The Failure Of Deterrence : Israel And Egypt

The role of the Middle East has been very crucial to the United States, especially after WWII. The U.S. had three strategic goals in the Middle East and consistently followed them throughout various events that unfolded in the region. First, with the emergence of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the U.S., policymakers began to recognize the importance of the Middle East as a strategic area in containing Soviet influence. This also coincides with the U.S. becoming increasingly wary of Arab nationalism and the threat it posed to U.S. influence. Secondly, the emergence of the new Israeli state in 1948 further deepened U.S. policy and involvement in the region while also creating friction between the U.S. and Arab states which were

The Yom Kippur War happened in October 1973, which involved the Arabs and the Israelis, as well as two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. At the end of the war, the Israelis had won. However, the Israeli government and people were shocked by how the Arabs did. The Yom Kippur War has led to a number of effects on the Arab-Israeli relations, which can be classified as two aspects, short term and long term.

To start, Carter says outright what his vision for America was: “...but America does want to be the world's peacemaker.” Furthermore, Carter continues with his vision for America’s peace-seeking foreign policy. He does this by talking about SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: “The purpose of SALT, then as now, is not to gain a unilateral advantage for either nation, but to protect the security of both nations, to reverse the costly and dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race, to preserve a stable balance of nuclear forces, and to demonstrate to a concerned world that we are determined to help preserve the peace.” By speaking about the importance of the SALT, Carter effectively laid out what his plan was to secure peace amongst nuclear-armed nations. However, at the same time, President Carter made sure to lay out what America wanted to achieve in the immediate short-term regarding foreign policy: “Our firm commitment to Israel's survival and security is rooted in our deepest convictions and in our knowledge of the strategic importance to our own Nation of a stable Middle East.” As written before, it was strategically important to the United States that they maintain the sovereignty of Israel. Specifically, after failing to intervene in China during the uprising of the KMT, it

Since his presidency did not begin with Israel becoming a state, his focus was greatly adjusted and at first there was a noticeable decline in aid and care for Israel’s wellbeing. Israel was also rather vulnerable during this time, due to the fact that there more Jewish refugees entering Israel from surrounding Arab states. President Eisenhower convincingly proved that America had the ability to influence Israel in a good way, although his presidency ended with the Middle East still in a state of war. During Eisenhower’s administration, there were two successful incidents of U.S. management of Israel and in both circumstances, Eisenhower avoided the political compulsions of America’s attachment to Israel and instead forced the Israelis to act upon principle. Unfortunately, his presidency was the last to give Israel undivided focus, for the ones to follow were absorbed in other affairs and did not provide the same constructive support.

The United States has been unable to fully break from Cold War mentality which began after World War II, and any attempts to try and adjust this policy have been done in miniscule steps resulting in little change. Deterrence has been a strategy utilized by several presidents and administrations since the onset of the Cold War, and in many ways it still remains the central strategy for current foreign policy. The objective of deterrence is to prevent foreign powers from committing unwanted actions against the U.S. or

The superpowers, namely the USSR and US were in engaged in a war by proxy, which is very easy to identify if you analyze the conflicts in the Middle East from 1948 until, and including, the Yom Kippur War of 1978. The superpowers would employ tactics such as supplying their various ‘allies’ in the Middle East with weapons and finances which would afford them the ability to engage in the many conflicts that took place in that period such as the Suez Crisis, Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. All of this was done without either superpower’s putting their own men on the ground to fight, for fear of an all out war between each other. However much the superpowers might have fuelled the conflicts with supplying the Arabs and Israelis with weapons and finances, they were not the cause for the conflicts as they are much deeper rooted. Israel and the Arab states have always seen tension as per their culture and religious differences, and the growing nationalism of the Arab states and Zionism in Israel, which amounted to extreme actions such as the three major conflicts during the time period 1956-1978.

The Israeli advance towards the canal is a fake to show the world that Egypt in danger of being overthrown by the Israelis. The British and French then dissimulate as peacekeepers, trying to diffuse then tension between Egypt and Israel. They offer Nasser an ultimatum: “Israel and Egypt are to cease fighting or the two Western powers will intervene”. On the 31st of October this ultimatum expires and France and Britain attack, bombing Alexandria and sending in thousands of troops. Russia then threatens Britain and France with Nuclear weapons. At this point it looks as though the world is on the brink of another World War.

If Egypt and American allied together then it would be a catastrophe for Israel (Telhamy

This investigation analyzes what the war powers resolution was, and how it affected the American people. Also how the presidents since it was passed felt about it. To examine what drove Nixon to veto the legislation and what drove congress to override the veto. We will also find out what this had to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Yom Kippur war. Also, how the American people felt about the resolution and how it would affect America as a country. To investigate what this resolution did to the presidential powers a president has.

Ever since the early days of the Cold War, extended deterrence has been one of the most important but challenging aspects of American strategy.

Background: In the midst of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, conflict arose over Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was of particular concern due to Nasser’s increased connection with the Soviet Union, through the Czech Arms agreement and the Aswan Dam. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Great Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt. In facing this crisis, the U.S. had to consider Cold War politics with the Soviet Union, relations with Arab and Israeli nations, and relations with the invading powers

On May 15, Anwar Sadat, the Speaker of the National Assembly would visit Moscow, where he would be told by the Soviets that Israel had planned to invade Syria during the May 16 through May 22 time frame, all of this would prove to be false. Soviet intelligence cited the fact that Israeli troops parading in western Jerusalem, for Israel’s Independence Day, were doing so without heavy weapons, which they said were being amassed along the northern border with Syria. The reason as it turns out they were devoid of weaponry during their parades is to ease Arab tensions in the area. Sadat would pass this information along to Egypt and President Nasser, who would then parade Egypt’s forces through Cairo along its way to the Sinai Peninsula (Cleveland, 2009).

The previously accepted nature of war stemmed from the Clausewitzian trinity: war is emotional, an experience wrought with passion, violence, and enmity; uncertainty, chance, and friction pervade the medium of war; however, because war is not an end in itself, and because, as a means, it is subordinate to its political aims, war must be subject to reason (Clausewitz, 89). With the first employment of nuclear weapons, however, strategists and military theorists began to question Clausewitz’s foundational ideas (Winkler, 58). Similarly, Allan Winkler, in agreeing with Bernard Brodie’s thesis, opines that the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Winkler’s assertion stems from his argument that such a nuclear duel would yield a post-war environment incapable of recovery for any parties involved (62). He further describes Brodie’s realization that “[t]he atomic bomb is not just another and more destructive weapon to be added to an already long list. It is something which threatens to make the rest of the list relatively unimportant.” (62) Ultimately, Winkler abridges Brodie’s assessment in stating that “the United States was caught in the paradox of having to prepare for a war it did not plan to fight.” (63)

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been an issue that definitely defined The U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Israel is an ally of the U.S. that receives a lot of foreign aid from the states. It’s a priority for the U.S. to protect Israel so it’s obvious where its’ loyalty lies. Israel also has good relations with Egypt; Egypt is crucial to the security of Israel, so that makes them an automatic ally that receives quite a bit of funds as well. It’s an on-going issue that makes pointing out allies clear as well as seeing who the top

the conflict in the middle east between 1948-1973 was not purely fuelled by the interest and concerns of the superpowers but rather of a series of conflictual incidents, aswell as the main wars that took place from the years from 1948-1967 such as the: 1948 War, The Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. But although the conflict was not fuelled by the superpowers, the influence of the superpowers and the reach of the superpowers into the Middle East was evident in the years both prior and following 1978. But even despite the influence and interests of the superpowers between and including 1948-1967 being undeniably evident, the extent of this influence cannot be said to have “fuelled the conflict”.