The Ford Pinto Ethical Dilemma

The moral issues about the Ford Pinto is that they take their profit is more important than human life. They also did not inform the consumer about the facts of the Pinto. Lastly, they also lobbied the safety of the car to lowest standard (Shaw, Barry & Sansbury 2009, pp 97-99).

The Ford automobile company began producing the Ford Pinto line up in 1968. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at the time of the pinto production was Lee Iacocca. The reason for the decision to mass produce the pinto in a short amount of time is because American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports. Lee Iacocca wanted his engineers to design and manufacture a compact car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and cost less than 2,000 dollars. Because of this monumental task from Lee Iacocca, that meant the ford pinto automobile would have to be built within 25 months instead of the typical 43 months. There are many safety test that is mandated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration before a vehicle

In August of 1978 three teenage girls were driving a Ford Pinto and were struck from behind. The three girls died because the Ford Pinto’s fuel tank ruptured from the collision and burst into flames. There was a big debate about the safety of the Ford Pinto to its proneness to its fuel tank catching on fire in low-speed rear-end

There are many different cases where people have been critically injured or have died from burn-related injuries from the ruptured the Pino gas tank. This case study specifically discusses the 1978 untimely deaths of Lynn Marie Ulrich, Dana Ulrich, and Judy Ann. Between 1971 and 1978, the Pinto was responsible for a number of fire-related deaths. It was the death of these teenagers that lead brought the controversy of the Ford Pinto’s faulty gas tank placement to a climax resulting in criminal homicide charges for the automaker. Ford’s CEO Henry Ford II and Ford’s new president Lee Iacocca were responsible for the launch of the Ford Pinto. To stay ahead of the growing competition, The Pinto was not to weigh over 2,000 pounds and not costs not to exceed $2,000. Ford officials knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire issue when struck from the rear, but were desperate to expedite the vehicle’s release, the Pintos timing was set just under 25 months. Tooling has already been kicked off, so when crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank, it was too late for any design modifications. The tooling was well underway. Therefore, Ford’s president decided it would be too costly to make changes in the Pinto’s gas tank location pushing ahead with the original design which went unchanged for six years. Any changes to the low-cost Ford Pinto would result in an increased price, thus possibly making it less desirable by small car buyers. Iacocca understood that people shopping for compact cars were watching every dollar, One Ford engineer explained, “the process of elasticity on these subcompacts is extremely tight. You can price yourself right out of the market by adding $25 to the production cost of the model”.

Indubitably, the company wronged the consumers and passengers by violating their rights to not be killed in a car fire and their right to minimal health

Ford executives were under a great deal of pressure to produce a smaller, more gas efficient automobile. Japanese and German automobile sales were rapidly increasing. These competitive forces drove Ford’s executive team to respond by rushing the design process of the Ford Pinto. By 1973, the Pinto was well into production when engineers discovered a flaw in the gas tank, which was located just under the rear bumper. They discovered that if the vehicle suffered a rear-end collision over 20 mph, the gas tank could break and spill gasoline into the passenger compartment, potentially resulting in a fire. The remedy for the flaw was a part that cost $11.00 per vehicle. Executives at Ford knew the company had followed all safety standards and regulations. At that time, automobile safety standards only needed gas tanks to withstand a collision under 20 mph. An internal cost-benefit analysis revealed the costs would be substantially higher to fix the design flaw that the costs associated with any potential damages due to collisions and loss of life. The public remained unaware until Mother Jones journalist, Mark Dowie broke the story in 1977. Fueled by the media, what followed was a frenzy of public outcry and court trials.

The Elkhart County Grand Jury took up the matter and filed a charge of criminal homicide against Ford, the Automobile American Corporation that designed the Pinto car models. According to Elkhart County Grand prosecutor, Michael A. Cosentino, Ford was guilty of reckless homicide, because the company committed a conscious, plain, and unjustifiable neglect of harm that positioned the gas tank in the rear end of the car without proven protection. Besides, Ford engaged in negligence and substantial deviation from the acceptable standards of conduct. The major focus of the case entailed the expanding and assessment of acceptable standards the company violated in the process of manufacture of Pinto cars.

Personal evaluation of this case would take into consideration the fact; one engineer did offer a document indicating and estimate for the cost of value refitting which would prevent the Ford Pinto from bursting into flames should a rear end collision occur. A simple, $1, plastic gadget weighing one pound fitted over the gas tank bolts would have prevented the tank from being punctured. Conclusion was that "it was more economical to let people die and settle the suits afterward" (Newton and Ford, 2008). Put simply, the Ford corporate heads believed no project was worth manufacturing if the cost-benefit indicated a greater cost than the benefit. Further evaluation of the analysis indicated if the

The legal issue is: Should Ford Motor Company be liable for the car accident of it’s Ford Pinto which caused fatal burns to Lilly Gray and permanent burn injuries to Richard Grimshaw? Should Ford Motor Company pay historical punitive damages because of the car defects that the senior management was knowledgeable of before pushing it into the consumer market?

The means were limited design time and reducing costs. By cutting costs, Ford knowingly created a product which could prove dangerous and fatal to its consumers. Does Ford’s ends justify its means? Ford did create a sub-compact that sold extremely well and competed fiercely with foreign imports. The goal of the Ford Pinto was met. The costs of this win were substantial however. The money that Ford tried to save by not recalling the vehicle was spent when Ford recalled the Pinto, and extra was spent in compensatory and punitive damages in lawsuits. So the costs that Ford tried to avoid were incurred anyway along with extra.

In Canada, individual regulating bodies are in place to licence and regulate practitioners in their respective professions. It is in the public’s best interest that these professionals are knowledgeable and driven to progress society in a responsible manner. This includes acting in an ethical manner that aligns with the personal and corporate standards expected of members in a particular profession. The Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) is in place to regulate such behavior among engineers and protect the common interest of the Ontario community. At the end of this paper it will be evident that public welfare is paramount. This will be shown by how it ought to be enforced under the PEO, and how failure of the Ford Pinto was fueled by

I think Pinto case raised some serious issue of abusing human rights and not behaving ethically in the world of business. Any business/service should never ever put a value on human life and not take consideration of a known deadly danger. Ford had an option as well as the solution to design the car in a way that prevented cars from exploding; however they refused to implement it.   They thought that it was cost effective not to fix dangerous condition than to spend the money to save people in spite of the fact that the only added cost was $ 11 per vehicle.

Ford was not in violation of the law in any way and had to make the decision whether to incur a cost to fix the obvious problem internally. There were several options for the fuel system redesign. The option most seriously considered would have cost Ford an additional $11 per vehicle. Under the strict $2000 budget restriction, even this nominal cost seemed large. In addition, Ford had earlier based an advertising campaign on safety, which failed miserably. Therefore, there was a corporate belief, attributed to Lee Iacocca himself, of “safety doesn’t sell”. (2)

There was strong competition for Ford in the American small-car market from Volkswagen and several Japanese companies in the 1960’s. To fight the competition, Ford rushed its newest car the Pinto into production in much less time than is usually required to develop a car. The regular time to produce an automobile is 43 months but Ford took 25 months only (Satchi, L., 2005). Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from exploding, the company chose not to implement the design, which would have cost $11 per car, even though it had done an analysis showing that the new design would result in 180 less deaths. The company defended itself on the grounds that

The CBA itself did not force Ford to act unethically, their greed and their sole priority to avoid extra cost even if it meant the loss of a human life drove them to an unethical decision. Ford faced a simple problem, do they fix the Pinto or do they kill innocent people. Sadly, they preferred the money saving option, which was to ignore the defect and to pay compensates to effected families and loved ones. The company defended their decision using the CBA model as if they were legally exonerated from any penalties due to their actions. Fortunately, the jury did not see it as if their decision was justifiable even if the method to evaluate the decision