The Determinants Of Successful Influence On The Success Of Arms Influence Essay

President Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his extraordinary, worldly diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” During the early twentieth century, he brandished that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy in support of his country’s political objectives. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him as a diplomat and Commander in Chief was the superior power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nation’s ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms or elements within a state. Powerful states strive to employ all the elements of power, including diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and most importantly military to further their national objectives. Although a reasonable person might expect that a militarily powerful state routinely triumphs over the weaker state in matters of war, superior military power only guarantees a victory on paper, not in any real war. This paper will show that when one considers a state’s relative military power, weaker states are capable of defeating more powerful states that struggle to formulate

The American “way of war” can be seen politically through the evolution of military policy as political perspectives changed. Post-World War II reveals primary and consistent policies that lead American military policymakers to avoid major international conflict. Coined the Cold War, Americans began waging war

So the theory suggests that because democracies externalise their interstate norms, they resolve disputes with other states like them in a peaceful way. Hence domestic inner-state policies influence their foreign policies. However, this proclamation is disputed by C. Layne who argues that the ‘crux’ of this theory is that if the assumption that democracies promote their peaceful inner-state norms and beliefs, then they shouldn’t ever threaten other democracies, especially not in a crisis. I will use the case study of the ‘Trent affair’ to provide evidence of how war was avoided. I will argue that in this case, war was avoided not because of the domestic pacific influence on foreign policy but because of other strategic reasons.

Countries, depending on the surrounding factors, may employ varied approaches toward the rising powers: especially, either a preventative war or, instead, an engagement. Some states would utilize war toward the challenger; even a victory is not probable, as doing so would be less costly now in compared to the later (Levy, 1987). Nevertheless, engagement, as a choice, is also widely utilized in the international relations; rather than attempting wars, states use positive inducements for cooperation (Nincic, 2010). Question is on those factors, which determine the choices of the states toward challenger. Regime types, international structure and players, and beliefs on challengers’ intentions affect the selection of either strategy besides other factors, yet each has its own costs at the end.

President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his impressive diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” He wielded that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy during the early twentieth century. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him was the superior muscle power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nations ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms within the state. Powerful states employ all the elements of power to include diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and of course military to meet their national objectives. Although one might expect that militarily powerful states regularly triumph over weaker states in matters of war, superior military power does not guarantee a victory. This paper will show that states possessing weaker military power are capable of defeating militarily superior states that struggle to formulate sound military strategies for their armies, fail to generate the required military effectiveness on the battlefield, or cannot overcome the unpredictability of war.

The most prevalent reasons for states going to war are security, interest, standing, and revenge; of these, I posit that security is the most frequent. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on warfare occurring since the onset of the 20th century, however many of the core arguments retain efficacy through the countless centuries of human warfare. States don’t trust one another; even the best relationships between states are mired in spycraft with, or in opposition to one another. To summarize Waltz, drive for security is something that all states want, and need, as long as there are multiple states and at least one of them is looking for power.

By the 1970’s and 1980’s arms control became an urgent concern, consequently, stabilization of the superpowers became priority. The result was the “bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks had resulted in the SALT Treaties of 1972 and 1979, both aimed at regulating the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union.” (Hanson 201)

(Henriksen, 1999) The international community could attempt to dissuade the rogue nation from engaging in an act of war by threatening military retaliation. Tyrants have historically treated conciliatory actions in response to warlike behavior with contempt. For example, Hitler interpreted Neville Chamberlain’s agreement to the Munich Pact as appeasement and weakness, while Moscow removed its missiles out of Cuba in response to Kennedy’s political resolve and our country’s show of

4.Bell, Mark S. “Beyond Emboldenment. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy.” Conference Papers—American Political Science Association, 1/1/2014, pp.

No nation is ever merely able to act at its people’s whim; a system of alliances and treaties has formed over the course of history, and breaking any of those agreements can mean anything from a small conflict to a large-scale war. One such

Throughout history, conflict had always broken out between enemies when the appearance of deterrence — the material and spiritual likelihood of using greater military power successfully against an aggressive enemy — vanished. From Carthage to the Confederacy, weaker bellicose states could convince themselves of the impossible because their fantasies were not checked earlier by cold reality. A stronger appearance of power, and of the willingness to employ it, might have stopped more conflicts before they began.

Typically, in popular depictions of arms races, the political calculations that start and regulate the pace of the game remain obscure. As Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., has noted, “The strange result is that the activity of the other side, and not one’s own resources, plans, and motives, becomes the determinant of one’s behavior.” And what constitutes the “finish line” of the game is the province of assertion, rather than analysis. Many onlookers, and some participants, have claimed that the likelihood of war increases as the accumulation of arms proceeds apace.

I disagree with Kenneth Waltz’s position that nuclear proliferation makes the world a safer place, and how best to measure the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in regimes that are developing, unstable, or “third-world.”1 While some scholars see nuclear weapons as a threat to stability and peace due to their mass destruction capability and the potential for horrific fallout triggered by ethnic and geopolitical instability, others see those weapons as holding the power to maintain an appropriate balance of power between opposing regimes at times of tension and during periods of low level conflict. This debate is reflected in international relations.

Abstract Since Munich, appeasement—a policy of making unilateral concessions in the hope of avoiding conflict—has been considered a disastrous strategy+ Conceding to one adversary is thought to undermine the conceder’s reputation for resolve, provoking additional challenges+ Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom, and Roberts formalized this logic in their 1982 solutions to the “chain-store paradox+” I show with a series of models that if a state faces multiple challenges and has limited resources, the presumption against appeasement breaks down: appeasing in one arena may then be vital to conserve sufficient resources to deter in others+ I identify “appeasement” and “deterrence” equilibria, and I show that when the

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1 & 11) was an arbitration in which the US and the Soviet Union pledged to maintain productive compromise on strategic aggressive weapons. There were two individual consultations, SALT 1 & 11, both were approved by the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1972 and 1979. The original set of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1) launched in November of 1969 and ended in May 1972. The following set of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT 11) was introduced in November 1972. SALT was first proposed by U.S President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. In this presentation, I will explain several different angles on my opinion of the SALT Talks. Towards the conclusion of the 1960s, the United States