The Greatest Asset When Conducting The Operations Process

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, a unit known as the Rakkasans, were conducting Operation Iron Triangle in 2006 in Iraq when soldiers killed eight unarmed Iraqi men. The US military severely reprimanded the Commander of the Rakkasans, COL Michael Steele, for the unethical command climate his leadership allowed to exist within the unit at that time. This unit will need a new commander that can set and maintain an effective, ethical command climate through his leadership. That new commander should resolve the issues that led to the reported war crime in order to establish a culture that perpetuates an ethical command climate.

Lieutenant General (LtGen) Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps, commanded the 1st Marine Division (1 MAR DIV), to include a Brigade and specialized units from the US Army and Iraqi Forces in support of Operation Phantom Fury to gain command and control of Fallujah, Iraq, in November 2004. He described the situation to subordinate units and directed them continuously on the ground while simultaneously assessing the mission accomplished. An excellent execution of mission command and the operations process resulted in the restoration of local government in Fallujah.

The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called

Colonel (Col) Michael Steele’s resolute beliefs regarding how to prepare his unit for combat and his bravado demeanor commanded respect from other bemused military officers. While serving as Commanding Officer (CO), 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Col Steele aggressively cultivated a command climate focused on three core principles: personal protection, precision, and lethality. Although these three core principles narrowly aligned with the Army's "Soldier's Creed", Col Steele’s principles did not reinforce the Army’s individual and organizational core values. 3rd Brigade’s disassociated ethical subculture fostered a toxic environment which compromised both subordinate commanders' and individual soldiers' moral standards to various extents. Col Steele’s vague guidance concerning proper ethical behavior during the execution of high stress Counter-Insurgency (COIN) missions resulted in subordinates failing to conduct kinetic operations in accordance with established Army ethical standards. The military establishment shall remember May 09, 2006 as the day the revered "Rakkasans" failed to personify the unit's motto of "Ne Desit Virtus," meaning "Let Valor Not Fail". For on this day, four soldiers assigned to Charlie Company, known to the “Rakkasans” as the "Kill Company", murdered eight unarmed Iraqi citizens during Operation Iron Triangle. These four soldiers failed to understand the nature and consequences of their iniquities as they could no longer distinguish

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

In taking command of an organization, the commander needs to understand how the entire organization works; the synergistic effect of all its parts. Unlike the staff officer who may focus on the part of a problem relevant to his/her function and the efficiency of his/her section, the commander must have a holistic perception of the issue. The commander’s thinking must now shift more focus to the conceptual level of

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

As Operation Anaconda took shape the command structure became very convoluted. MG Hagenbeck had command and control (C2) of the majority of the U.S. ground force elements, but not all of them. There was a separate chain of command for black Special Operations Forces (SOF) and inter-agency operations. These forces reported directly to CENTCOM, and had different priorities and the authority to request and receive support from a variety of the same assets needed for Operation Anaconda, to include AC 130 gunships. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003)

10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9

Operation Al-Fajr in Arabic, Operation Phantom Fury was the code name given to the second battle of Fallujah, considered the hottest point of conflict of all the military campaign in Iraq. Led by the US Marine Corp against the Iraqi combatants, who had held the city under their control, some consider it was the most difficult battle marines have been involved since Vietnam in the 60s. The battle put end to the insurgent control over the city and constituted an important victory for the US troops, however such victory had a high painful price 1.

Leading from the front is the best way to implement Commander 's intent. According to The Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, “The Commander drives the operations process through Understanding, Visualizing, Describing, Directing, Leading and Assessing the operational environment” Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP 6-0, pg. 1-4) (2012). The Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major both echo the Commanders directives in driving the operational environment. The Command Staff is to provide timely and effective reporting to the Commander providing a more in-depth analysis. As a senior NonCommisioned Officer (NCO) representing the command, the Sergeant Major (SGM) has high regard with Unit command and subordinate unit Soldiers. The SGM has influence in the Command Staff to drive and verifying timeliness of staff reporting. I will support Mission Command using my influence as a Sergeant Major in planning, problem-solving, assessing, motivating, and echoing the commander’s intent throughout the command.

In any mission, the Commander is the most imperative participant. He or she guides the mission to the intended outcome. It is through the commander’s activities that the directed outcome is achieved. Through successful understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing the commanders of Soldiers are able to accomplish the directed mission and thus winning wars. Throughout the role of commander in the Battle of Hamburger Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt attempted the complete these commander’s activities. (ADRP 5-0) The successes and failures of mission command he had, will be explained, giving a better understanding of the Battle of Hamburger Hill and the pivotal turning point in the Vietnam war.

509th commander, Col. Paul W. Tibbets Jr. choose Maj. Charles W. Sweeney, commander of the 393rd Bomb Squadron to command the mission

Lieutenant General James Conway, Commander of the First Expeditionary Force (MEF), was ordered to withdrawal his Marines from Fallujah and leave the city to the insurgents1.