The Characteristics Of Graham Lowder During The Vietnam War

Foreign Policy has long been at the center of heated international and domestic debates. Statements that serve as the catalyst for these debates are often labeled as blatant lies. For example, President George W. Bush believed the Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction. When President Bush’ claim could not be substantiated opponents suggested the President was a liar. Henry R. Nau asserts this label may be an oversimplification. Nau separates the existence of facts and the interpretation of said facts. People from different cultures interpret the same facts differently (1). It is human nature to simplify the world into black and white terms. In “Why We Fight Over Foreign Policy” Nau explores the common bases of interpretation

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

In her book The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, author Marilyn Young examines the series of political and military struggles between the United States and Vietnam, a nation that has been distinctively separated as the South and the North. Young chooses to express the daily, weekly, monthly progresses of the affairs collectively called the Vietnam Wars, focusing on the American interventions in the foreign soil. She seeks to provide an answer to a question that has haunted the world for years: What was the reason behind the United States interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign country in which it had no claims at all? Young discloses the overt as well as covert actions undertaken by the U.S. government officials regarding the foreign affairs with Vietnam and the true nature of the multifaceted objectives of each and every person that’s involved had.

During the Lyndon Baines Johnson presidential administration, both those policy makers who supported America’s involvement in Vietnam and those who opposed the war were part of the “containment generation.” They had reached political maturity during World War II and the early years of the Cold War and had experienced the intense anticommunism of the McCarthy era of the early 1950s. These leaders understood and applied the lessons of American nationalism, which had the primary message that the U.S. was the dominating nation that had to embrace its responsibility to aid and improve nations in America’s image. Therefore, when they saw that there was a threat of the spread of communism to areas of Southeast Asia, a majority of the

The introductory attack began spectacularly during celebrations of the Vietnamese Lunar New Year and left global lungs breathless (Farber and Bailey 34-54). Widely seen as the turning point in the Vietnam War, the NLF and PAVN won an enormous psychological and propaganda-associated victory, which ultimately led to the loss of popular support for the War in the United States and the eventual withdrawal of American troops. Additionally, the events surrounding the Tet Offensive piloted American citizens to increased polarization. Attracting members from college campuses, middle-class suburbs, labor unions, and government institutions, the anti-war movement was swollen with aggrieved affiliates (Farber and Bailey 34-54). The observable pathos of the protesters delivered the distrust of a growing population to the White House doors; the budding doubt in governmental affairs was difficult to discard and impossible to ignore. Indisputably, the Tet Offensive of 1968 cleaved the fragile harmony of the public and birthed a political skepticism that continues to subsist in modern American minds.

When fighting the Vietnam War many did not think it possible for the United States to loose. Those fighting underestimated the power of the Viet Cong. With a foreign land and foreign customs Marines struggled to get accustomed to the way the war was fought. Philip Caputo addresses these learned lessons in A Rumor of War. Lessons that were learned in Vietnam also have relevance to the current war in Afghanistan. The men in both wars fought against an enemy that blends in with the locals. Philip Caputo’s first hand account of the Vietnam War shows the mistakes that were made and how those lessons taught the United States not to make the same mistakes in Afghanistan.

The Vietnam War is widely regarded as the lowest point in the history of U.S. foreign affairs. It mercilessly dragged an unwilling country on a fatal ride for twenty years, all while receiving low approval ratings and high funding. The Vietnam conflict served as an optimum environment for the virus of controversy. No one has more experience with controversy than Heinz Alfred Kissinger. He is the ultimate pragmatist, as embodying his philosophy of realpolitik, a diplomatic ideology based on utilitarianism rather than international ethical standards. When one’s political calling card downplays the role of ethics in diplomacy, that individual is bound to garner a high profile reputation. Kissinger himself has lamented the national predicament during this conflict—squeezed between the ultimate rock, his duty to keep peace, and hard place, his duty to act with the approval of the American people. This predicament was rooted in an omnipresent opposition to Communism, as was America’s role in the entire Cold War. Cold War politics were politics of fear. That fear drove competition, which bred a certain variety of leader – a logical, calculating politician with regard for nothing but his country’s success. To avoid an uncontrollable spread of Communism through the westernized world, some moral casualties were strewn about the wayside. However, the American public had no trouble rolling up their collective sleeves to back this forward-thinking activist. In more recent years, some

On January 30, 1968, during Vietnam’s Tet celebration, VC and NVA units launched a immense attack in all of South Vietnam's provinces. They had struck 30 provincial capitals along with major cities Saigon and Hue. The Tet Offensive shocked Americans at home who thought the war near victory and the homefront support for war effort grew. CBS news reporter Walter Cronkite returned to Vietnam to see what was happening; He had been a war correspondent during World War II and reported from Vietnam when America was early involved. There was even a poll In 1972 that determined he was “the most trusted man in America.” On February 27, 1968 a broadcast summed up what he found during his return to the war zone. He closed by saying:“To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy’s intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this

The USA was extremely vain when going to war in Vietnam. They had extreme firepower. With a few weeks notice at the time, had the power to turn Vietnam into a region of radioactive glass. The US’s strategy of search and destroy conflicted directly with the Vietnamese’s strategy of hanging onto their belts (caplan,2012). Unlike previous American victories against

Deploying a propaganda technique that would be honed to perfection during the Gulf War thirty years later, Nixon began to redefine the war. From the spring of 1969 on, the war was going to be first and foremost about the men who were being sent to fight it (and not, mind you, about the people who sent them there). In the first instance, this meant prisoners of war. The administration’s clever campaign to muster public opinion around the POW issue was launched on May 19 at a press conference held by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. Enthusiastically promoted by the media, the POW issue soon dominate war news to such an extent that the writer Jonathan Schell observed that many people were persuaded that the United States was fighting in Vietnam in order to get its prisoners back.

The Cold War era proxy war known as the Vietnam War wrecked global havoc during 1955-1975. Although the destruction on the ground occurred in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the bloodshed of the war was just one part of a much larger worldwide communism versus capitalism battle headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. For the U.S., diplomatic and military policies had never before been so tightly intertwined with domestic policies. The war in Vietnam had such an impact on the home front in America that the term, “The Vietnam Syndrome” is still repeated to this day. The war, which is sometimes seen as a part of the larger anti-communist policy of ‘containment’, is largely to blame for the near destruction of three presidencies, as well as causing numerous political and social divides, a detrimental effect on the U.S. economy, and a credibility gap that caused distrust between government and the people. The focus on the war meant that many domestic issues such as the civil rights movement, the war on poverty, and Johnson’s ideology of the ‘Great Society’, were neglected by the government and therefore limited in their progress. The overall domestic impact of the war in Vietnam was largely negative and extremely divisive.

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

The investigation assesses the level of success President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy attained during the Vietnam War to end U.S. involvement in the war. In the strive to evaluate the level of success this policy demonstrated, the investigation evaluates the ability of the policy to equip, expand, and train Southern Vietnamese forces and allocate them to a substantial combat position, all while simultaneously reducing the quantity of U.S. combat troops in a steady manner. The Vietnamization policy is investigated and analyzed by both its causes and effects. The motivation that led to Nixon’s creation of this

Today’s strategic environment, whether government or corporate, is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) often times characterized by “wicked problems” or unsolvable problems. Compiled during the early 19th century, Clausewitz’s manuscript “On War” arguably posited the same conclusion in relation to the strategic level of war. He described war as uncertain, unpredictable, and marked by chance. The more the scale moved from the tactical realm to the strategic realm, the more complex war became due to the aforementioned variables. Society today must contend with the impacts of globalization, which has led to significant changes in economic, social, and cultural norms. These changes have resulted in compressed timelines and reduced decision space. With so much information available, the risk of information overload has presented challenges to how individuals approach problem solving. As a result, society has become over reliant on what Guy Claxton defines as deliberate mode (d-mode), “a way of knowing that relies on reason and logic.” (Claxton, p2)

The Arrogance of Power by Senator J. William Fulbright, provides an insightful analysis of America’s national identity, politics, and international relations through the context of the Vietnam War that is still relevant today. Fulbright’s analysis is perceptive and prognosticative. His predictions regarding the War and future relations with the east were often times proven correct. By the same token, his arguments were also rhetorically effective. Throughout the book, Fulbright skillfully uses logos and ethos to transmit his ideas. Moreover, the book has added to the class by providing additional context and insight into the Vietnam War and by providing examples of leadership. Despite the merits of the book, there are instances where I agree