The Decision Regarding Behavior Management Options

The plaintiff in Ard v. East Jefferson General Hospital, stated on 20 May, she had rang the nurses station to inform the nursing staff that her husband was experiencing symptoms of nausea, pain, and shortness of breathe. After ringing the call button for several times her spouse received his medication. Mrs. Ard noticed that her husband continued to have difficulty breathing and ringing from side to side, the patient spouse rang the nursing station for approximately an hour and twenty-five minutes until the defendant (Ms. Florscheim) enter the room and initiated a code blue, which Mr. Ard didn’t recover. The expert witness testified that the defendant failed to provide the standard of care concerning the decease and should have read the physician’s progress notes stating patient is high risk upon assessment and observation. The defendant testified she checked on the patient but no documentation was noted. The defendant expert witness disagrees with breech of duty, which upon cross-examination the expert witness agrees with the breech of duty. The district judge, upon judgment, the defendant failed to provide the standard of care (Pozgar, 2012, p. 215-216) and award the plaintiff for damages from $50,000 to $150,000 (Pozgar, 2012, p. 242).

A student named Jamie refuses to do her work. She is constantly talking and interrupting the other students and makes no effort to participate in class. The teacher has to constantly reprimand the student and it is causing less learning due to the interruptions within the classroom. She seems somewhat clear of the rules and procedures in the classroom, but is not motivated to follow them.

Part I: Overview of Case (who is involved and what they are arguing, as well as all possible theories, defenses, and torts involved)

Finally, Sucklal argues that she was denied an adequate opportunity to be heard with respect to the motions hearings on September 26, 2013, and September 5, 2014. At the outset we note that an appellant has a responsibility to cite us to “the facts material to a determination of the questions presented.” Md. Rule 8-504(a)(4). Indeed, “we cannot be expected to delve through the record to unearth factual support favorable to the appellant.” Rollins v. Capital Plaza Assoc., L.P., 181 Md. App. 188, 201 (2008). In her brief, Sucklal makes bald assertions that she was denied due process, but fails to articulate the specific circumstances that give rise to such claims. The deficiencies in the arguments notwithstanding, after a through review

Brohawn, supra, 276 Md. at 399. Subsequently, the other party to the altercation filed an action against Brohawn seeking damages for intentional torts and negligence. Id. at 399-400. Transamerica, Brohawn’s insurer, refused to defend Brohawn on the grounds that her coverage contained a policy exclusion whereby Transamerica was not responsible for intentional conduct. Id. at 400. Thereafter, Transamerica initiated a declaratory judgment action, in the same court, seeking to have the court declare that Brohawn’s conduct was intentional, and, therefore, fell within the policy exclusion. Id. at 401. The circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because “the question of coverage would be ‘determined by the jury’s verdict in the tort suits]. . . .” Id. at

In the complaint, it is alleged that Dr. Rehman breached the relevant standard of care by discontinuing the pharmaceutical Glucovance, and by ordering insufficient monitoring of Ms. Green’s glucose levels; and that Millennium Health and Rehabilitation “failed to property monitor the deceased, ignor[ed] panic values on her labs, [and] misinterpreted the order discontinuing the Glucovance without order of [Dr.] Rehman.”

App. Ct. Mass. App. Ct. at 341, the court reasoned that the degree of emotional distress can be inferred from the actual conduct and the circumstances, no need for an expert witness. Caddys had headaches and stomachaches and could not concentrate on work because their home was taken away from them which is not something an ordinary person could endure. Id. Similarly, Taylor felt so unsafe that he and Mya quit their jobs, he withdrew his membership from the union, and they left Massachusetts altogether because Murray was threatening their lives. No reasonable person could carry on with their life when someone is threatening to take their life. Although, Murray may argue that Taylor’s weight loss, insomnia and nervousness are not severe enough physical ailments, according to a holding in Agis, 371 Mass. Mass. at 146, absence of physical damages should not thwart a claim. Thus, the court will likely rule that Taylor’s favor on this

. The husband of the plaintiff file a petition to the court that his wife[plaintiff] is mentally ill and needs to have a court order directing the admission of her to the mental health hospital. The petition initiated by plaintiff’s husband is the order of the Wayne County probate court, and it is also appropriately certified by Doctors Wolodzko, who after appearing in her house and introducing himself as a doctor , and have a conversation with her in person that day and another day in telephone, determine that she is suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and Smyk. The court gave the order and the Plaintiff was taken by ambulance from her home to a private psychiatric

The Supreme Court will also hold that Sampson did not met her burden to raise a fact issue on each element of this theory against a hospital for the acts of an independent contractor emergency room physician as well as resolve a conflict in the courts of appeals holdings regarding its necessary elements. The Supreme Court discarded the doctrine that a hospital has a non-delegable duty to its emergency patients by granting a summary judgment in favor of a hospital due to the posted signs saying that the physicians were independent

The Plaintiffs felt that since the hospital was licensed and accredited that they should be held responsible for their employees and their actions. It states in the regulations that any infraction of the bylaws imposes liability for the injury. At any time if Dr. Alexander had questions or concerns he could have reached out to an expert in this field to consult

Plaintiffs allege that defendants had prior knowledge that their daughter was a target for murder by a psychiatric patient and failed to warn the victim or anyone capable of stopping act. Defendants had notified campus police of patient’s intent, but after detaining him briefly, chose to release him because he “appeared rational.” Plaintiffs allege liability based on defendants’ failure to warn of impending danger, and failure to confine the patient. The Superior Court of California sustained the defendants’ demurrers to plaintiffs’ complaints. Appeal followed.

The case Stowers v Wolodzko presents complex issues concerning the liability of a doctor for actions taken following a person’s confinement in a private mental institution. During the mist of a martial conflict the husband called a psychiatrist to come to his home and evaluate his wife. A colleague, Dr. Smyk, and the psychiatrist, Dr. Wolodzko, arrived without explaining to the wife, Stowers, the purpose of the visit. Ethel Stowers was forcibly dragged from her home in ambulance and admitted to Ardmore Acres under the care of Dr. Wolodzko. During her 23-day stay, she was denied the right to write or receive letters, use the phone, or consult with an attorney. She refused treatment but was forced to submit. Dr. Wolodzko and Dr. Smyk signed

Count II of the First Amended Complaint attempts to state a cause of action for wilful and wanton conduct, but fails. First, Plaintiff again does not allege the existence of a duty or a breach of any duty. These elements are not only necessary to plead a sufficient cause of action for negligence but also for a wilful and wanton claim. See Kirwan, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 155 (citation omitted). On this basis alone, a wilful and wanton claim cannot survive when the underlying negligence claim is insufficient. Notwithstanding, Defendant’s alleged conduct does not rise to the level of wilful and wanton conduct because Plaintiff does not allege that Support Systems intentionally harmed Ms. Wasson or that Support Systems acted with utter indifference or in conscious disregard of Ms. Wasson’s welfare. See id. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Accordingly, Support Systems requests that Count

The appellant’s second submission concerned the way the judge in the first instance referenced sudden and temporary loss of self-control to the jury in the direction. The appellant submitted that this direction was incorrect. He also proposed that the learned Judge’s direction regarding the appellant’s characteristics in an attempt to use the model set by Lord Diplock in DPP v Camplin. The counsel for the appellant criticized the learned judges direction on two grounds: Firstly, that the Judge did not mention that the appellant was suffering from a condition known as the battered woman’s syndrome which so affected her personality that it put her in a state of learnt helplessness. Secondly, that the list of characteristics should have been left open so that the jury may pick up on the fact that she suffered from a