The Bush Administration's Post-War Strategy

The Bush administration's National Security Strategy was a product of America’s belief in American interventionism and exceptionalism, and marked a dramatic shift in the United State's foreign policy. In addition, it showcased the Bush administration’s push to find answers to 9/11. In the few years after the tragedy, the US would seek to strike a blow in the war on terror in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime had supposed ties to terror groups such as Al-Qaeda. The nation quickly moved to war, and invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003. However, even though the war was quickly declared over, the continued deaths of American troops in Iraq gave rise to powerful protests. Artist Joe Wezoreck’s collage War President, critiques the continued stay of American troops in Iraq. Once Iraqi accounts of the war, such as Wendell Steveanson’s collection of stories “Dispatches from Iraq” surfaced, the American public truly began to question the real purpose behind the Iraq war. These sources initiated the changing perception of the American identity as a bastion of freedom and democracy as a result of the Iraq war. In the end, the Iraq war ultimately failed to provide answers to a post 9/11 nation, and instead revealed the flaws of interventionism and muddled American foreign policy to the disillusioned American

Invading Iraq was—and remains—a highly debated and controversial decision within both world politics and the academic disciplines of politics and international relations. With a growing number of deaths, rising tensions in the Middle East, and a failure to find any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the voices condemning the Bush administration have been increasing ever since the decision to go to war was announced. While many scholars have traditionally argued against the war, this paper will argue that the Iraq War can be justified.

The invasion and the war in Iraq remains a continuous topic of divisiveness and sensitivity in today’s America. One of the negative evaluation of the war is attributed to the false impression of the length of the war which lasted seven years, not six months as presumed in 2003. As the invasion initiated, the ideologies of American government then failed to perceive the large number of troops required, casualties and the financial toll in the interest of the preventive war doctrine. However, when weighing the failures of this war, there are successes brought home that relate mostly to the lessons the American military and the government learned with the use of counterinsurgency tactics after “winning the hearts and minds” of Iraqis (Young). Nevertheless, with evaluation through levels of analysis, the accomplished agenda of ending Saddam Hussein’s regime justifies success and failure, mutually.

From its humble beginnings, the United States of America has expressed its intention to assist individuals who desired freedom by serving as an exemplar of liberty. Originally, Americans sought to preserve their republic by avoiding all foreign altercations and external constraints. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, in his first inaugural address Thomas Jefferson warned his audience of the potential dangers of foreign affairs by stating, “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,” pleading for a delicate balance between national security and commerce. This sentiment on foreign policy was reiterated on July 4, 1821, by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams when he said, “America does not go abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.” At the dawn of the 21st century, the implications from Adam’s statement are no longer consistent with the demands of American national security. The key tenets of the Bush doctrine, democratization and preemption, have deviated from Adam’s vision and redefined United States foreign policy for the 21st century.

United States policy towards the Iran-Iraq war was interesting to say the least. While the United States claimed to be a neutral party, they supported Iraq for the majority of the war, supported Iran for a brief period, then went back to only supporting Iraq. Both sides committed numerous atrocities and war crimes, and for the most part received little to no American condemnation. Through this essay, I will explore the reasons for the US involvement, and their responses to a number of war crimes, particularly Iraq’s use of chemical weapons throughout the war.

Bush, asserted that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), multiple Iraqi human rights violations stemming from the WMDs, and the suspected Iraqi support for al-Qa’ida, who had been previously chased out of Afghanistan. After the initial invasion, however, U.S.-led Coalition Forces were unable to locate any significant evidence of WMDs. Back in the U.S., investigative committees subsequently concluded that Iraq possessed no WMDs and did not harbor any connections to terrorist organizations. Moreover, Hussein had been successful at evading capture despite an intensive manhunt, and U.S. forces seemingly were unable to play a domestic security role, further leading to the dissolution of Iraqi security services and ushering in widespread looting and disorder. This highlighted that the invasion of Iraq was not be an easy victory as originally surmised. Since that time, many scholars have focused on the effects of the Iraq War, speculating on the Bush Administration’s motives for the decision. While some within scholarly circles have attributed the invasion of Iraq to groupthink, a theory that has recently become a staple in understanding foreign policy disasters, there is little literature that has been applied to the rationality of the decision to invade and whether groupthink influenced the decision-making process. Therefore, this paper will seek to examine the decision to launch the invasion of Iraq and the clearly failed planning for the occupation of the

Since the war on Iraq began on March 20, 2003, at least 1,402 coalition troops have died and 9,326 U.S. troops have been wounded in action. This is no small number and the count grows daily. One would hope, then, that these men and women were sent to war with just cause and as a last resort. However, as the cloud of apprehension and rhetoric surrounding the war has begun to settle, it has become clear that the Bush administration relied on deeply flawed analyses to make its case for war to the United Nations and to the American people, rushing this country, and its soldiers, into war. This is not to say that this war was waged against a blameless regime or that our soldiers have died

Following the attacks in America on September 11, 1999, there was a public outcry for justice throughout the country. Even with significant public support to wage war against Iraq, there was not enough reason to persuade congress. Over the course of two years, President George W. Bush proved that there was a purpose in the war, not only seek vengeance against terrorism; but, gift a people freedom from dictatorship. Yet, there were still downsides to war including inevitable loss of American life and damaged reputation for our country. For that reason, the United States of America should not have gone to war with Iraq in 2003 due to the extensive federal funding for undesirable warfare which took away from domestic prosperity, the preventable injury to veterans as well as violence against civilians, and the country’s damaged reputation achieved due to the illegitimacy of the war.

The United States of America has always had an invested interest in the Middle East: from a religious perspective to a financial one. America has always ensured that it will have an official war narrative for becoming involved with the Middle East. As the United States evolved, so did the war narratives. Nowadays, technology allows most people to have access to information in little to no time. Unfortunately, we often forget that there are many influences on the war narrative. For example, this nation’s past, the public’s expectations, and personal bias are just a few influencers of America’s narrative. America’s current war narrative is still influenced by the public perspective of the Vietnam War. Vietnam was the first time what happened during a war could be broadcasted at home. This played a huge part in the growth of the public’s anti-war sentiment. Thus, control of what the American public saw was necessary. During the Gulf War, the government made sure to account for this new form of narrative, and this caution has affected the media’s portrayal of the Middle East.

America is under attack, not from an enemy in a faraway land, but here at home, by our own government. In the current year 2010, almost 7 years after "shock and awe" campaign that officially started the war in Iraq, the U.S. government fails to recognize that our efforts in the Middle East have plateaued, and it is time to bring our troops home. The surge campaigns in recent years were felt by many, to be an unofficial recognition that the war is not going well, and several top generals have had high hopes for this military strategy, but compelling evidence concludes this was a short-lived success. No one can deny the financial toll the Iraq war has had on America, for America is in the middle of one of the worst economic crisis in recent

Walter Russel Mead, a Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes that “American strategy for U.S. foreign policy is shaped from four distinct schools of thought: Hamilton and his protectionist toward commence, Wilson and his sense of moral principles; Jefferson and his maintenance of our democratic system; and Jackson, the advocate of populist values and military might.” Henry Kissinger argued that one of these schools has dominated American strategy and stated, “It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign Policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march to this day.” After reviewing many of the actions and statements made by the presidencies since Woodrow Wilson, during and after the Cold War, there is no doubt that Henry Kissinger is correct in his statement.

Oh, George H.W. Bush, the ever famous 41st president of the United States. Commonly known as Bush 41 to differentiate him from his son, who would become the 43rd president, as shown in things like “Bush 43 Shares Spotlight With Bush 41 as Tribute Book Is Published” (Baker, Peter 1), Vice president to Reagan during both terms, as well as a president who was elected at a crucial time where the Cold War was reaching its end, from 1989 to 1993, even if that didn't necessarily mean world peace. His domestic policies, as well as foreign and economic policies, were tough at the time. Notable events from these include the US invasion of Panama, the Gulf War, and the economic recession in 1990. His presidency is notable for the events listed already,

Unfortunately, the hawks’ views and previous actions in which they prevented the U.S. from agreeing with or joining multilateral groups triggered a firestorm among foreign and domestic critics. To differentiate, the pragmatists, or ‘constructive realists,’ believed that the U.S. goals would be better achieved by working within the “post 1945 institutional framework” that they had helped to build. They knew that a unilateral military campaign would do irreparable damage to U.S. long-term interests, and that the results would be problematic. The United States would be in a stronger position to deal with Iraq if it had carefully built up international support – the pragmatists accepted that institutions such as the United Nations, if combined

In 2003, the United States saw the Iraqi government for what it was: an oppressive dictatorship. The U.S., at the time, was a neoconservative actor that believed democratic values should be shared with the world. Using this rationale, the Bush administration invaded Iraq. Ultimately the intervention failed, proving neoconservatism is unsound. This failure suggests that the U.S. must unsubscribe from the usage of neoconservative strategy and look to a realist approach for foreign policy. Neoconservative strategy works to “spread democracy everywhere” , which fails to recognize the problems with fighting cultural identity. It is for this reason that neoconservative strategy fails. A realist approach can achieve neoconservative goals without

In August of 2002, the Bush administration’s position about Iraq had changed significantly. Prior to this point, the United States and other western countries had been arming Iraq with weapons of every type. The fact the United States and other countries had been arming Iraq with weapons, shows how little they considered Iraq to be a threat. This quickly changed. A debate on invading Iraq, held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, created