The Army Capabilities Integration Center

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. More specifically, they provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, concepts serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capabilities. The role of concepts is to describe how future forces will operate. Concepts assists in the identification of prioritized capability gaps and integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

The quick evolving military environment, needs the US Army redouble its efforts to reduce the uncertainty associated with the downsizing. There are some predominant principles that can guide the Army’s efforts in minimizing the impact of uncertainty during the force reduction. Even with major political and legislative challenges, keeping balance among the different proportions of readiness is a goal of US defense policy. During the budgetary preparation, downsizing of the armed forces often becomes one of the first victims of fiscal reduction. This was true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression made military preparedness a very low national priority. The Army’s downsizing effect put its readiness

The most critical issue that we face when it comes to downsizing the army is the readiness and security of our nation. Politicians say that downsizing the military brings back the nation’s financial stability. Army leaders do not see it that way, but weakens our nation 's defense capability and our commitment to the rest of the world. General Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff (2013), states that “In his professional military judgment, that the projected end strength and force structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary in one major combat operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat operation” (Chief, Congress and DoD hammer out Army 's future manning levels, par.18). The military is not just weakened by the numbers, but by experience and

Non-US/Multinational Policy Goals, include NATO expansion in size and influence). Relations with Russia. Create an independent Kurdish nation.

Given constrained funding and the requirements of short-term national military objectives and longer term operations, the Army should balance the Total Force as follows: first, decrease the Active Component deployments and increase the Reserve Component, specifically the National Guard. Second, assign National Guard units to specific regions and/or missions so that their training can be focused on these conflicts. And third, increase the use of National Guard units to reduce active component use particularly for low-intensity conflict and short term missions.

The Department of Defense (DOD) must decide how to rebalance the armed forces general force structure to meet future challenges and opportunities in an austere fiscal environment. The general force structure and capabilities of Joint Force 2020 necessary to adjust the force based on current strategic direction and fiscal constraints is a smaller, efficient, adaptable and integrated joint force. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes US military forces will evolve and remain modern, capable, and ready while accepting some increased risk through force reductions. Rebalancing will require innovative approaches and solutions to protect the homeland, build global security, project power, and win decisively with a leaner force.

Despite the complexity of this environment and fiscal austerity, the JF25 must “protect our Nation and win our wars.” It must deter and defeat state adversaries, disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations, and strengthen the global network of allies and partners.” The prioritized capabilities required for Joint Force 2025 are linked to the imperatives of securing the homeland and maintaining strategic agility. This essay discusses general attributes of the JF, specific capability requirements by service, and the risk associated with focusing the rebalance on these two imperatives.

For decades, the United States and Russia, formerly The Soviet Union, have held tensions with each other over different political stances and military actions and intelligence. Starting from the late years of World War II - when the Soviet Union had aggressively spread communism throughout Eastern Europe - up to a couple years ago when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine out of nowhere; their relationship has been a rollercoaster of a ride for these two countries. Even though the United States and Russia are no longer in a Cold War, there has been and continues to be tension between the two countries as exemplified by many events of conflict including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Russian military’s current presence in Syria.

After reviewing The AOC, TP 525-3-1, which describes how the United States Army will employ forces and capabilities in complex

The United States military has never been as weak as it is under Barack Obama. In a time where the world is getting more dangerous every day, whether it is the growing threat of ISIS, Russia or North Korea, the current president insists on continuously making cuts to the military. According to an independent panel appointed by the pentagon and congress, “the shrinking U.S. armed forces, which are being downsized to fit that strategy and budget cuts, is a serious strategic misstep on the part of the United States and is inadequate given the future strategic and operational environment.” This essentially means that these cuts are weakening the military so much, that it will be ineffective to deal with global threats.

Since the beginning of our nation and the development and expansion of the services that defend it, we have faced a myriad of complex issues: shrinking force structures, global security concerns, and fiscal constraints to name a few. From George Washington’s Continental Army, which evolved into the current Joint Force operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are faced with increasing complexity of the operating environment. This heightened complexity and ever shrinking available assets to satisfy these requirements, are the very reason that all commanders at all levels need to find innovative ways to increase operational efficiency in addition to lowering fiscal and asset demands. This new operating environment has also driven the Army Reserve to transform from a traditional strategic force to an operational force.

1. This is a position paper about how the military can survive current fiscal constraints. I am advocating that the military should look at all the operations and resources they have and prioritize what needs to be done to survive the fiscal constraints. I will discuss the problem, then explain different solutions. Finally, I will explain why the best solution is to prioritize.

Russia has built a strong, but stagnating economy on several natural resources to include the refinery and export of natural gas and oil. According to the Jim Picht (2014) exportation of natural gas and oil to Eastern Europe account for 70 percent of Russia’s exports and 53 percent of the government’s revenue. Along with exporting oil to Eastern Europe, Russia also exports too many countries to include China and Belarus. Europe fueled majority by Russian supplied natural gas and oil, the dependency of Europe’s need for this natural resource is the reason Russia’s economy is so strong. In 2014, when Russia decided to invade the neighboring country of Ukraine has led Europe to begin searching for other suppliers of their natural resources. If Europe finds other countries to supply the natural resources

To implement the recommendations the organization needs to maintain the current force mix and capability distribution currently allocated in TAA 18-22 and future TAA 20-24 must maintain a balanced force that would provide necessary flexibility to maintain an operational reserve. In spite of recent force turbulence, the current force sizing and rebalance initiatives should stabilize RC formations to preserve the Army’s strategic depth while providing enough balance to complement operational capabilities across all components. The current force mix and structure appears to meet current joint demands and the RC cannot afford to reduce the already lean force if they are to keep up with the operational demand. Leveraging the operational reserve current capacity is more responsive and less costly than generating new

The crisis in Ukraine and Crimea’s recent accession to Russia are events that clearly highlight the underlying sources of conflict in global politics. While Russia sees its actions in Crimea as a “reunification” and the respect for the right of self-determination, the West views it as a threat to European security and a violation of territorial integrity. Crimea has been a debatable topic from the time it came under the control of the Russian Empire in 1783 during the reign of Catherine the Great. The justification then was similar to the reasoning being used by Vladimir Putin today. Catherine declared that she was protecting ethnic Russians in the region from the Ottoman Empire, much as Putin is claiming to protect Russians from Ukrainian