The Dod Developed The Cyber Strategy

The most recents detections of how cyber warfare is inevitably coming was the accusations of Russia hacking the the Democratic National Committee and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s email’s releasing damaging evidence against them which ultimately lead to Donald Trump being named the President of The United States (Diamond, 2016). The effects of cyber warfare have leaked over in to televise series, forming shows such as CSI cyber, and the gaming world, Call Of Duty Infinite Warfare. Neglect regarding cyber security can: undermine the reputation of both the government and elected officials; force unacceptable expenditures associated with the cost of cleaning up after security breaches; cripple governments' abilities to respond to a wide variety of homeland security emergency situations or recover from natural or man-made threats; and disable elected officials' ability to govern (Lohrmann, 2010). Classified information such as overseas operators and attacks, missile locations, response plans and weaknesses, and much more cripples America’s ability to defend itself from enemies both foreign and domestic. To combat cyber terrorism is the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, or CISA. In an article titled “Why Cybersecurity Information Sharing Is A Positive Step for Online Security” it is discussed that under CISA, the Department of Homeland security will have more responsibility for domestic cybersecurity. CISA’s fundamental purpose is to better enable cybersecurity information to be shared between the private and public sectors (2016). The sharing of threat information between public and private sectors can give the the United States a head start by allowing them to share information rapidly and more often to combat enemy threats while still providing safety for privacy and civil

There are two directions for information and directives to drive strategic cyberspace decisions at NSWC PCD. The first is always direction sent through the Navy command chain by either direction from an Admiral and policy changes or through directives from N2/N6 at NAVNETWARCOM through the CIO/IA command chain. Either path often leaves little room for choosing an interpretation locally. However, either the upper management, Commanding Officer, Technical Director, and technical department heads will meet and issue a local direction or in some cases directives flow from N2/N6 to NAVSEA to The Warfare Center Headquarters to the Warfare Center CIO and/or IAM. In the case of the latter path, more input, discussion, and interpretation is available at the local level. In those cases the CIO will call a meeting of the IAM, IT Manager, IT Operations Manager, and other key advisors to discuss the requirements and provide options on the how to meet those goals within the strategic operation plan of the command. The CIO will then draft a local recommendation to be presented at the CO/TD forum for upper

Summary of the outcomes: The project stated on 15/12/2015 and it lasts for 2 months. During the project there were few stages such as initiating the project which happened in the beginning of the project. Then there was planning of the project which happened after 15 days of the project initiation. During next month there

While working as the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at the Army Materiel Command, the command was under constant attack by hackers. The Army’s current network defense system was woefully inadequate for protecting the commands 140 locations worldwide. After sustaining a couple of very high profile attacks using these tools, it became evident that something else was needed. One of the command’s subordinate commands was the Army Research Labs and is on one the foremost research labs in the world. One of the labs mission was Cyber Defense and came under my preview as it program manager. The lab had developed several cyber security tools and had been testing them very successfully on a several platforms. The power of this tool

On October 31, 2010, The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) achieved Full Operational Capability becoming a sub-unified command under the United States Strategic Command. As a newly formed armed forces command, USCYBERCOM was given the mission for centralizing cyberspace operations, organizing existing cyber resources and synchronizing the defense of military networks. In order to achieve this mission, prior Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, directed the USCYBERCOM to focus on developing cyber capability and capacity via the DoD’s Cyber Strategy. The purpose of this strategy is to guide the development of DoD's cyber forces and strengthen the United States cyber defense and cyber deterrence posture while building cyber capabilities

Clarke and Knake use a mixed method research approach in Cyber War to support their hypothesis that offensive prowess is meaningless without solid defense in cyberspace, and that the United States need immediately fix our defensive cyber shortfalls, or face apocalyptic doom. Specifically, the authors define ‘cyber war’ as “actions by a nation state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” This infers that they are really talking about ‘warfare’ and

In 2003, I was recruited to set up and lead a new cyber security initiative for the Army Materiel Command (AMC), a 53 Billion dollar year logistics command that serves as the army version of amazon for the army’s current inventory of weapons, supplies and vehicles. AMC, at this time, had over a 100k workforce spread across 140 locations worldwide. During this timeframe, the Department of Defense was still trying to define Cyber Security and mature the process they had in place. DOD was a large target and AMC ranked high due to the research we performed for the Army and the DoD. The attacks came from all types of hackers ranging from, high school and college kids to state sponsored attacks using everything from off the shelf scripts to specialized tools designed to specifically break down our security systems. At this time my command had one of the worst records in the army for cyber security incidents. These attacks were, due to their ferocity and complexity, having a devastating impact on our ability to support the war efforts in Iraq and some attacks resulted in exfiltration of sensitive but unclassified data. AMC, during this timeframe, owned 50% of the Army’s computing power and this took the form of workstations, servers, applications and communication circuits so the impact was significant. Coupled with these ongoing attacks, the Army changed the way security incidents were being reported, directing all incidents to be reported to the Chief Of Staff (COS) of the

(IA) operations. He employed textbook tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) by, with, and through an assigned CTF 1070 Cyber Protection Team (CPT) eliminating a real world cyber threat to Outside United States (OCONUS) Navy Enterprise Network (ONE-Net) and the DODIN.

Cyberspace – Joint Forces will secure the ‘.mil’ domain, requiring a resilient (DoD) cyberspace architecture that employs a combination of detection, deterrence, denial, and multi-layered defense. We will improve our cyberspace capabilities so they can often achieve significant and proportionate effects with less cost and lower collateral impact (p. 19).

There is a new threat to the world, cyberspace. New technologies are being developed daily that threaten secure organizations. Attackers are able to take advantage of any vulnerability that they can find no matter the geological location. This threat poses risks to the economy, militaries, and governments around the world. The U.S. is at the forefront of the defense of cyber security, but with the endless number of cyber terrorists, the U.S. defense is not enough. Nations need to come together to provide a standard for cyber security that is able to be enforced throughout the world. The many different organizations provide many avenues of approach for various attackers to take advantage of the vulnerabilities in cyber defense. The only way to prevent these attacks is for the U.S. and its international partners to develop a strategy for global cyber security. Actions are currently being taken by many of the U.S. 's allies, yet there is still much work to be done. The enforcement of cyber security standards must take place in all government organizations, and similar standards should be followed by civilian corporations. This new cyber-warfare must be regulated and controlled just like any other battlespace.

According to Department of Defense (2014), the transition from Department of Defense (DOD) Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) to the Risk Management Framework (RMF) has started. RMF reemphasizes the criticality of implementing continuous monitoring according to DOD (2014). In this paper, the shortcomings of DIACAP will be described and analyzed. Courses of action to address the weaknesses will be addressed. It is not clear that the transition to RMF and continuous monitoring alone will completely turn around the trend of ineffective cybersecurity in DOD. Most likely, RMF continuous monitoring will have to be combined with strategies like the consensus audit guidelines where security controls are prioritized and streamlined to those with most effectiveness. Additionally, wasteful spending and ineffective activities must be eliminated so that investments are concentrated on making positive impact to security and operations.

The following document will provide information pertaining to presidential administrations both past and present and their respective views on cybersecurity policies. Policies of each administration will be reviewed and summarized, noting actions taken to secure a more resilient, dependable, cyberspace. Additionally,

Cyber security is a major concern for every department, business, and citizen of the United States because technology impacts every aspect of our daily lives. The more we use technology the more complacent, we get with the information that is stored within our cyber networks. The more complacent, we get, the more vulnerable we become to cyber-attacks because we fail to update the mechanisms that safeguard our information. Breaches to security networks are detrimental to personal, economic, and national security information. Many countries, like Russia, China, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, now have the abilities and technology to launch cyber-attacks on the United States. In the last five years there have been several attacks on cyber systems to gain access to information maintained by major businesses and the United States Government. Cyber-attacks cause serious harm to the United States’ economy, community, and the safety, so we need to build stronger cyber security mechanisms. Based on my theoretical analysis, I recommend the following:

Therefore, it is important to reform current organizational deficiencies which hinder current cyber-warfare efforts, adopt a new doctrine relevant to the new threat, and make cyber-warfare one of the United States Government’s top national security priorities.

The branches of the military, for a couple generations, have always been the Army, Navy, Air force, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard; however, in an ever evolving digital world, the notion that outer space would be the next military front is being rapidly replaced by the idea that cyber space will be the next arms race. The United States has been defending attacks on their infrastructure day after day, night after night, when one hacker on one side of the world sleeps, another takes their place to attempt to compromise the US government. The motives may range from a political ‘hacktivist’ trying to prove a point, to an economic spy, trying to gain a competitive edge on its more upstart rivals, to an attempt to control the United States