The Battle Of Ap Bac

In 1961 President Kennedy sent a group who’s mission was to report on conditions in the South and assess if the United States should continue to deploy troops to Vietnam -Brigham, 1. In 1962 there was a massive increase of United States troops in Vietnam –MacDonald, 626. The numbers grew so large that they almost tripled. This led for the South Vietnamese to be instructed by advisors, who were attachments in the field -MacDonald, 627. Army recruits in the Special Forces were brought in to train the tribesman in the highlands. They also assisted the South Vietnamese in some of the more remote regions of the country -MacDonald, 627. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups accompanied the Special Forces advisors, and they were able to disrupt the flow of the North Vietnamese from the country of Laos into South Vietnam -MacDonald, 627. These men were in charge of most parts of the operation, in a country where leadership had never been encouraged -MacDonald, 628. The United States troops also had many problems directing the civilians because of the language barrier. At the same time the Special Force troops were frustrated in directing their tactics -MacDonald, 628.

This paper will examine the Battle of Fredericksburg through the research of analytical papers, historical articles and technical reports by conducting the four steps of battle analysis. It will analyze the effects of the use and dismissal of intelligence assets and disciplines when applied to the planning of a territorial battle campaign. Using terrain analysis it will discuss how the choice of advantageous terrain can sway the outcome of a battle. It will also discuss how timing and momentum can be critical to our overall military planning. Finally, it will present an alternative outcome to the battle by establishing the utilization of intelligence assets available to both commanding generals and how altering critical decision points would have presented a significantly different result.

The battle of Ap Bac was a small battle engaged between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the insurgents, or the People Liberation Armed Forces (Viet Cong AKA VC) with the assistance of American’s weapons and advice during the Vietnam War. It took place on 2 January, 1963, near a small village named Ap Bac which is located approximately 65 km southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta. (Starry, 2002). As a senior leader, it is important that we have to be technically and tactically proficient. In order to be proficient, we not only need to be trained, but also we have to know how to gain experience from past battles in history using battle assessment, and critical thinking process to study the battle. That way, we know what needs to be improved, how to sustain it, and how would we execute it better next time. Therefore, studying the history of the battle of Ap Bac will enhance the knowledge of how the commanders used the most effective and efficient method for applying decisive action on the battle field. It would be a successful outcome for the South Vietnamese ARVN, and Kennedy’s administration would have gained more trust from American people for the presence of American troops in Vietnam, if the American advisers and the ARVN’s commanders would have integrated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (ITP) throughout the operations process to identify the gaps of intelligence between human intelligence (HUMINT),

The battle of Lexington and Concord was possibly the most important battle in American History. It was in this battle where third and fourth generation Americans decided to take a stand against the stifling presence of the King of Britain’s troops. This is also where a powerful but vulnerable nation decided to take steps to quell a largely underestimated revolutionary force. The British were much better equipped and had more experienced soldiers and officers. The Americans had will, guerrilla warfare, and a much better understanding of the battle terrain. Despite this, the British should have easily won the battle. This paper will show that if the British would have exercised a little patience, established good OPSEC procedures, and developed proper counterintelligence

wagon Commander never expected that large group of Texans and Native American will able to attack during the dark of the night. The planed details for a month that legendary Waite was preparation paid off. The report for the two war was saying that one of the CPT was not able to saver due to his horst were not in condition, that pinot it show that somehow the leadership cooperation on that time was not in good shape. The report say that General Gano plane was each troop will lead his troop but wone of the troop that was Addie to the plane was not expected. Using unconventional warfare in the Pea Ridge battle is was not good philosophy that give the troop that follow under Brigadier General Stand Watie which let to give the force the scope to look at the upcoming battle Conventional warfare meaning wage war by using

The Battle of An Loc Vietnam also regarded as the Easter offensive as it started the Thursday before Easter weekend and lasted 96 days. It preceded the TET offensive of 1968 and may have been one of the most prolific battles of the era. The Battle of An Loc showed the will and fortitude of the enemy as well as tested the perseverance of the defending forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Along with all this it showed a more modern form of battle using ground as well as air power, and set the stage for the superiority of the air power used today.1

This paper will examine how a unwavering adversary and difficult terrain combined to negate the effects of American technology. The Battle of Hamburger Hill was a battle of the Vietnam War which was fought by the United States and South Vietnam against North Vietnamese Forces from May 10–20, 1969. The battle took place on Ap Bia Mountain in the rugged, jungle-shrouded mountains along the Laotian border of South Vietnam. Ap Bia Mountain anchors the northwest corner of South Viet Nam's A Shau Valley. The valley has been a major infiltration route for Communist Forces from the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos to the coastal cities of Northern I Corps since1966. Ap Bia Mountain dominates the northern valley, towering some 937 meters. Official

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

In any mission, the Commander is the most imperative participant. He or she guides the mission to the intended outcome. It is through the commander’s activities that the directed outcome is achieved. Through successful understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing the commanders of Soldiers are able to accomplish the directed mission and thus winning wars. Throughout the role of commander in the Battle of Hamburger Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt attempted the complete these commander’s activities. (ADRP 5-0) The successes and failures of mission command he had, will be explained, giving a better understanding of the Battle of Hamburger Hill and the pivotal turning point in the Vietnam war.

A 1998 abstract review for military training by Paul J. Jaeger reflects to the importance of “the application of operational intelligence as a function of operational art” and how the “Planning and execution for the Midway operation required fusion of strategic operational and tactical intelligence by the commanders involved; most notably Admiral Chester Nimitz” (Jaeger, pg 22). The strategy employed was to act immediately and tactically to the intelligence the commanders received from the code breakers. David J. Jerabek also “analyzes Admiral Nimitz strategic leader competencies and evaluates his contributions in achieving a total victory in the Pacific for the Allied powers” (Jerabek)

Tactics had played major role in the Vietnam war. They were used in the battle of Ia Drang to have an impact on the battlefield. The three major tactics, History.com’s Staff said, were the U.S.’s air mobility and B-52 strikes also North Vietnamese guerilla warfare. The U.S. wanted to test their air power

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle and apply the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. The operation took place during 1971 in Northern Vietnam by United States Special Forces operators. The

As victory in WWII appeared imminent, the USAAF under General Hap Arnold commissioned studies to assess the impact of strategic bombing in the war. In addition to results about strategic bombing, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that “the U.S. should have an intelligence organization capable of knowing the strategic vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions of any potential enemy.” In spite of the aforementioned dearth of intelligence on the USSR, very specific information was needed for military and political leaders to make decisions regarding their strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Additionally, the strategic bomber forces needed a list of verified targets in case conflict with the USSR broke out. In order to fill the major voids in information the US civilian leaders employed a bifurcated approach: human intelligence (HUMINT) obtained through agency operatives, and signals (SIGINT) and imagery (IMINT) intelligence acquired

As the Vietnam War progressed, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229)

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US