When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was created in 1952 as a provision of the Treaty of Paris, no one could have imagined from such humble beginnings that the ECJ would become the institution that it is today. Today, the conflict between a semi-autonomous judiciary capable of conveying uniquely European rights on citizens able to be defended before a supranational court, and European governments, remains one of the clearest examples of the unintended consequences of an economic union that has over time evolved into something much more. As such, the question of why and under what circumstances European governments defer to ECJ judgements has never been more pertinent. In this paper, I will first provide a brief overview of two significant developments in the trajectory of the ECJ, before focusing on the case of France as an ideal example of how national legal contexts can at times conflict with EU law. Second, I will argue that the ECJ is keenly aware of its precarious position as an actor in the process of European integration. Since the 1960s, the court has occupied a contested space between those questioning the legitimacy of national law in light of the primacy of EU law, and those arguing that a democratically accountable EU requires an independent judiciary and supranationally shared set of rights and responsibilities. The supremacy of EU law to that of national law is an inherently delicate concept, challenged by both politicians and citizens alike.
That such a momentous step was taken in Factortame is, on the face of it, grist to the mill of those who contend that sovereignty has been ceded to Brussels. Yet Wade’s analysis — and the dramatic consequences that it implies — is problematic. For one thing, it is incompatible with the way in which Lord Bridge — the only Law Lord in Factortame to consider this point in any detail at all — explained the judgment. He argued that any limitations upon its sovereignty implied by EU membership had been accepted ‘voluntarily’ by Parliament when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972. The implication was that Parliament is at liberty to permit EU law to prevail over its own enactments. The flip side of that coin must be that if Parliament
The legitimacy of the ECJ to uphold EU legislation is a necessary component of effective human rights policy. The history of its increase in power is worth noting. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the ECJ’s location in Luxembourg, far from the political fray in Brussels and Strasburg, prevented it from becoming a strong body of the EU. Yet, throughout that time the court methodically built case-law that would lead to its surge in influence in the 1980s. The two most significant developments of the court during this time period were direct effect and supremacy. These twin pillars clarified the relationship between the national and EU legal orders.
This paper points out the reasoning for why and how the Supreme Court and judicial system became what it is known for today. The Supreme Court was not always a perfect and well organized system. The court early beginnings started out after a decision at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was establish. This decision called for a national supreme court. With the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress made the US Supreme Court possible. One key person who had a role in developing the Supreme Court into a court of “judicial review” was the fourth Chief Justice, John Marshall. Today the judicial system is broken down into three levels; local, state, and federal. And within these levels are different levels of the court system that handle civil and criminal cases. Each level has a different role to play in the court system but, they all serve the same purpose.
The developing jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice also made it clear that there existed effectively an autonomous European legal order and that the member States were obliged to acknowledge the primacy of Community law over national law in areas where it
This paper will assess the claim that supremacy of EU law is still an evolving and debatable concept. To do this, I have divided this paper into four sections. The first section will discuss the establishment of supremacy in EU law through ECJ case law. The second section will explore the vibrant debate surrounding constitutional pluralism that has arisen since the early 1990s. The third section will examine the debate and impact of the codification of primacy in the early 2000s. The fourth section will examine the extent to which the principle of sovereignty has been accepted in three EU Member States, namely, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland.
Enforcing the European Union legal system is diverse and done on multiple platforms; through not only actions taken against member states for breach of their obligations, but also, for example, through the use of direct effect1. Article 267 TFEU; an organism devised to practice private enforcement of EU law before national courts, has been critical to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU law in member states. References for preliminary rulings occur when the national courts are presented with a question of EU law due to uncertainty of the provision. The national court will therefore ‘make a reference to the Court of Justice (COJ) to obtain a preliminary ruling on any point of EU law relevant to the proceedings’2. In
This essay will examine and evaluate the principle of supremacy of European Union (‘EU’) law since its ‘inception in the two fundamental authorities’ of Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie and Costa v ENEL analyzing how these cases established ‘an autonomous legal order which limits national sovereignty’ . Using Professor Weiler’s prism of ‘bi-dimensionalism’ this essay will examine supremacy through two viewpoints, how the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has looked at the supremacy of EU law and how the national courts have viewed the supremacy. Whilst the EU may have one view, the second part of bi-dimensionalism is how the Member States have reviewed and interpreted the EU decisions reconciling them with
This paper will analyze one of the most fundamental rules of law in criminal law, the Principle of Legality under the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found in Article 7 ECHR. “Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege” (“no crime without law, no punishment without law”- NCSL), is often referred to as the Principle of Legality in many legal contexts. It is considered a human right and also at the heart of many national criminal legal systems. It is a crucial element of legal defense to a criminal prosecution in which no crime or punishment can exist without a legal ground. It is a guarantee of human liberty; it ensures the fairness and transparency of the judicial authority and it protects individuals from state abuse and
Roles of the European Court of Justice ‘The European Court of Justice played a decisive role in the
Helfer, L.R., Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European human rights regime. European Journal of International Law, 19(1), 2008, .pp.125-159
As one of the founding member of the European Council, formed in 1953, United Kingdom was entitled to incorporate the European Conventions on Human Rights into the state’s domestic law. Undoubtedly, the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) is one of the foremost achievements in European legal history and the topmost achievement of the Council of Europe. The emergence of the authority of the European Court of Human Rights has been defined as one of the most notable occurrences in the history of international law. Its predominance in the area of human rights standards is also
There are numerous reforms in the International Criminal Court that needs to bé established to the national justice system in order to uphold the same aims of International law. The International Criminal court needs to increase its universality of the scope of the court, although the icc statute has been ratified by many states, efforts to reinforce its universality must be strengthened, such as the United states, Russia and China, this complicates, if not makes it impossible, for the court to exercise its jurisdiction. This limitation of its jurisdiction contributes to the misperception that the court is not impartial, which is unfortunately further reinforced by the fact that all the current ongoing investigations are conducted on the
It is important to set the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights in context by examining the development of rights within the European Union. The embryo organisation that commenced the EU (The Coal and Steel Community 1951) was introduced in the wake of World War II to rebuild Europe by economically tying previously warring nations together. The consensus amongst the "heavy weights" of the EU was, if member states were economically invested in each other to ensure financial stability within their own state, future conflicts would be avoided. The EU had taken the role of a purely economic organisation which explains why it was not focused on social issues such as human rights, leaving such matters to individual member states to determine. Then came the political advancement of the 1990s, as evidenced by Weiler; ‘[The Maastricht Treaty] appropriates the deepest symbols of statehood: European citizenship, defence and foreign policy’. Naturally, the issue of human rights became prominent within the EU, and after much debate and a Convention the Charter was passed and given legally binding status under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Charter has proved to be a controversial issue within European politics, with doubts being voiced about the functionality of the European Union’s own “Bill of Rights”. To effectively assess the question at hand, this essay will evaluate the extent to which the Charter is a necessary and desirable development, before reaching an overall
Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber) of 21 May 2015
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) can be defined as an international agreement initiated within the Council of Europe, which was established in 1949 in Strasbourg in France in order to unify Europe after the Second World War (Harries et al., 2014; O 'Boyle, 2014). According to Donald et al., (2012), United Kingdom was among the first countries to adopt and has played an important role in ECHR creation at that time. In 1966, the petition and jurisdiction of UK’s citizens was voluntary and individuals was able to take a case and jurisdictions to the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Latterly, in 1998 this process become compulsory for all countries that are members of the (ECHR). Since that time, European countries has become covered under this agreement as a form of legal system in the unify area.