Does positing temporal parts provide a solution to the statue-clay paradox?
The paradox in question makes it seem as if two objects can inhabit the same location at the same time, yet this is not the case eternally. At least one or both exist subsequently or beforehand the time of coincidence. In specific, the example being looked at is the statue-clay paradox whereby a lump of clay is moulded and therefore a statue is created. It is then displayed for all to see, however the question becomes what is currently being displayed? It seems obvious to say that it is the statue, but what happened to the lump of clay? The clay was moulded, not destroyed so logically speaking it still exists but in a different shape. Could there be two individual objects being displayed, that of the statue and that of the lump of clay? It seems almost counterintuitive to suggest that there are two distinct objects but when examining them they are in essence not the same as each other; for example the statue can be claimed have the “art” property whereas the clay cannot. The differences in properties suggest that these two objects, as hard as it is to accept, are inhabiting the same location at the same time. Leibniz’s Law is often used to articulate this argument of co-existence or coincidence. It states that if objects vary in their properties, then it can be said that they are not the same object.
In this essay I will be exploring the temporal parts answer to this paradox and arguing for