The Cold War : The Strategic Air Command ( Sac ) Strategy

The American “way of war” can be seen politically through the evolution of military policy as political perspectives changed. Post-World War II reveals primary and consistent policies that lead American military policymakers to avoid major international conflict. Coined the Cold War, Americans began waging war

When President Truman authorized the use of two nuclear weapons in 1945 against the Japanese in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II, the nature of international security was changed irreversibly. At that time, the United States had what was said to have a monopoly of atomic bombs. Soon thereafter, the Soviet Union began working on atomic weaponry. In 1949, it had already detonated it first atomic bomb and tensions began to heat up between the two countries. With the information that the Soviets had tested their first bomb, the United States began work on more powerful weapons1, and a fight for nuclear superiority had begun.

Washington D.C. in the summertime is constantly perspiring, a rather miserable place to be. And, although the summer of 1949 was equally as dredged, Paul Nitze, an expert economist who lacked status in the United States government, was about to receive the opportunity of a lifetime. George Kennan, longtime diplomat and Russian studies expert, was looking to retire to his quiet farm in Pennsylvania, but he needed to leave a successor for the Policy Planning Staff. He decided on Paul Nitze. However, just months later after Russia succeeded in building and testing an atomic bomb and Nitze’s appeal for an assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Kennan on September 30 wrote, “I face the work of these remaining months with neither enthusiasm nor hope for achievement.” Obviously, the Cold War would be a large undertaking for any Russian expert in the State Department, however, it is more than likely that he was referring to working closely with colleague whose foreign policy tactics evidently began to differ greatly from his own as time would show.

The decision to drop the atomic bomb, made by President Truman, was largely influenced by political factors rather than military factors. Traditionalist historians argue from the military perspective that the bomb was used to end the war as quickly as possible and with as minimal causalities as possible. Revisionist historians, on the other hand, argue the political perspective where they believe that the bomb was dropped as a diplomatic tool to intimidate the rising superpower that was the Soviet Union. In 1945, there was little reason to doubt the traditionalist perspective; however, in retrospect, with the evidence now gathered and available, it was very likely there were other strategic reasons that played a larger role in the decision Truman had made. By observing the historical timeline, the Cold War began shortly after World War II. Truman was aware of the rising power of the USSR and the threat of the spread of communism into Europe and Asia. The fear of this threat was what likely influenced him and Congress to use the bomb more so than the desire to end the war more efficiently.

The two superpowers in the world, the United States and Soviet Union, had begun to show their strengths immediately after war. Following the war, they got involved in events such as the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War in an attempt to prove who was stronger. After those events the two countries participated in an arms race, a contest in which they competed to see who was to build more powerful weapons. As this race turned into a more serious situation, and Americans started to realize that the United States wasn’t the only one with powerful weapons, fear united them once again. As shown in Document 3, the dominant problem throughout the years 1953-1962 was the threat of war.

The physical weapons used in the Cold War were nuclear weapons. Though the Cold War never resulted in these weapons being used, the US and the Soviet Union both strived to develop better, more destructive bombs before the other. In one graph, it is shown that, from 1960 to 1977, the amount of nuclear warheads on ICBMs increases exponentially for both countries(Document 5). The graph also shows the

The Cold War was a period when the Soviet Union and the United States began negotiations which would eventually see the end of the Cold War. Still, in the early 80’s the Cold War offered little open diplomacy between the Americans and the Soviets. As such, both were content to increase their nuclear stockpiles and augment their armed forces budgets if necessary. Therefore, anti-nuclear movements and demonstrations were a typical feature of the early 1980’s (The Cold War in the 1980's, 2010). The international achievement of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or (INF), was an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that each would destroy an entire class of weapons as part of this nuclear disarmament treaty (Abbot, 2011).

In his article, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Marc Trachtenberg considers three historical approaches to the role that nuclear arms played during the 1962 conflict: first, the view that nuclear arms played no role at all, with U.S. and Soviet weapons cancelling each other out, second, the interpretation that the risk involved with nuclear warfare heavily influenced policy making, and finally the view that the strategic imbalance of nuclear force, characterized by a substantial American advantage, significantly impacted the outcome of the crisis. In weighing the three interpretations, Trachtenberg dismisses the first in supporting the existence of the second, using a variety of primary sources to identify instances when decision-makers were influenced by the risk of nuclear warfare. The focus of the article, however, is on advancing and complicating the third approach, which Trachtenberg claims is congruous with the second. In this third section, Trachtenberg advances the approach that the imbalance of nuclear capabilities impacted Soviet strategy but not American decision making. Accordingly, Trachtenberg’s article is characterized by two central claims: that risk of nuclear war influenced policy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and that American nuclear superiority disproportionately affected Soviet decision-making.

Starting in the 1949 with the explosion of an atomic bomb(RDS-1) in Russia and ending with the dissolvement of the Soviet Union, the nuclear arms race was an extremely tense few decades that forever changed the United States in many ways. The Arms Race is exactly what it sounds like; a race to amass more advance weapons. During these four decades, the Nuclear Arms Race affected Americans socially through instilling a variety of emotions ranging from fear, to awe of the power of the nuclear weapons, economically through enlarging governmental role within the economy and mostly importantly, the political impacts were more involvement required by the U.S government in world affairs and as a force against Russia.

When the National Security Council Report 68, better known, as NSC was first made known in Washington, policy makers thought that the evident build-up of Soviet nuclear arsenal would severely counteract America’s eminent nuclear edge, and would, in theory, weaken the country’s plain superiority in economic power. Truman’s advisors were particularly worried about the fact that the danger of mutual destruction would never dissuade the Soviet Union from launching pre-emptive attacks against American positions in Europe and the Pacific. If in fact the Soviets refrained from attacking American military installations in Europe and elsewhere, the only rational option that the Soviets might take would be to reposition its conventional forces in Europe

President Harry Truman’s use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan during the Second World War is the most controversial decision in history. While it was an undoubtedly difficult decision, it was indeed necessary in order to end this six year war that had ravaged the world. While many critics argue that the bomb was used primarily as an act of vengeance toward Japan, simplifying such a crucial moment in human history downplays the very real threat Japan posed to the United States. While avoiding strained relations with the other Allied countries, Truman had to assess the possible danger of the Soviet Union in a post-war world. Furthermore, the possibility of an arms race, the moral implications of using this weapon, and

Source C focuses on the American relationship with the Soviet Union and their indefinite competition to be better than the other, giving information about the commencement of the arms race between the two countries and their discreet battle over which country had the better security and defense system. This source contains information that is critical to one’s understanding of the American policies that were legislated at the given time period.

Considering the continued growth of Communism on the international stage and the Democratic president Harry S. Truman’s inability to stop events like the Communist takeover of China, the Republican Platform, that President Dwight D. Eisenhower ran on, proposed an exceptionally tougher stance on Communism. The platform had determined mere containment of Communism to be an insufficient solution, so therefore called for military action to reverse the spread of Soviet influence. However, President Eisenhower also promised large budget cuts to the military, so they devised a policy that they believed would cut spending but also increase the effectiveness of the military’s power. The Eisenhower administration announced this policy that called for the creation of a nuclear bomb carrying air fleet, that would be used as a threat to any Communists groups to discourage them from making advances to invade or takeover countries requesting American aid. Eisenhower planned to reverse the growth of Communism by using a superbomber airfleet as an effective weapon against Communism, however, he often failed to follow this initial foreign policy throughout his administration.

The harbinger of Death was finally at the command of humankind. The arguably darkest days of armed conflict, characterized by the brightest of lights, was a result of unlocking the power of the atom. In an instant and a flash, at the Trinity test site, the nuclear age was born. The United States Army had its bomb, but the bomb was just the beginning. The United States Army Air Forces realized not only the tactical advantage of wielding such power, but the most effective means of exercising that power. The inception of the 509th Composite Group, 1st Atomic Bombardment coupled with the advent of the B-29 Superfortress offered the United States the means to devastate Japan, destroy their will to fight, and ultimately silence the Japanese

The American doctrine of deterrence stemmed from the development of nuclear weapons. Strategic analysts, using this development as a point of departure, recognized that a nuclear capability established a defense scenario that was, in fact,