The Case of the Speeding Driver

In the case of Santiago v. State of New Mexico (Santiago v. State of New Mexico, 2009), security officers had responded to a fight and caught the defendant running out the front door of the Mall they were working at. The defendant was pinned to the ground and handcuffed. The security guards searched the defendant by reaching inside his pockets and removing several items, including a pill bottle containing four grams of cocaine. Shortly after, police showed up and the defendant, as well as the removed items, was turned over to police.

The Merit case of Fernandez v. California is seeking to determine whether the Constitutional rights of Walter Fernandez were violated under the 4th Amendment when law enforcement conducted a search of his residence upon obtaining consent from his girlfriend, who was also a resident, after Fernandez was taken into custody (and had stated his objections to the search while at the scene). In Georgia v. Randolph (2006), in a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court held that when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. This paper will provide a statement of the decision, based on current

This case mainly deals with the interpretation of our Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which protects us from unlawful search and seizures. What we can learn from this case are: the differences in court systems, the elements that comprise the Fourth Amendment, and the controversies surrounding it. The text relevant to this case can be found within the first six chapters of our textbook, with an emphasis on Chapter 6 “Criminal Law and Business”.

Case Procedural History: Roy Caballes tried to suppress the drugs seized in the stop by claiming that the state troopers did not have probable cause to search his vehicle. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress the seized marijuana. The trial judge held that the use of the drug dog did not prolong the duration

Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrant less search. Because the search was unlawful, he maintained that the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be excluded. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that ?a reasonable argument? could be made that the conviction should be reversed ?because the ?methods? employed to obtain the evidence?were such as to offend a sense of justice.? But the court also stated that the materials were admissible evidence. The Court explained its ruling by differentiating between evidence that was peacefully seized from an inanimate object, such as a trunk, rather than forcibly seized from an individual. Based on this decision, Mapp's appeal was denied and her conviction was upheld.

Facts: The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and states that an officer to have both probable cause and a search warrant in order to search a person or their property. There are several exceptions to this requirement. One exception to this is when an officer makes an arrest; the officer can search an arrestee and the area within his immediate control without first obtaining a search warrant. This case brings forth the extent of an officer’s power in searching an arrestee’s vehicle after he has been arrested and placed in the back of a patrol car. On August 25, 1999, the police responded to an anonymous tip of drug activity at a particular residence. When they arrived on scene, Rodney Gant answered the door

Maryland police officers pulled a vehicle over for speeding at approximately 3am on 7 August 1999. The police officers found three men in the vehicle. The driver was Donte Partlow, the front seat passenger and defendant Joseph Pringle, and the backseat passenger Otis Smith. One of the police officers asked the owner and driver of the vehicle for his license and registration. When Partlow opened the glove box, the police officer observed a large amount of money in the glove box. The police officer checked for outstanding warrants and issued Partlow a warning. Then the officer asked for permission to search his vehicle. Upon searching the vehicle the police officer found the money he had seen earlier as well as five baggies of cocaine in-between the armrest and back seat. All three occupants in the vehicle were questioned and denied any knowledge or ownership of the cocaine. Subsequently all three men were arrested and brought back to the police station for questioning. Pringle waived his rights after being given a Miranda warning and confessed that the cocaine was his and he intended to sell it. He claimed that the other occupants in the vehicle had no knowledge of the drugs. At trial, Pringle moved to suppress his confession, claiming that it was the result of an illegal arrest. The court denied his motion, and

Dickerson, Timothy Dickerson was seen in a drug known area. An officer ordered a pat down to investigate. When searching for weapons, the officer felt a small lump in Dickerson’s pocket. Without further evidence, the officer reached into his pocket and found a bag of cocaine. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the cocaine in this case was inadmissible as evidence even though the Court held that officers were allowed to assume that an object was contraband through touch. It was stated that, “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view

The court should find that the evidence found against the defendant, Mr. Arnold J. Stewart, should not have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The moment Stewart left his suitcase in the care of Mr. Holt, he gave him possession over it. In the case of United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1990), the court determined that the one who has the right to possession of personal property has the right to exclude others from searching it. In this situation because of Larry Holt’s growing concerns with the suitcase beginning left with him for longer than intended and the concerns of whether the suitcase contained a bomb, he did not exclude

INTRODUCTION: In Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the question of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure was brought before the court system. The case looked at the admissibility of evidence discovered during search and seizure, in particular, as it relates to street encounters and investigations between citizens and officers of the law. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the decision of the 5th Ohio Court of Appeals. This case was of particular importance it helped establish what type of search and seizure behavior was lawful and unlawful on the part of officers, and set clear guidelines. The rulings in this case pertain to the Fourteenth Amendment (Cornell University Law School, n.d.).

Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53 (N.D. 1983)); Florida v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 414 (Fla. 2012) (discussing the difference between actual and constructive possession); Brent v. State, 957 N.E.2d 648, 648, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the defendant did not have actual or constructive possession of a bag of drugs located on the ground, beside a vehicle, that the defendant was in); Hunter v. Commonwealth, 690 S.E.2d 792, 794, 799 (Va. 2010) (holding that the evidence would have supported a charge of constructive possession of a firearm when the defendant/passenger stated that the gun located in the driver’s glovebox was his, but he was not charged with that crime); Martinez v. State, 152 P.3d 1237, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the defendant’s case must be reversed because he was not aware of the required mental state to plead guilty to constructive possession); Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the State must prove that the accused had actual or constructive possession of the drug); Washington v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 291 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the defendant had actual possession of drugs found in another person’s pocket under the accomplice liability theory); Sims v. Alabama, 733 So. 2d 926, 929 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that the defendant had actual possession of the drugs located under the driver’s seat of a vehicle he

The district court’s holding that allowing ambiguity to defeat apparent authority would unreasonably burden police officers by forcing them to clarify the consenter’s authority over every container within the area they were permitted to search should be upheld as it is one that is supported by persuasive precedent from a sister circuit of this Court. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000). In Melgar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit uses Supreme Court precedent to support the position on ambiguous apparent authority stated above. See id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)). The Seventh Circuit states the Supreme

In the case California v. Carney, Charles Carney was the owner of a motor home that was parked in a public lot. The motor home was kept under surveillance since the agent received prior information about the motor home exchanging marijuana for sex. The agents watched a young male go into the motor home with Carney. After the young male entered the motor home with Carney the shades were closed. After an hour went past the young man finally left the motor home. As the young man exited the motor home the agents followed and stopped him to find out what he was doing in the motor home. He admitted to receiving marijuana in exchange for sex. The agents requested for the young man to go back to the motor home and knock on the door. When Carney opened the door and stepped out the agents entered the motor home. The agents entered Carney’s motor home without a warrant or consent. When the agents entered they discovered marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale. Carney was then taken into custody and the agent took possession of his vehicle. Carney was charged with the possession of

Five years ago, the Center for Controlled Disease (CDC) reported that 79.5% of college students are sexually active (The Daily Barometer Staff). Seeing that nearly all students are having sex, it seems plausible that every university would have the proper education and health resources to insure that students are being safe and smart in their activities. Declining to provide these resources is similar to letting an inexperienced driver take the wheel of a automobile. Most teens would jump at the opportunity to speed down the streets at first chance. But quickly after putting the car into drive, the excitement would soon fade as panic starts to kick in. This speeding driver, much like an uneducated sexually active college student, would not

​Did you know that in two thousand fourteen there were five thousand nine hundred and thirty three speed related accidents in the state of Kansas of which eighty were fatal?