaning of human life and is the Edna J. Koury Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Wolf addresses the questions of the meaning of life in hope to distinguish the characteristics and reasoning that gives meaning to life. According to Susan Wolf view about the meaning in life, “I would say that meaningful life are lives of active engagement in projects of worth… two key phrases, ‘active engagement’ and ‘projects of worth’” (Wolf, 205). However, I believe that her proposal leaves out our basic motives and reasoning that’s

Susan wolf interprets a meaningful life as one that has within the basis of an affirmative answer to the basis for an affirmative answer to the needs or belonging that are characteristically described as needs of meaning. She described meaningful lives as lives of active engagement in project worth. Which she divided into groups, first is ‘’active engagement’’ and project worth.

When thinking about morality, it is necessary to consider how aspects from both nature and nurture, along with free will, may form ones moral beliefs and dictate ones moral actions. To understand how moral beliefs as well as actions formulate and operate within individuals and societies, it is imperative that a general definition of morality is laid out. Morality, then, can be defined as ones principles regarding what is right and wrong, good or bad. Although an individual may hold moral beliefs, it is not always the case that moral actions follow. Therefore, in this essay I aim to provide an explanation that clarifies the two and in doing so I also hope to further the notion that one’s moral framework is a product of all three factors; nature, nurture, and free will. The first part of this essay will flush out what exactly morality it and how it manifests similarly across individuals and differently across individuals. Contrariwise, I will then explain how morality manifests similarly across societies and differently across societies. Alongside presenting the information in this order, I will trace morality back to primordial times to showcase how morality has evolved and developed since then, not only from a nature-based standpoint, but also from a

Susan Wolf, in her article Moral Saints (1982), suggested that it’s best not to be a moral saint. In my paper, I want to reject the claim view by claiming it may be better to be a moral saint. My argument would have the following structure: 1. Having personal excellence would result in some personal characteristics lost and unhappiness in some degree. 2.

Susan wolf interprets a meaningful life as one that has within the basis of an affirmative answer to the basis for an affirmative answer to the needs or belonging that are characteristically described as needs of meaning. She described meaningful lives as lives of active engagement in project worth. Which she divided into groups, first is ‘’active engagement’’ and project worth.

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

In her critical analysis of ‘Moral Saints’, Susan Wolf examines the concept of a moral saint in order to understand what exactly a moral saint would be like and why such an agent would be an unattractive individual. More so, she raises questions about the significance of this contradictory figure for moral philosophy. Looking first at the idea of moral sainthood from the ethics of common sense, Susan Wolf then considers what relations these have to the conclusions that can be drawn from both Utilitarian and Kantian moral theories. Having found these relations, Susan Wolf then speculates on the implications of these considerations for moral philosophy (Wolf, 1982, 419-420). As part of my essay, I aim to explore Susan Wolf’s argument of the ‘undesirable and unattractive’ life of a moral saint, and why she speculates such a view. Looking first at the distinguishing figures of the Loving Saint and the Rational Saint to which she bases her underlying characteristics on, I then look into Susan Wolf’s arguments in relation to Utilitarian and Kantian theories and how she speculates their undesirable notions that lead to the idea of moral sainthood. Having explored these speculations, I them aim to conclude on how Susan Wolf’s argument of the ‘unattractive’ moral saint is misunderstood, as she primarily bases her argument based on the idea of moral judgement.

In James Rachels’ book, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, he expresses ideas within the concluding chapter, “What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory be like?” that lay an silhouette of every moral approach we have discussed so far and compounding it into a final discussion with a couple of final contentions towards a comprehensive understanding of morality and the approaches we can make as moral guides to make decisions that are virtuous for each class without exception. Rachels’ gives thoughtful perspective on all subjects that we have learned about and makes final accumulations for the way we can decide to use these for our own benefit. While then expressing the virtues we must value for ourselves to have a best plan, and the ways our choices can help others in a positive aspect.

The question of what constitutes morality is often asked by philosophers. One might wonder why morality is so important, or why many of us trouble ourselves over determining which actions are moral actions. Mill has given an account of the driving force behind our questionings of morality. He calls this driving force “Conscience,” and from this “mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” we have derived our concept of morality (Mill 496). Some people may practice moral thought more often than others, and some people may give no thought to morality at all. However, morality is nevertheless a possibility of human nature, and a

John Finnis, an Australian legal philosopher has tried to resurrect the natural law tradition in moral philosophy and law since the mid-1960s. He tries to offer a "neo-Aquinian" natural law philosophy which does not presuppose a divine being. By focusing attention on goods rather than a single Good, Finnis skilfully articulates what he calls a theory of moral action for our day. Or, in other words, he seeks a theory of how to live well. Finnis identifies a number of equally valuable basic goods or ends, given human nature, there are seven. Three are substantive, existing prior to action and four are reflexive which is depending on our choices.