The Army Design Methodology ( Adm )

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. More specifically, they provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, concepts serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capabilities. The role of concepts is to describe how future forces will operate. Concepts assists in the identification of prioritized capability gaps and integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

Critical thinking is an essential trait that every Army officer must possess. Officers must learn this trait and sharpen it through regular practice. The idea of critical thinking as a valuable aspect of the problem-solving process may seem daunting on the surface; however, it creates a more effective process in reaching crucial decisions for the Army officer. The critical thinking process, along with the elements of thought, used with the Army Problem Solving Process provides an established framework from which all involved parties benefit from because it enhances communication channels across all hierarchies. The elements of thought also provide thoroughness in thinking that closely align with the steps of the Army Problem Solving Process. In addition, the critical thinking process creates confidence in problem solving despite the challenges the problem presents. Therefore, it is quite evident that Paul & Elder’s Elements of Thought do assist Army officers in the conducting of the Army Problem Solving Process.

It is important for the Army Officer to pay attention to the concepts and theories, and not to fall into wrong assumptions that will divert the solution away of the purpose, mission, or goal of the Army Problem Solving Process. When the Army Officer compares the possible solutions it’s important form him to remember all the background and information, and to keep in consideration all the inferences and solutions. The Army Officer critical thinking must keep his options open avoiding to fall into false assumptions, and needs to keep a good baseline of concepts and theories.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

During our military careers we are faced with many different situations and problems. We will need to present solutions to these situations and problems. The Army has four types of military briefings for us to choose from to effectively communicate our solutions. These four military briefings are decision briefings, information briefings, mission briefings and staff briefings. Each situation will have a factor in determining which type of military briefing is needed. To know which military briefing is to be used, we must understand the purpose of each briefing. This paper will give a narrative on each of the four military briefs and the steps involved for the presentation of each brief. I will begin with decision briefings. Before I can begin with decision briefings, I must give a brief discussion on the Army’s problem solving process.

The command structure in United States Military is vital to the success of missions carried out in or outside the country. The Department of Defense is responsible for overseeing the establishment of command hierarchies that work for specific units. The commands, guidelines, and orders are passed from the highest-ranking personnel to lowest ranking officers who must perform the directive or pass it to subordinates with the same instructions. The principles that establish the command structure in the military evaluates the performance of each command and the officers involved in the various missions. The key principles that affected the execution of Operation Anaconda resulting in mission deficiencies are organizational structure, decision-making, and collaboration.

Our nation’s military continuously evolves to ensure success in future operations. This change is only be possible if our top leaders work in concert towards a common goal. The purpose of this document is to highlight how General Stanley McChrystal changed the manner in which the U.S. Military operates and communicates in an ever-changing environment.

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

Taking the field in 2003, the U.S Army, the most dominate fighting force in the world seized the initiative in Iraq. This paper outlines the staging of one command, the 101st Airborne Division, their commander Major General Petraeus, and the challenges of shifting rolls from combat to nation building and the effective transfer of power. Additionally, this paper will detail the Mission Command philosophy, specifically the describe action with the four step process of commander’s intent, planning guidance, critical information and friendly information as pertains to developing the commander’s intent during the initial occupation of Mosul, Iraq. While little was known about the current

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is a decision-making model to assist military members in making sound military decisions and to compile operation orders. This paper will describe MDMP and show how it can be applied to daily operations. The paper will identify the steps in the model and describe how critical thinking impacted the decision.

In the view of global security,(2011) The military decision making process abbreviated as MDMP is a planning model that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing and comparing courses of action(COA) that are best suited to accomplish the higher commander’s intention and mission. The MDMP comprise of seven stages and each stage depends on the previous step to produce its own output. This means that a mistake in the early stage will affect all the other stages that follow. These steps include:

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)