The Difference Between Common Intention Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel Has Been Described as ‘Illusory’ (Hayton). Do You Agree with This Statement? Consider How the Case Law Has Developed and Give Reasons for Your Answer.

In the case of Gagnon v. Coombs, Joan Coombs did not have the right to convey the Shelburne farm to a trust that Joan herself established. Joan was the agent and Francis Gagnon was the principal in this case. At the time when Joan transferred the property to the trust she was no longer an agent but was unaware. Even though Joan thought she was still an agent she did go against the duties of an agent, thus not giving her the right to move the property to a trust.

When Martin arrives at his beach front property, he is disturbed to learn that his property is under seizure from the local authorities under the right of eminent domain. Arguing against this appropriation, Martin shall claim that the seizure of his land is not for the public good, rather for the expanse of a private business (Kubasek, Brennan, & Browne, 2006). Olejarski (2015) states, “the principle of tangibility, which requires that direct, tangible benefits to society should outweigh agential or private interests” (p. 370). Moreover, the building of a beach side resort does not innately provide tangible benefits to a community as much as it does for the private interest of a business. Martin has a case against the local government’s abusive definition of eminent domain and should move to dismiss the procurement of his

However, because Harry detrimentally relied on Tom’s promise by building a 2000 sq. ft room onto his house to make room for the trains, he should be able make a claim of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is an exception to the classical elements of a contract. The courts should allow a contract to be enforced albeit it lacks consideration by allowing detrimental reliance to substitute for consideration.

(1) ‘The matters to which the court is to have regard in determining an application for an order under section 14 include—a) The intentions of the person or persons (if any) who created the trust’,

From a wide range of available case law it can be safety suggested that secret trusts are enforced on the basis of fraud prevention but the courts remain concerned as to the possible uncertainty and confusion that could be created by upholding a doctrine that completely undermines all forms of formalities.

The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor

This question require us to consider the three certainty requirements and the circumstances in which a valid trust is said to be properly constituted. The general requirement to create a trust is that if the trust is properly constituted, it bind the settlor and be enforceable by the beneficiaries. On the other hand, if the trust is not completely constituted, it will be ineffective as the general rule requires. Equity will not be able to help because of two of its maxims "equity will not assist a volunteer" and "equity will not perfect the imperfect gift" . The court will be prevented from coming to the aid of a volunteer beneficiary regardless of how undesirable the outcome might appear.

The doctrine of consideration is one of the most provocative issues under common law that has come under intensifying criticism because of the constriction of its definition. The definition of consideration has a very narrow scope of view; However Consideration continues to clarify out non-contractual promises. The other question which this essay will address is whether the abolishment of consideration would be a wrong move. And if it were to be abolished would other doctrines such as intention to create legal relations and promissory estoppel be equally effective. The other question which this essay will address is, if the courts were right to limit promissory estoppel to a defensive role and not a cause of action in Baird v Marks and

In the facts of the case, a testator gave North Tawton Parish Council some money in order to ‘provide some useful memorial to myself.’ The trust was held to be invalid, as it was non-charitable, and there was no ascertainable beneficiary. This case followed on from the decision in Re Astor’s Settlement, where it was held that the need for a beneficiary is mandatory nature of the trust, thus if trustees are to be obligated, then there must be someone who can enforce their equitable right. In the case of Re Endacott, Re Astor’s Settlement was cited by Lord Evershed who stated that memorial not within his category of anomalous cases as to do so would ‘go far beyond any fair analogy to any of those decisions.’ However, Re Endacott also laid down some exceptions to the general rule that private purpose trusts are non-enforceable within the

The procedural requirements for revoking or amending this trust are intended to prevent fraud, reduce the risk of undue influence, and provide certainty with respect to the Settlor’s intentions. A court, in order to give effect to the actual intentions of a Settlor, may give effect to a document not satisfying all procedural requirements for revoking or amending a trust if the court finds that (1) the Settlor was competent; (2) the attempted revocation or amendment was not the result of fraud, undue influence, or duress; (3) the document was clearly intended to amend or revoke the trust; and (4) there is no reason to deny equitable relief. The proponent of the document shall have the burden of proof. The standard

One particular criticism of the decision of Spry is the argument against the decision of the majority as demonstrated in Glover’s article who states that ‘finding that the husband had a beneficial interest in the trust based in his power to appoint the wife and the wife’s right to be considered surely means that the dispositive power must be exercised in the wife’s favour. Where has the discretion gone? Only through illegal and fraudulent denial of discretions which qualified his positive power could the Spry trustee act consistently with the Chief Justice’s findings.’ The power vested in Spry is strongly against the purpose of a discretionary trust according to Glover who further states that ‘the fact that exercise of the power may result in property (for the power-holder or someone else) does not mean that the power is itself property. Power is a capacity to act and not a thing which one owns. Equity jurisprudence has distinguished between powers and property for

As regards (i), beneficial interest in a family home can be claimed through an oral agreement between the couple, where claimant relied on the agreement to his or her detriment. A lie can be considered as an oral agreement. However, it must have been communicated to each other. Instead of legal language, the courts are looking for language that forms the necessary intention on which to base a proprietary interest. Intention of parties must be common where Dilon LJ expressed that if parties’ intention was not expressed, ‘common’ intention would be difficult to prove.

Whether Jack is entitled to those items depend on the distinction of theses items, whereas Laurence is concerning issue with land purchase which involves concepts of proprietary estoppel and constructive trust. The arguments will be concerned in turn below and advices for each issue will be given. Additionally, likely disputes and counter- arguments will be mentioned and comparative conclusion will be reached in the end of this essay .

In order to determine whether or not Emily could enforce the promise on the basis of promissory estoppel, the six-point test established by Walton v Maher[9] must be satisfied. Firstly, the promisee assumes the existence of a particular legal relationship. Secondly, the promisor is

It is to be noted that in Re Montagu the recipient was a volunteer , that is, who gave no consideration for the transfer of title so he could not count as equity’s darling. In Akindele by contrast the defendant had given consideration under a valid contract for the assets he received. Should it be ‘unconscionable’ for a volunteer to retain the benefit of his receipt being one who paid nothing for what he received in breach of trust where as under a valid contract a defence of bona fide purchaser will always apply to commercial dealings.