Father finally alleges that the circuit court erred when it awarded Mother $20,000 in attorney’s fees. Mother asserts that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees in this case was reasonable and that there is no support for the argument that the trial judge abused its discretion when making its attorney’s fee award. We agree with Mother. Under FL § 12-103, a court may award attorney’s fees to either party in a motion to modify a custody order, in a proceeding to recover arrearage of child-support, or to enforce a child support or visitation order. Prior to making an attorney’s fee award, however, the court must consider “(1) the financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was substantial justification for bringing, maintaining, or defending the proceeding.” FL § 12-103(b). Notably, if the court finds that there was no substantial justification for the litigation articulated in subsection (a), the court’s discretion to deny costs and fees diminishes and the court is compelled to award the aggrieved party costs and fees. FL § 12-103(c). Decisions concerning the award of counsel fees rest solely in the discretion of the trial judge. Jackson v. Jackson, 272 Md. 107, 111-12, 321 A.2d 162 (1974). The proper exercise of such discretion is determined by evaluating the judge’s application of the statutory criteria set forth above as well as the consideration of the facts of the particular case. Id. at 112, 321 A.2d 162.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Americans with Disability Act claim. The plaintiff’s is not estopped by her SSDI and long term disability claims.The court foreclosed to grant the plaintiff new trial. The appellate court the district court’s ruling.
The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit at the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The verdict of the jury found the Defendant liable and was in favor of the Plaintiffs. Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial for judgment as a matter of law.
1. The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Greer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Austin's will contest was barred by T.C.A. § 32-4-108 (Supp. 1991).
FACTS -- Subsequent to a failed attempt from the plaintiff to appeal and receive the right to a trial, Harold Caldwell filed a bill of review for a case that was decided with his absence due to a dearth of convenient notification. The contrasting party, Robert Barnes, declared that he hired private process server DeWayne Perdew, to deliver the summon to Caldwell and that the decision made by the lower courts is correct. The decision of lower courts was made during a pretrial hearing, denying Caldwell a trial.
Case 1 is an appeal to the conviction rendered by District Court Judge Bradley on
Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss their action against the Defendants under K.S.A 60-241(b). Defendants have opposed this motion because they feel it would be unfair to them because 1) it would not settle the issues in the case, 2) it would deny the Defendants further discovery, and 3) it represents only a partial dismissal of the case because the Court would maintain the protective order. This memo is divided in two main parts. The first part discusses both dismissals without and with prejudice and considers the advantages and disadvantages of both. To choose, which to go with the main question will be balancing the risk of the Court imposing expenses as a condition of dismissal vs. the State foreclosing its ability to re-file
Griggs, the defendant, then decided to appeal to the courts, claiming they erred by rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, determining the child witnesses were competent to testify , admitting hearsay testimony from various witnesses, denying his request for a continuance, and admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). The Supreme Court responded by affirming, holding “(1) the district court did not err by (i) rejecting Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (ii) determining that the child witnesses were competent to testify, (iii) denying Defendant’s requests for continuances, and (iv) admitting other bad acts evidence under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the district court erred in allowing the admission of some hearsay testimony at trial, but the errors were harmless; and (3) Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not
What was the ruling of the court at the trial level and briefly explain the trial judge’s decision?
For summary judgment to be granted, the movant must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The appellate standard of review for reviewing summary judgment orders in this case is the de novo standard, as this is a decision regarding “mixed questions of law and fact”. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).
Woods filed a K.S.A. § 60-1507 motion for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed; res judicata barred his claim, and even if it did not, “Woods failed to overcome the strong presumption that his attorneys sufficiently investigated [the witness’s] proposed trial testimony.” Woods filed a second § 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that “a colorable claim of actual innocence” required the district court to reconsider the merits of his
Procedural History: U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted judgment in favor of defendants. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the respondents’ refusal to pay the
Beside jurisdictional questions, I think we have three main arguments on the injunction fee’s issue. They are 1) the motion is not timely, 2) the statute does not allow for fees to be placed upon the State, 3) the injunction was not improperly granted. I would start off by mentioning that Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, P.A., 285 Kan. 485, 488, 173 P.3d 642, 646 (2007) does appear to be the main case in this area of law, and beside Idbeis most of the other cases tend to be older, so some areas of this topic do not seem to be covered well. I would also note that if fees were to be awarded, they would only be able to get fees related to attempts to overturn the injunction and so say fees that were done for the general case would not apply.
Sharpe JA found that the defendant’s deliberate and repeated actions arising from a complex domestic arrangement, and its provocation of strong feelings and animosity in the plaintiff, favoured a higher award. In contrast, the fact that the plaintiff suffered no
The courts ruled that the plaintiff had not right to use such coercive methods when competing for business and the liability was clear in this circumstance. The defendant was awarded $1250.00 by the plaintiff for compensatory damages and $4000.00 was awarded by the association for exemplary damages. Plaintiff attempted to appeal stating the awarded amount was excessive; the courts ruled that the amount awarded was not excessive and denied the appeal from the plaintiff. No dissenting opinion was made.
When I walked in, the defendant was seated on the stand, and he was telling the judge that he had filed for custody of his four children. As he was explaining why, Brad Macdonald, the ex-wife’s lawyer, objected. His reason for objecting was that the basis for filing was not relevant. I didn’t know that lawyers were free to interrupt people on the bench while they were presenting their case. The judge sustained the objection, and the defendant continued to plead his case.