As noted in the Small Wars Manual (SWM), “Regular war never takes exactly the form of any of its predecessors, so, even to a greater degree is each small war somewhat different from anything that preceded it. The SMW was originally published in 1935 and written as a response to a call for doctrine after the Philippine War and numerous small wars in Central and South America, the banana wars. Military leadership recognized the importance of irregular warfare and unfortunately due to World War II, switched their focus towards regular warfare. However, some would argue that WWII ended with a tone of irregular warfare due to the development and use of the atomic bomb.” It was outside the paradigm of Napoleonic styled warfare with massive unit formations facing each other on the plains of battle. Since a vast majority of wars over the last 100 years have been fought using the irregular warfare construct it would be extremely important for the US military to train and equip a sizable piece of the force to focus on fighting an irregular war. However, this does not negate the need to train and equip forces to fight a regular war. Our strategic policy should be to fully incorporate irregular warfare into our defense industrial complex to provide for the greatest coverage of war contingencies.
Neither type of war should take priority over the other. In fact, each is dependent on each other. We need the ships, planes, and tactical logistics equipment to provide irregular warfighters
2. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) counterbalances the Defense Departments tendency to focus on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars by empowering those small nations to improve the security of their countries to prevent conflicts from happening. The NDS focuses on the different irregular warfare tactics that can be used by our enemies in the strategic environment. It gives us guidance on what we need to do to prevent the use of these irregular warfare tactics. It was not until the last decade that the U.S. military started fighting the irregular wars; our Special Forces units were the ones that were fighting the unconventional wars. The U.S. military has had a difficult time changing its focus on fighting conventional wars to fighting irregular wars. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military became very experienced in guerrilla warfare tactics. However, when that war ended the focus shifted back to fighting the conventional wars and that experience was lost. Now, because of the lack of experience, the U.S. military is having a difficult time fighting the unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In the 1960s, the low-intensity conflict in Indochina that had progressed since the end of the Second World War became a war. Weather a conflict is of smaller importance or is a full blown war is not only down to government
Historian George Herring argues that the idea of “Limited war theory” was an assumption that played a huge role in the escalation of the war. Limited warfare as described by Stephen Peter Rosen is when “They combine political, military, and diplomatic dimension in the most complicated way” (Hollitz 280). It is a type of warfare that is very difficult for anyone to successfully wage and that is why Herring was convinced that it contributed to the escalation. He states that America 's leadership “operated under the mistaken assumption that limited war was more an exercise in crisis management then the application of strategy, and they were thus persuaded that gradual escalation would achieve
During this type of warfare, the enemy may have already infiltrated, destroyed, or damaged a foreign nation’s government, essential services or infrastructure vital to the indigenous populace for survival and governance. Aviation elements accomplish the transport and swift insertion of personnel, supplies, and materials to assist our forces and to help maintain or rebuild infrastructure. These activities achieve the overarching effects of building trust and confidence within the local populace to foster support for our efforts. Additionally, air assets bring tremendous combat power to the irregular warfare fight. An assortment of ordnance i.e.; precision guided munitions, rapid insertion and extraction methods, and troop and equipment transport enable our forces to quickly strike, maneuver and gain the advantage in an irregular warfare engagement. The Aviation Combat Element also allows both the Ground and Logistic Combat elements to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. More specifically the Marine Expeditionary Unit provides a mobile sea based warfighting unit capable of deploying on short notice. The Aviation Combat Element has the ability to move those combat forces from ship to shore with an over horizon capability. The ability to quickly move forces around the battlespace provides opportunities for United States forces to influence the population by conducting meetings with local leaders and proving our commitment to the people of the affected country. This capability not only enhances but solidifies the Marine Corps ability to utilize maneuver warfare principles while engaging in an irregular
Arguably the bloodiest war in American history, the Civil War introduced a new type of warfare—total war. In total war, all resources are poured into military power, and any beneficial facilities are used by the military, including transportation and communication. This new type of warfare would prove to be very effective and unforgiving in the battles to come. With the invention of new types of troop and supply transports, as well as the invention of the telegraph, the war faced a new era of modern combat.
Mobilizing for even regional conflicts can require several days for a modern army, and the U.S. Army is no exception. In fact, during World Wars I and II, as well as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the U.S. Army was forced to rely on obsolete equipment left over from previous conflicts until the nation could organize the resources needed to support the Army in the field. Conversely, when these wars have been fought to their bloody conclusions, the Army is routinely demobilized and downsized and the enormous amounts of excess materiel and ordnance that have been harnessed must be disposed of in the most efficient method available. To determine how the U.S. Army has historically dealt with the transition from war to peace in the 20th century, this paper provides a review of the relevant literature followed by a summary of the research in the conclusion.
This paper reviews America’s paradoxical love-hate relationship with war and how this relationship influences American warfare through the research and study of the interpretation and analyzation of American military models, policy and goal changes, the use of military technology, “American way of war,” and the relationship with, preparation for, and application of war.
The military of the United States has developed its own unique way of war, the American way of war, which has made it the most lethal military on earth today. Military strategists devise effective and efficient ways to use this capability to quickly and decisively win the nation’s wars. As threats to the United States continue to change, the American way of war evolves to defeat each threat.
Assess the value of classic works of strategy, from Sun Tzu to Jomini, in today's world. Has modern technology, for example, made them largely obsolete? How far can the nature of military strategy be said to be 'timeless'?
Army Special Forces soldiers were trained to organize and develop indigenous troops as guerrillas to harass, raid, and sabotage larger enemy forces over time to degrade and ultimately destroy their ability to fight. The Army considered guerilla warfare to be part of unconventional warfare … (p. 1).
Traditionally, according to Clausewitzean school of thought, war is considered to be “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”. These traditional wars, also known as “Old Wars” are generally characteristically financed by states and occur between states as a means to achieve states interests by using regular national armed forces which generally have a discernable vertical structure and hierarchy. Historically, it could be seen that these Old Wars were primarily fought because of geopolitical or ideological reasoning and the method use to finish the war would be through decisive battles where territory was gained to
Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of
Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US
War has always been a “come as you are” not with the military you wanted to have. Time and resources are the most critical factors in preparing for war. This can only be accomplished by leadership (both civilian and military) that sets forth on a track to plan for the next war. World War II was dominated by numerous errors on both the Allied and Axis nations. The nation that was able to identify those errors and correct them quickly won. However, World War II was the first technology war of mankind. For nearly every technological advancement, there was a counter-technology. For example, German radar was
By nature the war is considered to be political, fundamentally interactive and most importantly something exceptionally violent. If any of these elements are absent, it might be constituted to something else instead of a war because it has got a certain nature to be called as a war and must meet a certain criteria. While on the other hand, the character of war is something that keeps on changing as per the manifestations and changing phenomena of the real world. The character of war is political that keeps on taking place among various societies. Politics plays a great role and character in shaping the society. While the conduct of war is highly affected by cultural, political, ethical, legal, technological as well as social factors along with the factors associated with the organization of military. However, the place and time keeps on playing great role in deciding the character of wars .