TF Wolfpack

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

The 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) has a proud history of accomplishments. It has served in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Historically, the morale across the brigade was high; leaders took care of their Soldiers, and all of them did their best to train them, accomplish missions successfully, and support them in any way. The 4th ABCT HQ, as well as each of the battalions, were highly efficient and effective, and most of them were jubilant to be part of the brigade. Three years ago, one of the best maneuver brigades in FORSCOM was the 4th ABCT. The brigade had focus; leaders and soldiers were dedicated, and there was a strong work ethics. However, the 4th is facing some challenges ahead that are going to make difficult to reach its full potential. Amongst several leadership problems, there is a major one. There is not an organizational vision in the brigade, and if there is, it is unclear and poorly evident.

The department’s leadership is responsible for providing appropriate manpower and resources to each mission using an increasingly tight budget, while also following strict laws for high priority missions, such as nuclear defense, which mandate both high levels of training and manpower (Air Education Training Command, 2015). Additionally, warfare technology has become incredibly advanced. Due to this complication, the educational and technical requirements for military service members and employees are steadily increasing.

During his enlistment with the U.S. Army, he saw a couple of major changes within the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). Each of these changes resulted in his current unit changing in strength and equipment. Although at the time, this young Soldier did not completely understand the complexity of the changes, he did understand how the changes affected how his section completed their daily duties and his direct chain of command.

The following Monday, I reported to Raven School, and upon conclusion of the 2-week course, I had fallen in love with the idea of being an SUAS Operator. It was the grandest task I had done to date and could not wait to put my new skills into action, however, per everyone from my Section Chief to my First Sergeant, I would never touch the Raven during our upcoming 12-month deployment to Regional Command (RC) East, Afghanistan. As ordered, I threw the idea of operating SUAS into the trash, that gave my brain the room my NCO’s needed to cram more Field Artillery knowledge in. Fast forward to January 2009 as my unit was conducting a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. I was notified that I was tasked

o helped with four real world MEDEVAC situations and thirty-eight TOC Battle Drill training scenarios while deployed to the MFO

The organization that I am currently a part of is the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technicians (NEOD). We are an exceptionally small group of less than 1,500 special operators. As a scalable and agile bomb disposal force, we are trained in a plethora of complex and dangerous tasks ranging from IED to chemical and biological weapon remediation in any type of situation. NEOD can enter a crisis swiftly from the air, under the sea and across land. Post 9/11 global terrorists and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed members of our organization to the breaking point with back-to-back deployments and relentless training. Successfully responding to, and assuming tactical command of thousands of dangerous events every year merely increased

While the brigade continued to combat the global war on terrorism the Soldiers within the organization continued to demonstrate exceptional meritorious service in Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom. While assigned to multiple locations in combat theatre, the Soldiers in the brigade contributed full spectrum aviation support to the overall successful accomplishment of the Regional Command West and International Security Assistant Forces; once again, earning the brigade another Meritorious Unit Citation (Army, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2013).

I think that is a base wide problem. I feel most squadrons, even down to the flight/shop level, fail to understand one another’s own unique part of the mission. Most just carry out their day to day requirements without caring how their actions could affect another group. The entire base would operate much smoother if there was open line of communication in an effort to understand what one group has to do daily to complete their part of the mission.

This Personal Experience Paper (PEP) describes operations prior to and during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 11-12. It chronicles A Troop, 1-82 Attack Helicopter Battalion, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, and 82nd Airborne Division. The PEP specifically addresses non-standard aviation maintenance Soldiers assigned in a flight troop. Early realignment of an aviation brigade led to a very successful OEF rotation, a high readiness rate for OH-58D helicopters, and numerous combat hours flown. The paper further addresses the following: the critical first 100 days of an OEF rotation, troop internal 24-hour maintenance program, no task force aviator support, the brigade mandated 120-hour flying hour limit, and the importance of voice communication

Hey Scho. I really appreciate your insight. We have a very diverse class with all different backgrounds and career paths. It’s been good to study and learn from other within the class. I’m sure this question hits home as a CENTCOM expeditionary squadron commander and C-146A pilot.

I work in the electricity field and that is nothing to play with for it has the potential to kill you. A lot of SSgt’s and TSgt’s has been disregarding what their airman has been doing lately like not showing up for physical training or not completing their end of day duty checks. It’s not until an airman makes a mistake when a noncommissioned officer (NCO) corrects them on their wrongdoing. I believe this is a careless way of doing things and there seems to be no initiative to want to make things better. I was always a firm believer that you should leave the things you are in charge of better than it was before. So when you are in charge of an additional duty, airman or work center. That additional duty, airman or work center should be more improved than when you had received

The Kiowa’s limitations had a definitive effect on its development and subsequent attempts to replace the airframe, however, while well known, the practical expertise of the aircrews allowed it to operate in harshest helicopter environments the Army has experienced. This expertise and adaptability of not only the aircrew, but the airframe as well, allowed for the OH-58D to not only maintain but also increase its effectiveness from the jungles of Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, the deserts of Iraq, and the mountainous regions of

There is a point in a Soldiers career where you have to make a decision that best suits you. In 2007, the Army Acquisitions Corps (ACC) offered me the opportunity to be a part of something new. Having already been actively involved in the acquisition community, providing for the war fighter, and feeling a sense of accomplishment in doing so, there is an internal sense of pride in being a part of the newest Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in the United States Army, 51C; Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Non-Commissioned Officer (ALTNCO). Making the transition into a new career would present me with a number of trials and tribulations, which lead me down a path of self-analysis and unit assessment regarding the lack of future planning to help properly build the enlisted contracting workforce. If the organizational design included personnel of various Military Occupational Specialties to handle the support roles of the unit, the mission focus, through practical application and training, would have led to the establishment of a stronger, more knowledgeable, and certified enlisted contracting workforce.

     With the attacks of 9-11, many of the military logisticians realized that we were not finished with what we had begun in 1991. They also realized that there had to be a better way to support the force. I deployed with the Army in Desert Storm and was witness to hundreds of