The Determinants Of Successful Influence On The Success Of Arms Influence Essay

The American “way of war” can be seen politically through the evolution of military policy as political perspectives changed. Post-World War II reveals primary and consistent policies that lead American military policymakers to avoid major international conflict. Coined the Cold War, Americans began waging war

President Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his extraordinary, worldly diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” During the early twentieth century, he brandished that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy in support of his country’s political objectives. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him as a diplomat and Commander in Chief was the superior power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nation’s ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms or elements within a state. Powerful states strive to employ all the elements of power, including diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and most importantly military to further their national objectives. Although a reasonable person might expect that a militarily powerful state routinely triumphs over the weaker state in matters of war, superior military power only guarantees a victory on paper, not in any real war. This paper will show that when one considers a state’s relative military power, weaker states are capable of defeating more powerful states that struggle to formulate

President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his impressive diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” He wielded that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy during the early twentieth century. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him was the superior muscle power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nations ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms within the state. Powerful states employ all the elements of power to include diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and of course military to meet their national objectives. Although one might expect that militarily powerful states regularly triumph over weaker states in matters of war, superior military power does not guarantee a victory. This paper will show that states possessing weaker military power are capable of defeating militarily superior states that struggle to formulate sound military strategies for their armies, fail to generate the required military effectiveness on the battlefield, or cannot overcome the unpredictability of war.

The most prevalent reasons for states going to war are security, interest, standing, and revenge; of these, I posit that security is the most frequent. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on warfare occurring since the onset of the 20th century, however many of the core arguments retain efficacy through the countless centuries of human warfare. States don’t trust one another; even the best relationships between states are mired in spycraft with, or in opposition to one another. To summarize Waltz, drive for security is something that all states want, and need, as long as there are multiple states and at least one of them is looking for power.

By the 1970’s and 1980’s arms control became an urgent concern, consequently, stabilization of the superpowers became priority. The result was the “bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks had resulted in the SALT Treaties of 1972 and 1979, both aimed at regulating the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union.” (Hanson 201)

The U.S. has a critical importance in regulating and protecting the supply of weapons in the Middle East. Martha McCoy, M.D., A.B.D., has studied extensively in the fields of political theory and

(Henriksen, 1999) The international community could attempt to dissuade the rogue nation from engaging in an act of war by threatening military retaliation. Tyrants have historically treated conciliatory actions in response to warlike behavior with contempt. For example, Hitler interpreted Neville Chamberlain’s agreement to the Munich Pact as appeasement and weakness, while Moscow removed its missiles out of Cuba in response to Kennedy’s political resolve and our country’s show of

4.Bell, Mark S. “Beyond Emboldenment. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy.” Conference Papers—American Political Science Association, 1/1/2014, pp.

No nation is ever merely able to act at its people’s whim; a system of alliances and treaties has formed over the course of history, and breaking any of those agreements can mean anything from a small conflict to a large-scale war. One such

So the theory suggests that because democracies externalise their interstate norms, they resolve disputes with other states like them in a peaceful way. Hence domestic inner-state policies influence their foreign policies. However, this proclamation is disputed by C. Layne who argues that the ‘crux’ of this theory is that if the assumption that democracies promote their peaceful inner-state norms and beliefs, then they shouldn’t ever threaten other democracies, especially not in a crisis. I will use the case study of the ‘Trent affair’ to provide evidence of how war was avoided. I will argue that in this case, war was avoided not because of the domestic pacific influence on foreign policy but because of other strategic reasons.

Throughout history, conflict had always broken out between enemies when the appearance of deterrence — the material and spiritual likelihood of using greater military power successfully against an aggressive enemy — vanished. From Carthage to the Confederacy, weaker bellicose states could convince themselves of the impossible because their fantasies were not checked earlier by cold reality. A stronger appearance of power, and of the willingness to employ it, might have stopped more conflicts before they began.

Typically, in popular depictions of arms races, the political calculations that start and regulate the pace of the game remain obscure. As Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., has noted, “The strange result is that the activity of the other side, and not one’s own resources, plans, and motives, becomes the determinant of one’s behavior.” And what constitutes the “finish line” of the game is the province of assertion, rather than analysis. Many onlookers, and some participants, have claimed that the likelihood of war increases as the accumulation of arms proceeds apace.

In the post-cold war era, with the rise of globalisation and the interdependence of markets, one can observe the moribund decline of traditional inter-state conflicts and the rise of more complex intra-state conflicts. The reasons behind these conflicts are manifold but at the heart is arguably always a conflict of interest between two or more groups. The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (2016) defines armed

Secondly, the motivation for war in pursuit of honor was alleviated through the formalization of international diplomacy and the evolution of beliefs about human rights. Lastly, we reviewed how the pursuit of self-interests, specifically security and resources, continues to serve a motivator for conflict, but primarily between those states operating outside of the current international order. So what are the implications of this argument for the future? The way in which we choose to manage the self-interests of states is of utmost importance. There is either the potential to reduce self-interests as a motivator for war, or the potential to erode the previous reduction of fear as a motivator. The current international order has prevented great-power war for over 70 years. There have been conflicts motivated by self-interests, but they pale in comparison to the death and destruction of the world wars. As threats to security arise and resources are restrained, states have the option to work within the system to meet them or pursue them by other

I disagree with Kenneth Waltz’s position that nuclear proliferation makes the world a safer place, and how best to measure the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in regimes that are developing, unstable, or “third-world.”1 While some scholars see nuclear weapons as a threat to stability and peace due to their mass destruction capability and the potential for horrific fallout triggered by ethnic and geopolitical instability, others see those weapons as holding the power to maintain an appropriate balance of power between opposing regimes at times of tension and during periods of low level conflict. This debate is reflected in international relations.