Tension Between Data Protection And Freedom Of Expression

The legitimacy of the ECJ to uphold EU legislation is a necessary component of effective human rights policy. The history of its increase in power is worth noting. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the ECJ’s location in Luxembourg, far from the political fray in Brussels and Strasburg, prevented it from becoming a strong body of the EU. Yet, throughout that time the court methodically built case-law that would lead to its surge in influence in the 1980s. The two most significant developments of the court during this time period were direct effect and supremacy. These twin pillars clarified the relationship between the national and EU legal orders.

The right to privacy is viewed as a fundamental right all over the world. However, there are many interpretations of what privacy is, and this interpretations are in some way related to historical events that shaped the meaning of privacy differently for every country. Countries of the European Union consider the right to privacy a sacred right, therefore, they have established laws to protect the respect for private and family life and the right to personal data protection. Although United States has some sector laws to protect privacy, the constitution does not mention privacy as fundamental right, nonetheless, the notion of privacy can be extracted from the first 10 amendments of the constitution. Consequently, regulation of the right to privacy changes drastically between Europe and the United States. Countries in Europe have regulatory agencies whose only purpose is protect the privacy of its citizens. In contrast, the

The 9/11 terrorist attacks irrevocably and dramatically transformed the landscape of national security and risk, marking the beginning of the nebulous and never-ending War on Terror. Western governments frequently cite terrorism to rationalize legislation that restricts the privacy and democratic freedoms of its citizenry as anti-terror, increasing unaccountable government power. This rhetoric includes that governments must eliminate all risk of terror, it being such an existential threat that we, as citizens, can and must do everything to fight “them”, including throwing out privacy and the freedom of the press. Our lives are both augmented and restrained by the advent of ‘big data’ that, when paired the ongoing mass, indiscriminate surveillance, strips individuals of their right to privacy. Governments have capitalized on the corporate practice of collecting massive amounts of data on individuals, which has increased in both scale and scope as surveillance technology has become more sophisticated and more difficult to evade. The result is that we live under a global Panopticon in the knowledge that at any point, our online lives and communications can be exposed and subject to scrutiny. Other democratic freedoms jettisoned in the fight include the transparency and accountability in public administration and, relatedly, a free, independent and pluralistic media. The same anti-terror rhetoric and legislation is used to spy on, prosecute, and imprison journalists and

The essence of this contention is that presently, privacy is not considered a legal tort and journalists and journalism practice are currently exempt from the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). This is the case provided “the practice is engaged in by the organisation...(and) deal with privacy in the context of the activities of a media organisation” (The Privacy Act (Cth) s7B(4)). The basis of the concept of privacy leads to speculation over whether current laws must be tightened to secure the privacy of Australian individuals. However, this in turn may be seen to compromise the basic principles of journalism. It has the potential to restrict the journalists’ freedom and prevent them from gaining information by means that they have previously. If the

“See you in court” has often been the mantra cried when a person feels their privacy has been violated, or their free speech infringed. When people take a legal cause of action against a party, they feel wronged them, then sue them in court for damages, this is known as a tort (p. 110). Current laws seem to favor free speech above privacy rights. These complex legal issues are often viewed through a libertarian or authoritarian lens. When the internet came along it compounded the difficulty of these matters. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in response to growing issues sprouting from the new medium, the internet. Privacy expert and law professor, Daniel J. Solove addresses these complex legal issues in chapters

“See you in court” has been the mantra often cried when a person feels their privacy has been violated, or their free speech infringed. When people take a legal cause of action against a party, they feel wronged them and sue them in court for damages, this is known as a tort (p. 110). Current laws seem to favor free speech above privacy rights. These complex legal issues are often viewed through a libertarian or authoritarian lens. When the internet came along it compounded the difficulty of these matters. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in response to growing issues sprouting from the new medium, the internet. Privacy expert and law professor, Daniel J. Solove addresses these complex legal issues in chapters

Solove tailors his message to this stakeholder by providing a better definition for the term “privacy”, which, in turn, creates a framework for how privacy and privacy violations should be evaluated in courts. Solove is advocates for these lawyers to amend how they understand privacy, and better suit the general concerns of the public. For instance, Solove expresses his opinion about a law on surveillance that is enforced differently based on whether the setting of the situation was in a public or private ambience. Known as the secrecy paradigm, if the information was public and not secret before, then there is no privacy violation as a result of the gathering and exchange of information. He asserts that this law should be re-assessed because surveillance can have adverse affects, regardless of the environment. Surveillance can restrict and alter people’s actions, and unconsciously allowing the government to affect their acts and creating architectural imbalance in society. Therefore, lawmakers could be major stakeholders in this piece because Solove discusses laws that should be reviewed, in order to better accommodate for privacy violations and the negative consequences that are associated with these

Lord Justice Glidewell said,” It is well known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy. The facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of the desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory provision can be made to protect the privacy of individuals’’ . This shows the English Common Law has no tort of privacy; the reason being is it has limited protection in the doctrine of breach of confidence.

One of the success of the Humans Rights Act is that, the judges have developed new principles of public law. For example, ‘proportionality’ principle for deciding matters of judicial review in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001); and ruling that the home secretary,

Common law makes provision for a confidential relationship and the duty of confidence. The Data Act 1998 and Human Rights Act 1998 have introduced enforceable rights for service users about how the information they provide is used. The Data Protection Act has restrictions on storing personal data in all formats, written and electronic. The Human Rights Act 1998 emphasises respect for privacy life and strengthens the hand of those advocating increased privacy for the individual. Due to these Acts and the duty of confidentiality there is a potential conflict between protecting the privacy and confidentiality of individuals and protecting the public, and a duty of care to the service

today we call them human rights" (McShea 34). The issue of whether or not to

In modern society, the issue of free speech vs. censorship often comes up. It is a hot topic among those interested in social issues, and represents two well meaning but very different arguments. The argument for freedom of speech says that communication and connectivity promotes progress, while the argument for censorship says that silence and isolation promotes security.

The freedom of speech that was possible on the Internet could now be subjected to governmental approvals. For example, China is attempting to restrict political expression, in the name of security and social stability. It requires users of the Internet and electronic mail (e-mail) to register, so that it may monitor their activities. In the United Kingdom, state secrets and personal attacks are off limits on the Internet. Laws are strict and the government is extremely interested in regulating the Intern et with respect to these issues.10 Laws intended for other types of communication will not necessarily apply in this medium.

This conferring of right would enable an individual to invoke the provision before the courts. An invention of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter, the CJEU) and first recognized in Van Gend en Loose , this principle, therefore, goes to the heart of the supremacy of EU law.

It is important to set the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights in context by examining the development of rights within the European Union. The embryo organisation that commenced the EU (The Coal and Steel Community 1951) was introduced in the wake of World War II to rebuild Europe by economically tying previously warring nations together. The consensus amongst the "heavy weights" of the EU was, if member states were economically invested in each other to ensure financial stability within their own state, future conflicts would be avoided. The EU had taken the role of a purely economic organisation which explains why it was not focused on social issues such as human rights, leaving such matters to individual member states to determine. Then came the political advancement of the 1990s, as evidenced by Weiler; ‘[The Maastricht Treaty] appropriates the deepest symbols of statehood: European citizenship, defence and foreign policy’. Naturally, the issue of human rights became prominent within the EU, and after much debate and a Convention the Charter was passed and given legally binding status under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Charter has proved to be a controversial issue within European politics, with doubts being voiced about the functionality of the European Union’s own “Bill of Rights”. To effectively assess the question at hand, this essay will evaluate the extent to which the Charter is a necessary and desirable development, before reaching an overall