The Art Of War : An Ancient Military Treatise Written By Sun Tzu Essay

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The American defeat of the British during the Revolutionary War was a direct result of George Washington's incredible leadership and generalship which epitomized the greatness of Sun Tzu's "Art of War"

How should leaders approach the ideas of peace and war? This question has fascinated those in positions of power for ages. Ancient Chinese philosopher Lao-Tzu believes that war should only take place in the direst of situations and should not be considered virtuous (61; sec. 31). On the contrary, Niccolo Machiavelli, a fifteenth-century Italian philosopher, states, “A prince, therefore, must not have any other object nor any other thought, nor must he take anything as his profession but war…” (86). While Lao-Tzu formulates an ideal approach to war and Machiavelli a practical one, neither one of their strategies would be effective in the real world; leaders must conduct their military with a balance of serenity and brutality.

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

Nicolo Machiavelli’s The Prince and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War both both provide directions for leadership with similar goals. The Prince is primarily geared towards providing valuable information about how a ruler of many principalities may govern different populations and acquire new lands. The Art of War provides us with a schematic of the optimal path to victory. This book is instead directed towards generals of powerful militaries with only the goal of winning. Concepts such as Machiavelli’s view of destruction will be contrasted with Sun Tzu’s victory-oriented argument for taking whole and several of their other ideas will be compared. Although Machiavelli and Sun Tzu have different intended audiences, many of their ancient tactics can

Today, no one seems to give much value of literary works or reading. Not because it doesn’t give anything beneficiary, but because not everyone had the urged to at least finish a book. We now live in a world where social medias almost dominates our daily activities. It’s unlikely to have a place for us to consume a non-fiction or fiction book. As absurd as it sounds but that’s how people often think. We now live in an egalitarian society, where everyone is given the freedom and right of its own.

To move from a point to another A Commander does not create the openings for an advance due to the unpredictability of the weather. Instead he uses the changes in the weather to aid the advancement of his troops. The significance of this chapter is clear in the landings on the Normandy beaches in the Second World War. In this chapter Sun Tzu also informs that talent and experience are above rules and theory. The knowledge in his book ‘Art of War’ isn’t grasped by simply reading the texts. Understanding it and knowing when and where to appropriately apply these concepts takes practice. These concepts were not created with scientific knowledge or calculations, because war cannot be analytically calculated. War is like water, Sun Tzu says “it shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.” Accordingly this book was written by generals in the army with years of experience, and wisdom and cannot be easily repeated. Sun Tzu says “One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.” Reading these texts only provides the reader with the theory; however to gain an understanding requires practice. Therefore the rank of a commander can only be attained through the medium of reflection, creativity, study, thought and intellectual instinct.”

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

Taoism and Confucianism are two primary Chinese ways of thinking. Historically, these two philosophies have been viewed as polar opposites, but upon further research, they have the same mission. The belief system of Taoism viewed in Tao Te Ching, written by Lao Tzu, is the monistic belief that human kind has a connection to the universe, and the “way” controls your life and everything that you do. The “way” has a pre-determined plan for your life, and you must sit back and follow it. On the other hand, Confucianism represented in The Art of War, shows that you have to work and discipline yourself to become complete. The Art of War is essentially a “battle plan”, and “Tao Te Ching “ is a essentially a book of ultimate humility. These two pieces seem quite different with their own different goals. While Confucianism and Taoism have different ways of reaching their respective goals, their goals and their destiny is essentially the same: and that is self-control.

Sun Tzu understood the nature of war as “the province of life or death,” and a “matter of vital importance to the state.”1 I agree. In my own experience, war awakens your primordial instincts and strips you of your self-rationalizations. Sun Tzu defined the character of war when he wrote, “water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.”2 Accordingly, Sun Tzu’s principals of war offer a framework adequate to explain the nature and character of 21st century warfare, which I rationalize as a near-continuous battle of ideologies fought through asymmetric means to advance the values and interests of state and non-state actors.

Throughout the ages of history, there were many wars that were fought. For every victory and defeat, what was it that really determined the outcome of the war? Which army leader had the better or worse battle plan? With the plan they had, did it increase their chances of victory? Were there key factors in an army leader’s plan that lead to their defeat? Or, was the best decision made to completely avoid war? For a lot of the wars that took place and the ones that were avoided many years ago, the mystery still remains unsolved on how and why certain army leaders were victorious or gained a certain advantage because of the choices they made. On the other hand, it is also unknown on how or why an army leader failed to a certain extent

This essay intends to define and give an overview of the ‘Principles of War', the philosophers that coined these principles and with examples from the various countries that used and have their own perspectives on the ‘Principles of War'.

There are numerous studies that say that the nature and character of war are quite similar to one another and can be even used synonymously. However, according to some writers, there

The “Art of War” and “De Re Militari” two military treatises were written one continent and around five centuries apart by authors that came from two vastly different backgrounds and cultures. Both authors penned treatises intended to inform and educate commanders about war yet the underlying theme is not victory but to ensure the survivability of their soldiers in battle. Sun Tzu and Vegetius differ on their ideas of this specifically on the relationship the military holds between the governing body as well as relations with the civilian population. However, what they do come together on ideas of efficient battle that minimizes Soldier loss as much as possible.