The Challenger Disaster : Engineering Ethics : The Challenger Disaster

The night before the launch, a teleconference between Thiokol and NASA was held to address the concerns regarding the performance of the SRB O-ring seal in cold weather. Thiokol recommended that the launch be postponed since there was no data available for temperatures below 53°F [2]. After internal discussions in the Thiokol group, senior management eventually endorsed the launch, recommending it to proceed, reversing their original decision [2].

Ronald Dittemore, manager of Shuttle Program, received reports directly from Wayne Hale (manager of Launch Integration) and Linda Ham (manager of Space Shuttle Program Integration). It is clear that decision about foam issue was made based on communication with Linda Ham, stating that in previous flights had no critical problems with foam. Dittemore did not attempt to receive a professional opinion from the engineers. Furthermore, Rocha sent an e-mail to Dittemore in order to determine whether Columbia’s crew could make a space walk to perform an inspection of the wing. Answer to this e-mail was never received suggesting that communication attempts directly from engineers to high-level managers were rejected. NASA is a complex organization that maintains strict reporting relationship. Information exchange is built on hierarchy and rules did not facilitate fast informal communication between employees and high-level management. This filtering process diminished the information flow to the key decision-makers. To solve this hierarchical structure managers like Dittemore should exaggerate their ambiguous threats, avoid status differences and build trust among employees. Managers ought to communicate with specialists in order to obtain reliable information and understand the situation.

Although many things about engineering are positive there is a dark side. We depend on them and while engineers are making innovations for us, and maintaining life as the way we know it they also struggle with ethical issues such as plagiarism, confidentiality, and whistleblowing. Just like the list of golden rules we learned as young children, engineers uphold a list of ethical rules to guide them to make the ethically correct decision when one of these situations arise. Bribery the act of receiving or giving a gift with something required in return is another example of an ethical issue that can entice engineers to break the code (“Gifts and Bribes”, 2006). Unfortunately this was the case for a former manager of the Army Corps of Engineers whose greed caused him to break the ethical canons to “avoid deceptive acts”, to “conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, and lawfully as to enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession”, and finally to “hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public” (“Code of Ethics”). His misconduct is an example of the unethical decisions some engineers make.

At the end all the risk are finance related, because the liability’s cost money and this will have an effect in the company’s earnings, so what is important is not only to try to avoid such events but also to be prepare in case they happen and have a plan, is like the saying “Hope for the best but be prepare for the worst”.

Risk; something we do everyday turning onto a street from a blind corner, jaywalking to get somewhere faster, peeking at our phones while driving and signing up for something new. The everyday risks we take can seem meaningless and uneventful, but for others it can mean their lives; for them everything must be in check otherwise it could result in death. Astronauts are trained for months about how to deal with the risks they will be faced with during their missions, along with proper solutions. These solutions are taught to them by the great minds of scientists; whose duty is to also make sure there is the least amount of risk possible for the mission. The scientists communicate to the head of the programs whether they believe the mission is possible or not, if it should be delayed or pushed up. Unfortunately, the communication between the scientists, and high up workers are ignored or misread. This was the case for the Challenger, a mission that lasted 73 seconds before it exploded, because the weather was too cold for the metal on the O-rings around the rocket. 17 Years later a similar miscommunication cause the loss of the Columbia shuttle because it failed to show the seriousness of the loss of foam from the outside of the shuttle.

Mostly because of humans instincts, with the Apollo 1 disaster, those who worked for NASA could of welcomed the Navy engineers tips; and would of prevented the deaths of the Apollo 1 crew. Then as we look to the Apollo 13 disaster, where it says in the safety rule book that if a piece of equipment is damaged or malfunctions it is to be replaced. Again this was ignored only because NASA engineers had gotten away with it in the past. Shortly after Challenger disaster would arise. Launch Comand knew what could happen if they launched the space shuttle bellow or above certain temperatures; and only because they had gotten away launches in the past were they ok with the situation. Finally, it took the lives of seven astronauts to cause a course of action. Though only seventeen short years later the lesson of the Challenger would be forgotten, and the United States would loose seven more astronauts’ only because NASA became lazy and started to cut corners just to get by. Nevertheless, when we get away with something the first time and there are no consequences to for our actions, why would we ever stop? Normalization of Deviance is a silent killer. Just as NASA slowly moved away from their saftey proticols, we as humans do the same, such as texting and or drinking and driving. The reason they are ilegal is because people died, the reason NASA had saftey proticols is because people

On the cold morning of January 28th, 1986, The Space Shuttle Challenger was launched. Seventy-three seconds into the flight, the space shuttle broke apart, causing the seven deaths of its crew members. Roger Boisjoly, a mechanical engineer for Thiokol brought to NASA’s attention about a failing O-ring safety concern in the shuttles rocket booster. After being ignored by NASA Boisjoly tried to bring the issue of the O-ring to people higher up in his company, all of the people ignored Boisjoly in his attempts to get the issue resolved. Thirteen hours before the launch of the shuttle, Boisjoly strongly urged not to launch the shuttle, all attempts failed. After the disaster took place Boisjoly told the press exactly why the shuttle failed to

On an unusually cool Florida morning in January 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 50,000 feet above ground just moments after liftoff killing seven crew members onboard (Palmer, Dunford, and Akin, 2009). A presidential commission, dubbed “the Rogers Commission” (hereafter, the Commission) after former Secretary of State William Rogers, was appointed to investigate the cause of the disaster. Although mechanical failure of an O-ring seal in one of the rocket boosters was identified as the physical cause, the investigation revealed something much more disheartening; organizational deficiencies at NASA had allowed potential safety hazards to be disregarded. The disastrous consequences of NASA’s organizational failure prompted calls

The pressure being put on me to send the Challenger was enormous, the President would be giving his State of the Union address and plans are he will be discussing the advancements the United States a made in the NASA program. I feel as though I have no choice, I must rely on all the testing that has been done. There is always risk when sending up any space shuttle, but the astronauts have been trained to do space

During the Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster, many professional responsibilities were neglected. First, engineers did not “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public” (Ethics Code II. 1. a.). For example, although the ice inspection team found the launch situation to be of great concern, the launch director authorized it anyway (Texas A&M University 5). At this point, professional bodies or public authorities should have been notified.

Garrett Hardin’s excerpt from “Lifeboat Ethics” first appeared in Psychology Today in September 1974. In this essay, there is a metaphor that rich and poor are very different. I strongly disagree with Hardin’s metaphor even though he is truthful about his beliefs. The metaphor is only being seen in one point of view, when there are multiple ways of looking at it.

Space exploration is as close to pure risk as any of us can conceive. A rocket blows upon launch or it doesn’t. A space craft reaches its destination planet or it doesn’t. The craft lands safely on the planet surface or it doesn’t. We can easily envision these risks, and this makes the process of managing them relatively transparent. Even better, the risk management jargon needed to understand the risk management process is minimal. Mostly, this case requires a thorough reading and some deep thinking. What better way to introduce good risk management than with such a transparent example.

Therefore, the potential implications of science are beyond the just the scope of the science field and extend into the public. Only the resultant technologies of research can be limited but the existence of knowledge alters the outlook on the world. Douglas states search for truth is a nontranscendent good but the development of knowledge is important and must be weighed against moral choices. Specifically, a scientist must consider the unintended consequences of their actions in regards to negligence and recklessness to determine if the risks offset the benefits. Recklessness is defined as being fully aware of the risks or imposing the unjustified risks on others, whereas negligence is defined as being unaware of the risks that could cause harm and prevent the risk. The Challenger disaster seems to exemplify the issues of scientists, or in this case, engineers, removing their role responsibilities. The engineers were told to put on their management hat by the Morton-Thiokol management team. However, it seems that there should not be separate hats but rather there should only be one hat that considers the consequences and implications of their own actions. The Challenger is not the only example of scientists removing their

In wake of natural disasters, the natural reaction is to find what went wrong, and who was at fault. The person at fault who failed to build and design structures that would have prevented catoptric damage. Additional questions are directed towards the engineer as to whether or not the job was done correctly. As an engineer, our main objective is to build and design safe structures that benefit society. All while making sure what we do is done in an ethically sound way. Engineering ethics is a field of applied ethics and system of moral principles that apply to the practice of engineering. The field examines and sets the obligations of engineers to society, to their clients, and to the profession. In dealing with engineering ethics natural disasters, engineer plays a role in designing structures to withstand natural disasters. The success of these structures is crucial because lives are at stake if these structures fail. Examples of this can be the failure in the levee system in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, the 2011 Tohoku Tsunami in Japan also was another major event in the failure of engineering. The casting of the blame for the failures of structures takes a secondary concern, to providing the adequate amount of aid to the victims of the disaster. Making sure the victims have access to food, cleaning drinking water and sufficient shelter are top concerns. Engineers are bound by the first Fundamental Canon of the ASCE Code of Ethics, in which

Rashomon was an amusing film about different perspectives. Each person involved in the crime had a different viewpoint on what had just happened. We were introduced to four different perspectives that all could have been true. It just so happened the last person who told his story, the woodcutter lied to the authority, but ultimately admitted what happened to the strangers at the gate. He hid the facts about what he saw to the authority because he had done something wrong as well. He stole the dagger from the scene of the crime due to its high value. The priest lost all hope in humanity when the woodcutter admitted to stealing the dagger and the stranger stole the orphan’s belongings. It was only restored when the woodcutter decided to take