The First Method Or Mode For The Appointment Of Judges

In looking at how political patronage and merit system and how they differ the answer is simple. However, there is much controversy in both. According to The Craft of Public Administration, written by George Berkley and John Rouse states that, “The selection of civil servants by merit and by political patronage are not mutually exclusives”. What this is basically saying is that while the two may have the same relation to each other political patronage and the merit system limits control and can exclude others from participation. In this paper I will discuss the history of political patronage and merit system, attempt to explain how they differ, and why both are of relative importance to the other.

Selection of judicial personnel differ amongst states in the united States, as all the states have their unique criterion of selection governing how they fill their state and local judiciaries. The five main methods are: Partisan elections, Nonpartisan elections, Legislative elections, gubernatorial appointment, and assisted appointment.

Each state within the United States of America (USA) has its own unique judicial selection process within its court system. The judicial processes vary from court to court depending on a particular state. This paper analyses these processes, the qualifications for selecting the judges and the steps for removing judges from office, as it applies in the USA states of New York and Texas.

The current president of The United States appoints the federal court system selection process for judges, and official, offices are decided by the senate (Gaines & Miller, 2012). Contrary to the federal judge selection process, they both assert that the state selection processes varies by different forms such as: appointment by the governor then validated by higher chambers of the particular states’ legislation, partisan or nonpartisan elections, or even utilizing The Missouri Plan of the integration of the appointment and election process; enabling the provision of additional opinions expressed by voters. In like manner, Glick & Emmert (1987) state that selection of judges also depend on: place of birth (have to be a United States citizen),

This case dealt with crucial points in the political history and can be listed as follows:-

Electing judges contradict the impartial and independent nature of the judicial system. Judges are not politicians. It is

In the United States, each state has its own rules and laws that govern for the

Texas legislative branch should change the way judges in Texas are appointed. Partisan trends are an undependable and mendacious method in order to choose such an arbiter of equity as a judge. The system in which the partisans elect judges in some lights may be a good thing. However, the way in which it is gone about is flawed. Take for example the fact that these judges must chose a party. So the voters are given a ballot with a number of judges’ names which have party labels directly affixed to them. It doesn’t make sense that in the court room one judge would have a dissimilar point of outlook than a judge from another party. Regardless of which Party you are affiliated with the laws that the citizens are to abide by are exactly that and have no affiliation with a specific party. Whether or not a judge is Democratic or Republican should not matter because the jurisdiction ought to remain the same. There are way too many deserving judges out there who get thrown out of these elections way to much just because of a party label. When a voter looks at a ballot it is very likely that some of them are voting because it’s the right thing to do. Nobody is to say all of these voters attentively follow politics other than watching a few presidential debates. So there’s a chance that a lot of undeserving judges are ignorantly getting elected in result of a specific party label that voter identifies with or simply because that person’s name stands out.

When judges are appointed to the federal judiciary they must take into account the atmosphere they will be entering into (the judicial climate a judge enters). These new appointees will enter into their position where they must interact with people who have been there longer than they have. By the time these new judges enter the federal judiciary there is already an existing composition and atmosphere. They enter into the decisions already made, in which they must uphold the precedents made and constitutionality of cases or, if in the trial and appellate courts, the result may lead to the higher court overturning their decisions. When decisions are constantly being overturned it can result in a lack of legitimacy of the judge and could eventually result in impeachment, recall vote, etc.

The role of law suggests that judge’s make their decisions based on “…legal facts as laid out in the documents submitted. They read the law, consider the intent of those who framed the law, and place it in the context of the Constitution” (Morone and Kersh 454). The decisions from previous cases commonly influence the decision of the justices. Secondly, ideology is another perspective that guides justices. This means that justices’ decisions are steered by their own values and beliefs. Additionally, collegiality and peer pressure also contribute to the justices choices. “Supreme Court justices… spend a lot of time together, hearing cases and discussing their decisions. They exert some influence on one another’s outlook and decision making” (Morone and Kersh 456). Lastly, justices consider the concerns of the Court as an Institution, which in turn affects the conclusions justices make. “They [justices] spend many years on the bench and are aware of the outside forces that might affect the standing of the Court- public opinion, a hostile Congress, or a skeptical executive” (Morone and Kersh

Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzma’s article answers the question to whether Solicitors General (S.G.) influence Supreme Court justices to behave differently than they would like. The article argues that unlike some studies that assert that S.G.’s influence the justices decisions, the reality is somewhat contradictory. They claim that Justices are more sympathetic to motions from the S.G. when both the justice and S.G. are “ideologically proximate” or when the Solicitors General’s motion is conflicting to his own ideological tendency. According to them, “justices will find a solicitor general’s information more credible when the solicitor general and the justice are ideologically congruent or when the signal from the S.G. is ideologically counter to his typical policy views”. (p 72) That means justices are sympathetic to the SG’s signals under two circumstances: when their ideology is close to the S.G.’s ideology or when the S.G. files a motion that opposes his own ideological tendency.

Carrubba’s article focuses on which justices on the court as the most influential. It was initially believed that the court’s median justice overall was the most influential, of which Carrubba and others disagree, hypothesizing that the median justice on the majority is. Carrubba and other’s utilize unconventional methods in order to test their hypothesis, that being the fact that, when deciding a case, justices must resolve a concrete dispute and that those unsatisfied with the majority ruling are able to write a concurrence or dissent. In testing their model, they explain that a justice concurs only if their own ideology strays too far from the majority and will concur otherwise. The dependent variable was the decision by a justice to file a special or general concurrence while the key independent variable was justice's ideological distance to the coalition median, the Court's median, and the opinion writer, and an indicator for majority and plurality opinions. The justices’ ideologies were gauged using Martin-Quinn scores as well. Overall, their results

Discuss the importance of the judicial selection and appointment in securing an independent judiciary. (50 marks)

Thus, in the demand of the new system, the settlement at the end illustrates the relationship between kinship and politics, which is that the establishment of court and the introduction of jury has its own political influence. On the other hand, when the jury cannot achieve the same opinions, the kinship will be considered as an important factor as Apollo had mentioned

Chief Justice M. Hameedullah Beg., Justice N. L. Untwalia, Justice P. N. Bhagwati, Justice P. S. Kailasam, Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer and Justice Y. V. Chandrachud.