The Case Of Balfour V Balfour ( 1919 )

The primary legal question facing the court is whether or not Ms Jonah and Mr White’s relationships can be classified and recognised as de-facto in accordance with the definition produced in section 4AA (1) of the Act. In order for the court to decide, it must be established if the pair’s relationships was one of a “genuine domestic basis”. The court must analyse Murphy J’s decision that the parties did not hold a “reputation” as a coupledom. Whether or not the feelings of both parties towards the grounds of their relationship was mutual is questioned. Furthermore, the appeal highlights that in accordance with the Act and precedence of Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343, it is possible for a marriage and a de-facto relationship to exist simultaneously, thus the court must address whether or not this fact is relevant to the decision.

The particular focus of this essay is on how terms are implied. This is central because the courts intervene and impose implied terms when they believe that in addition to the terms the parties have expressly agreed on, other terms must be implied into the contract. Gillies argued that the courts have become more interventionist in protecting the rights of contracting parties thereby encroaching upon the notion of freedom of contract. The doctrine of freedom of contract is a prevailing philosophy which upholds the idea that parties to a contract should be at liberty to agree on their own terms without the interference of the courts or legislature. Implied terms can be viewed as a technique of construction or interpretation of contracts. It has been argued that the courts are interfering too much in their approach to determine and interpret the terms of a contract. The aim of this essay is to explore this argument further and in doing so consider whether freedom of contract is lost due to courts imposing implied terms. The essay will outline how the common law implies terms. The final part of the essay will examine whether Parliament, by means of a statute, or terms implied by custom restrict freedom in a contract. An overall conclusion on the issue will be reached.

The law of contract requires that there must also be evidence of an intention to create legal relations between the parties. However it is usually held that the decision is against the intention for an agreement domestic in nature to be legally binding, such as in the case of Cohen v Cohen where an agreement between family members that may be morally binding will not necessarily create a lawfully binding contract. However there are exceptions to this. When both parties show an intention to enter a legally binding arrangement and it would be unreasonable for one party to revoke their decision, the arrangement holds evidence of a possible contract.

Contract law is relatively consistent regarding whether a contract was actually made and whether the parties involved can be legally held to the contract or not. This is primarily due to the fact that contract law proceeds from law handed down from centuries of civil and common law cases. Basically, two parties have to agree to the terms of the cited contract, after the offer is made and accepted (both parties have had time to review and make changes to the contract, although this process does not always occur), and they have either orally agreed or signed some form of written contract. It can be argued in a court afterword that there was not sufficient consideration or that one party coerced the other into an agreement, but these are usually handled at the signing of the contract. This process is time honored and, as said, has been in place for a long time. But, new types of contracts occur at times and they have a different sort of accounting by the courts. One of these types of contracts is that generally called prenuptial, antenuptial or premarital (Standler, 2009). This paper looks at prenuptial agreements and using the case of Simeone v. Simeone tries to determine some of the pros and cons of treating these agreements more like regular contracts.

Intention to create legal relations can be defined as follows. ‘An agreement will only become a legally binding contract if the parties intend this to be so. This will be strongly presumed in the case of business agreements but presumed otherwise if the agreement is of a friendly, social or domestic nature.’ Source (HNC unit 5 Business law course book) In determining whether the parties intend their agreements to be legally binding the court is guided by two presumptions. Parties to a domestic or social agreement do not intend to be legally bond. Parties

In week four’s theory practice, we reviewed the case scenario of Big Time Toymaker vs Chou in regards to determining the validity of a contract.  As we’ve reviewed, an agreement or mutual assent is of course essential to a valid contract but the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. If his words and acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree, it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind (Melvin, 2010).

The following case American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171 (Va.1904) it is expressed that; where the consideration for the promise of one party is the promise of the other party, there must be absolute mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other to a positive agreement. Both parties must be bound or neither is bound. A party making a promise is bound to nothing until a promisee, within a reasonable time, engages to do, or else do or begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first promise. Until such engagement or such doing, the promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no mutuality, and therefore no consideration for it.

Mutual assent and consideration go together so this paper will argue against them together. Mutual assent is the idea that all the parties in a contract know what they are contracting to and agree to it. As defined in Charles S. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, and Harry G. Prince’s Problems in

The offer and acceptance model is flawed- only an agreement is necessary. In order to fully comprehend this statement, we must first establish what constitutes and offer and what constitutes acceptance. “An offer is a statement by one party of willingness to enter into a contract on stated terms, provided that these terms are, in turn, accepted by the party to whom the offer is addressed”. Acceptance is “…an unqualified expression of ascent to the terms proposed by the offeror”. The “Offer and acceptance model” is based on the court’s adopt the “mirror image” rule of contractual formation. Applying the definitions stated above, we can take this to mean that there must be a clear and unequivocal offer which must be matched by an equally

The doctrine of consideration is one of the most established doctrines within the common law of contract. This essay will discuss the impact of Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 5 on the doctrine of consideration. It will shed light on the rules of consideration, ways to avoid consideration, application of the rules in the specific circumstance of performance of an existing duty in cases. Evidently an alteration to the rules and practices would be displayed. Courts today need to make a distinction between everyday social agreements and legally binding contracts, this is where the doctrine of consideration manifests. This case introduces the practical benefit rule needed for consideration however, this case did not alter set legislation formed from the case Stilk v Myric[1809]. As it was held in the Court of Appeal and not seen or upheld by the House of Lords.

Contractual agreements are supposed to be consensual, and freely entered into by the parties involved. Therefore, ‘before a court enforces a relationship as a contract, the courts must have a reasonably certain basis in fact to justify binding the parties to each other.’ (St. John’s Law Scholarship Repository, no date). Resolution of whether a contract was intended to be legally binding is not determined by what the parties themselves thought or intended. Rather, a more objective stance is taken by the courts. This is known as the objective theory of contract, and essentially enables ‘the courts to look at external evidence (what the parties said and did at the time)’ (Poole, 2006, p. 34), as to objectively indicate the parties’ intentions

A Contract requires several elements in order to be considered enforceable. However for the purpose of this essay we would explore one of these elements in order to effectively understand the controversial cases of Williams v Roffey Brothers and Nicholls (contractors) Ltd (1990) and Stilk v Myrick (1804). Before going any further one should briefly understand the doctrine of Consideration. Despite the vast amount of content written, the doctrine of consideration is still to this day unclear due to the inconsistency of the courts and its application of necessary rules. Consideration refers to that which the law deems as valuable in that the promisor receives from the promise that which was promised. In other words, it is the exchange of something of value between the parties in a contract. One should be mindful that in English law, every promise may not be legally enforceable; it requires the court to distinguish between are enforceable and non-enforceable obligations. This brings us to the controversial cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v the Roffery brothers. Many argue that that the case of Williams was wrongly decided leading to impairments in the rule initially established in Stilk v Myrick. This essay seek to analyse and critique the cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v Roffey Brothers and also highlight whether or not the new rule of Practical benefit lead to serious impairments in later cases.

Contractual agreement has always been viewed in terms of offer and acceptance. The universal principle to contract law has always been parties may get into an agreement in whichever way they deem fit and they are subject to certain terms as they choose. As far as legal requirements vital to their formation are binding contracts may be formed. Moreover a binding agreement may be manifested in terms of writing or in verbal form.

Conceptually, reasonable expectations of honest men and sanctity of contract are not in conflict. Indeed, they often point to the same direction – it is the reasonable expectation of an honest man that an agreement should be executed. Although it is observed that the two themes usually work side by side, this essay argues that in regards to the rules of acceptance of unilateral contracts, the English courts place more emphasis on reasonable expectations when making decisions.

In Privy Council decision Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom (Belize thereafter), Lord Hoffmann in delivering the leading judgment, assimilated the implication of term and contractual interpretation resulting in the well-known traditional tests: “business efficacy” and “officious bystander” merely as auxiliary role in discovering the the objective intention of the contract. Even though the Belize test has long been accepted by the English and the New Zealand courts, Singapore court seems to have reservations. A great deal of debate surrounds the issue as to the roles of the Belize test to be afforded to two