The Command Element: Brain Center Of The MAGTF

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

During arduous combat operations coinciding with a high OPTEMPO unit cohesion may flux toward a detriment of mission success. This report will focus on the 56TH Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in order to address the critical leadership problem. In addition, focus will center on relevant facts and assumptions that led to the critical leadership problem and rectify the issues. Furthermore, a new ABCT vision will be published in order to restructure the organizational culture toward a unified purpose and an increase in esprit de corps. (Verify with lesson for correct purpose)

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

As an aviator, we are constantly thinking PMSEII/METT-TC. We reflect on the local military, enemy forces, and civilian population. Subsequently, we try to capture the type of equipment, ranges of said equipment, quantity, choke points for the ground troops or aviation elements, and the loyalty of the locals to the enemy or friendly forces, just to list a few. We try to answer all of these before and continue to do so during each mission. As a reconnaissance and attack pilot, I must ensure I develop the situation for our ground and air commanders for present and future operations.

The MAGTF is the primary task organized unit designed and organized to conduct all missions across the warfare spectrum. It combines the command element (CE), the ground combat element (GCE), the air combat element (ACE) and the logistics combat element (LCE) balancing the needs of the mission. “The Marine Corps task-organizes for operations consistent with its statutory tasking to … provide forces of combine arms, including aviation … by forming MAGTFs. The MAGTF is a balanced, air-ground combine arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander, structured to accomplish a specific mission.”

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) utilizes command and control to exercise authority over assigned and attached forces within his or her command. Command provides direction and motivation to individuals and units, whereas control is the task of managing forces and the associated tasks required to accomplish the mission. Effective command and control successfully balances the art of command with the science of control and strengthens the commander’s ability to make and execute decisions. Mission command advances command and control

- As Tactical Support Communications (TSCOMM) Watch Supervisor, she provided 10 critical voice and data circuits to Patrol Reconnaissance Force, SEVENTH Fleet and deployed VP/VQ squadrons during 130 real-world flight missions and exercises encompassing a total of 12,210 flight hours in direct support of Commander, Task Force SEVEN TWO (CTF 72), Commander, Task Group (CTG 72.1) and Commander, Task Force SEVEN FOUR (CTF 74) missions and Commander, SEVENTH Fleet’s role in the Asian Pacific

When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties.

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

Project Abstract: The following is a discussion of the application of Army Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities which are employed in order to enhance the targeting and effects of the Ar-my’s Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Sections. The aim is to address how the assimila-tion of assets, programs, and capabilities currently available to the Army SIGINT Community by the Army CEMA Sections could significantly enhance their ability to conduct and execute the war-time mission, thereby enhancing the commanders’ understanding of the enemy’s tactical use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). This, in effect, would also reduce the time invested in acquiring EMS specific information and increase the precision and execution of Electronic Attack (EA), Elec-tronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Warfare Support (ES) by strengthening and

On the battlefield leaders are faced with challenging mission requirements. The information age has sensitized us to a variety of assets that have rarely been available but have rarely been organized, integrated and synchronized with our traditional assets (Murphy 1996) . As technology advances, leadership must adopt these assets for better situational understanding. Due to its range of technical applications, the Churchill mapping system would give commanders better situational understanding and aid ground forces in decision making. When the Nation calls upon the Army to fight and win its next war, the operational environment will be unlike the circumstances of our recent experiences (Perkins 2017) .