The Court Of Attorney 's Fee Award

For summary judgment to be granted, the movant must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The appellate standard of review for reviewing summary judgment orders in this case is the de novo standard, as this is a decision regarding “mixed questions of law and fact”. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).

In Cizler, a wrongful death action had been dismissed, before submission to the jury, for failure of proof. At the time of the trial the plaintiff, despite a diligent search for eyewitnesses to the automobile accident, could find none. The plaintiff afterwards found such an eyewitness and moved for a new trial. The court found the requirements of what is now paragraph 2 satisfied and granted the plaintiff's motion, but with the condition that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs and disbursements to date (including appeal costs).

1. The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Greer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Austin's will contest was barred by T.C.A. § 32-4-108 (Supp. 1991).

While victorious, the plaintiff’s believed that the district court had erred in their decision not to award punitive damages. The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the court had erred in denying their motion for summary judgment.

What was the ruling of the court at the trial level and briefly explain the trial judge’s decision?

Case 1 is an appeal to the conviction rendered by District Court Judge Bradley on

The student 's motion for summary judgment was granted by the court and dismissed Drakers claims against the students for defamation and libel per se. The students and their families then had to file another motion for summary judgment regarding Draker’s remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and negligence. Once this happened, Draker filed her third amended petition alleging the students only for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence and gross negligence as to the parents. Eric Goldman states, “the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed because under TX law the cause of action is a gap-filler, and there was no gap given that the defamation doctrine putatively governs these facts.” Along with her third amended petition, Draker filed a motion for continuance. This motion would give her more time to look into the facts of her remaining claims. This motion was denied by the trial court. Along with the denial of Drakers motion, the court granted the Schreibers ' and the Todds ' motion for summary judgment. Draker argues that the trial court made three mistakes. These mistakes, as listed in the case are (1) granting summary judgment in favor of the students on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of the parents on her claims of negligence and gross negligence; and (3) denying her motion for continuance and

The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Americans with Disability Act claim. The plaintiff’s is not estopped by her SSDI and long term disability claims.The court foreclosed to grant the plaintiff new trial. The appellate court the district court’s ruling.

Sharpe JA found that the defendant’s deliberate and repeated actions arising from a complex domestic arrangement, and its provocation of strong feelings and animosity in the plaintiff, favoured a higher award. In contrast, the fact that the plaintiff suffered no

Christopher Lambesis (Father) and Erin Lambesis (Mother) were divorced in 2013. In the divorce decree, Father was ordered to pay Mother $100 per month for child support for the two minor children. In October 2014, Father filed a Petition to Modify Child Support. Based on his own calculations using the Parent’s Worksheet for Child Support, he requested Mother pay him $100 per month. Mother requested a hearing in response including her own calculations indicating that Father should be paying her $123 per month. An evidentiary hearing was held and the court ordered Father to pay mother child support amounting to $149.30 per month. Father filed a Motion for a New Trial stating that he was not provided with documentation regarding Mother’s financial status in a timely manner and that the family court’s child support obligation calculations were incorrect. Mother filed an Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The court denied Father’s request for a new trial and granted Mother’s request for attorney fees. Father filed a motion to reconsider the allocation of parenting time coordinator’s fees. This motion was also denied. Father appealed the court’s decision.

Woods filed a K.S.A. § 60-1507 motion for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed; res judicata barred his claim, and even if it did not, “Woods failed to overcome the strong presumption that his attorneys sufficiently investigated [the witness’s] proposed trial testimony.” Woods filed a second § 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that “a colorable claim of actual innocence” required the district court to reconsider the merits of his

Griggs, the defendant, then decided to appeal to the courts, claiming they erred by rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, determining the child witnesses were competent to testify , admitting hearsay testimony from various witnesses, denying his request for a continuance, and admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). The Supreme Court responded by affirming, holding “(1) the district court did not err by (i) rejecting Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (ii) determining that the child witnesses were competent to testify, (iii) denying Defendant’s requests for continuances, and (iv) admitting other bad acts evidence under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the district court erred in allowing the admission of some hearsay testimony at trial, but the errors were harmless; and (3) Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not

Beside jurisdictional questions, I think we have three main arguments on the injunction fee’s issue. They are 1) the motion is not timely, 2) the statute does not allow for fees to be placed upon the State, 3) the injunction was not improperly granted. I would start off by mentioning that Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, P.A., 285 Kan. 485, 488, 173 P.3d 642, 646 (2007) does appear to be the main case in this area of law, and beside Idbeis most of the other cases tend to be older, so some areas of this topic do not seem to be covered well. I would also note that if fees were to be awarded, they would only be able to get fees related to attempts to overturn the injunction and so say fees that were done for the general case would not apply.

When I walked in, the defendant was seated on the stand, and he was telling the judge that he had filed for custody of his four children. As he was explaining why, Brad Macdonald, the ex-wife’s lawyer, objected. His reason for objecting was that the basis for filing was not relevant. I didn’t know that lawyers were free to interrupt people on the bench while they were presenting their case. The judge sustained the objection, and the defendant continued to plead his case.

The courts ruled that the plaintiff had not right to use such coercive methods when competing for business and the liability was clear in this circumstance. The defendant was awarded $1250.00 by the plaintiff for compensatory damages and $4000.00 was awarded by the association for exemplary damages. Plaintiff attempted to appeal stating the awarded amount was excessive; the courts ruled that the amount awarded was not excessive and denied the appeal from the plaintiff. No dissenting opinion was made.