The Five Principles Of The Western Way Of War

Through separate publications, Geoffrey Parker and Victor Hanson describe principal foundations (Parker) and a prominent element (Hanson) that serve as the basis for their argument in defining a Western Way of War. However, both men fall short in clearly describing what is a true Western Way of War. Both the principal foundations by Parker and the prominent element by Hanson, while insightful, only delineate a single type of warfare that was used by the armies of Europe and the United States, however they fail to capitalize on the basis of their argument because neither man legitimately compares that type of warfare to any other method of fighting that was used, or is currently used, by other nations around the world. Hence, there is no

tactics and maneuvering, where technology is the tool for tactical means. The battle of Yorktown was a

The Levee en Masse of 1793 was the first time mass conscription had been used in warfare, and therefore revolutionised military recruitment. The Levee en Masse did not involve as many people as conscription in World War One, as it only made military involvement compulsory for single men aged 18-25 without children. It must be noted that married men were required to make weapons,

tongue my utter forth, The venomous malice of my swelling heart.” (Barbara 193). This not only sums up who this unique character was, but the way the play went. Throughout it’s entirety, people did unforgivable things due to the main issue in the beginning (in a religious point of view) one of the four horsemen, War. This being set in a religious time period, it seems appropriate to bring to light the Catholic undertone of the story, as it is referenced many times.

Military innovation can occur at any moment as history and more importantly the conflicts that shape them runs their course. One can pontificate that the most significant innovation from all states, but particularly the Germans during the interwar period. On the eleventh hour, of the eleventh day, of the eleventh month in 1918, states across the globe were celebrating the end of the war to end all wars. However, on the contrary, Germany was on the other end of the spectrum trying to comprehend what happened in the previous four years that led to their current situation. Although World War I ended up as a disaster for the Germans resulting in the Treaty of Versailles, Germany valued their lessons learned which highly influenced their interwar

The Just war theory is and interesting one simply because the phrase just war is an oxymoron. War is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations. Implicit in this definition of war is the result of death and since justice is right action towards other death is the most unjust of things. Thus war is unjust.

The organisation of armies during the period of 1789 – 1945 changed drastically, with the increasing devolvement of power and the introduction of army sections, such as Napoleon’s corps system. These changes were the main factor in the outcome of wars during the period, but only where the organised army had effective command and control in place. Well-organised armies could perform tactics better; more easily carry out strategy and use transport more effectively to gain victory. Of all of these elements, the most important strength of a well-organised army was tactics.

Most military histories skim over the Middle Ages, incorrectly believing it to be a period in which strategy was displaced by a combination of banditry and religious fanaticism. Certainly the sources for medieval strategic thought lack the literary appeal of the classic histories of ancient Greece and Rome. Although Europe’s medieval period may be of special relevance to the 21st century. In the Middle Ages there existed a wide variety of empires to embryonic states to independent cities to monastic orders and more that brought different forms of military power to bear in pursuit of various aims. Unlike the power structures in the 18th and 19th centuries, military organizations, equipment,

The theories of just war pose limits from the ethics, law and policy to avoid arbitrariness in the outburst, to drive and the culmination of armed conflicts, asymmetric and irregular today. They are therefore from current frameworks of thought, resort to dialogue with its own ancient and classical tradition that has not lost validity to many new forms of armed confrontation actors who, like yesterday, are human beings who decide responsibly or not to undertake them and confront them.

Levee en Masse: Levee en masse is a military draft. It was created during the French Revolution. Instead of just demanding abled men to serve in the countries military, the government used nationalism and patriotism. The Levee en masse was a crucial notion in modern warfare and led to increasingly larger armies. It is also one of the first concepts of using nationalism to create a sense of national identity and a want to serve during times of war.

War, in all its forms, is tragic. International law was created to establish some basis of rules to abide by—including war—and states have signed on to such a contract. The actions of states in this ever globalizing world are difficult to be controlled. The source of international law operates through the hands of the United Nations. The enforcement of the law occurs through reciprocity, collective action, and a display of international norms (Goldstein, p. 254). War in fact has been given a justification, though it is arguable whether or not the basis of the idea is correct. Wars can be just under certain conditions.

In closing, it was evident that the west had a dramatic influence on the world and as it still does today. It’s important to note that possessing all the elements of the Western way of war does not guarantee success, it is the application of all the elements along with experience, the government and the will of the people. Army professionals today must understand that the ability of the United States Army ability to win decisively embraces these three fundamental characteristics of the Western way of war to sustain dominance across the full range of military

'Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West' published in 1995, edited by Geoffrey Parker has explained a number of factors that have played a part in the dominance of the western way of war. The western way included in here is more about the dominance of the western culture or the European culture in wars as compared to the other factors that may include technology or finance. Five main foundations according to Parker can define the western way of war. These factors include being superior in military and war based technology, superior military training and discipline, increased reliance on military theory, an increased competition between European states that lead to increased military innovation and lastly, military innovation by adoption of new and better technology (Parker, 2005, p. 67).

Throughout the human history, way of conducting wars, weapons and the model of command and control has been heavily influenced by the way people produced goods and services and by their overall culture. Militaries have used various types of command and control models that, in essence, have been different from each other by their degree of centralization. Until the French Revolution, militaries had been relatively small, conducting battles in relatively small areas that used to last at most few days. Command and control over armies were highly centralized and in essence they were “one man show.” French Revolution and Napoleon’s military genius brought the concept of massive armies and revolution in the way of waging wars. He transformed small static army into ranks filled by men fighting for common cause, respecting each other as fellow citizens and led by new breed of officers. Despite the fact that Napoleon introduced corps, independent armies, staff and new tactics and strategies that included numerical strength, deep strategic penetrations and rapid concentration of forces, his command and control remained highly centralized.

The French Revolution (1789) introduced great social and political changes. In the European warfare it incorporated significant changes; rather than monarch against monarch, war became a fight between nations, namely nationalism. Intense nationalism influenced citizens to accept great personal sacrifice, included military service, for the commitments and objectives of the State. The Napoleonic model, epitomized in the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz, masterly managed the rise of nationalism to succeed in warfare. Perfectly applied the Clausewitz’s trinity: “the first of these three as¬pects [violence] mainly concerns the peo¬ple; the second [chance] the commander and his army; the third [rational purpose] the government.” In the advent of the First World War (WWI), the huge increase of the European industries supposed a vast growth in iron and steel production. Moreover, the technological advances in explosive shells and artillery, the improvements in communications, and the steady professionalization of armies and their leaders posed radical changes to the character of war. Although firepower and technology contribute to the carnage and the calamitous number of fatalities, the nature of the war continued unchanged. The interwar period, military strategists sought to find an approach that would avoid a repetition of the bloody trench stalemate in the First World War. Many of them recognized the potential of armored warfare. J.F.C. Fuller claimed that the tank could